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Preface
This report summarizes the Ranger TV Subsystem program. This work
was performed by the Radio Corporation of America, under JPL Contract
No. 950137, for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute
of Technology, Pasadena, California. The period covered by this, the
Final Report onthe program, extends from July, 1961 through July, 1965.
The report is submitted in five volumes:
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Volume 4
Volume 5
Summary
Subsystem Analysis
TV Subsystem Design
Manufacturing, Product Assurance, and Test
Evaluation
This volume, Volume 4, is divided into two parts. Part a contains:
• A description of the special manufacturing techniques employed on
the Ranger TV Subsystem project,
• A description of the reliability methods employed on the Ranger TV
Subsystem project,
• A description of the Quality Control methods employed on the Ranger
TV Subsystem project, and
• A history of the Ranger TV Subsystem test program.
Part b of this volume contains the appendices to part a.
iii
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iSection I
Manufacturing Engineering
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Ranger Requirements
The Ranger program imposed new and greater
responsibilities on the engineering support
facilities. To achieve the Ranger mission ob-
jectives, a new concept of reliability in manu-
facture (surpassing that of preceding space
programs} was required. Stringent require-
ments had been placed on the selection and
qualification of electronic components. More
explicit delineation and control of processes
was required. Precautionary measures were
needed to insure that materials and processes
of manufacture would not degrade the built-
in reliability of qualified materials and com-
ponents.
2. Existing RCA Capability
In meeting these high reliability requirements
and the stringent Ranger schedule, RCA was
able to apply its experience in space technology
gained on Score, Echo, TIROS, Relay, and
similar programs. Thus, a great many of
the required Ranger techniques were already
in existence, having been proved by testing
and by successful space flight.
Existing production equipment and facilities
were broadly arrayed in support of engi-
neering requirements for models, prototypes,
and short-run flight programs rather than
high-production runs. The machining and
metal-working equipment was of excellent
precision quality, and the operators were
qualified as expert mechanics and toolmakers.
Proficient personnel were available for turn-
ing, boring, milling, drilling, and welding of
aluminum, stainless steels, carbon steels, and
magnesium. Forming, bending, and blanking
of sheet materials were confined to the lighter
gauges.
Printed-circuit facilities had been established
to provide a quick-reaction, short-order capa-
bility for producing high-quality printed-
circuit boards. The equipment and techniques
used were those acceptable for highly reliable
military and commercial production.
Conformal coating, bonding, and potting capa-
bility was established as an engineering rather
than a production operation. Essentially all
applied materials were compounded, applied,
and tested as part of a development orproduct
qualification program.
3. New Manufacturing-Engineering Programs
The intensified requirements for additional
reliability of manufacture prompted the im-
plementation of manufacturing-engineering
programs for exacting control of manufacturing
and testing of products. Detailed manufacturing
and testing procedures were developed for pro-
duction operations. The recording and docu-
mentation of manufacturing and test results
were established and maintained to ensure the
identification and traceability of material and
processes at all times. The development of new
processes and techniques was keyed to the need
for reliable and safe joining of high-reliability
components without degrading component per-
formance or life. These efforts led to the
increased use of high-reliability transistors
and diodes, the development of new soldering
and welding techniques, and the employment
of high-quality weldments and castings,
machined to precision requirements.
The significantaspectsof manufacturingand
testing arediscussedhereinin relation to the
higher reliability and improved uniformity
whichtheyproducedontheRangerprogram.
B. FABRICATION TECHNIQUES
1. Fabrication of Camera-Shutter Solenoid Coil
To obtain a solenoid plunger with low mass,
the coil was made the moving element of the
camera-shutter solenoid and rode on the mag-
netic core which was stationary. The unique
construction of the coil necessitated the de-
velopment of a special coil-forming machine
and a process to implement the design. A
cutaway view of the Camera Shutter Assembly
is shown in Figure 1.
The body of the coil was formed from epoxy-
impregnated glass-cloth tape. In fabricating
the coil, the glass-cloth tape was passed
through an epoxy bath and wound onto a steel-
mandrel. The epoxy-glass tube thus formed
was placed in an oven to cure the epoxy.
After curing, the tube was machined, and
magnet wire, passing through an epoxy bath,
was wound onto the tube. This operation was
followed by winding another layer of epoxy-
impregnated glass cloth onto the coil. The
new layer was then cured and machined, after
which the steel mandrel was pressed from
the coil.
The major problem in manufacturing the shut-
ter solenoid coil was the prevention of air
entrapment. Air trapped in the epoxy or be-
tween the glass tape layers would cause
bubbles in the epoxy-glass material when the
coil was exposed to a vacuum environment.
These bubbles would deform the coil suffi-
ciently to cause binding between the moving
coil and the magnetic core, since the clearance
between the two was only 0.0005 of an inch.
The problem was overcome by directing a
jet of hot air onto the epoxy-impregnated
glass cloth during winding to prevent harden-
ing of the epoxy before all entrapped air
was forced out by the pressure of the winding.
Another problem was encountered in main-
taining the very smooth finish in the bore
of the coil when removing it from the steel
mandrel. Various mold-release agents were
investigated for coating the mandrel prior to
forming the coil. These included polishingwax
and teflon coating which did not give the de-
sired results. Ultimately, the problem was
solved by the use of a high-temperature
silicone grease.
2. Fluorescent Coating for Electrical Conductors
A unique insulating material was developed for
the conformal coating of exposed terminals
and conductors. The material is a thixotropic
polyurethane resin which contains a trace of
fluorescent material. When exposed to ultra-
violet radiation, the material fluoresces so that
pinholes or uncoated areas are readily dis-
closed. Coated areas with a film thickness
of less than 5 mils do not react to the ultraviolet
light and are, therefore, easily detected.
Processes were developed for the preparation,
storage, application and curing of the coating
material. The material was applied on all TV
Subsystem subassemblies, and each subas-
sembly was rigorously inspected under the
ultraviolet light to ensure complete encap-
sulation of the conductors. The use of this
material and inspection technique has become
the standard on all company programs.
3. Energy-Damping Materials
A number of cured urethane resin compounds
were developed for use as energy-damping
materials. These materials were employed
in the fabrication of isolators which were
used to eliminate or minimize microphonies
induced by the operation of the camera shut-
ters. The materials exhibited high energy-
absorption characteristics, good tear strength,
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and low outgassing in a thermal-vacuum
environment.
C. ASSEMBLY TECHNIQUES
Assembly methods and soldering techniques
in use at the start of the Ranger program con-
formed to high-reliability military production
standards. Nevertheless, the superior re-
liability required for a successful Ranger Mis-
sion engendered a program of continuing
improvement of assembly techniques.
1. Soldering of Coaxial Cables
Improved methods were developed for solder-
ing connectors on RF coaxial cables. These
methods included ultrasonic cleaning of con-
nectors just prior to soldering, pull tests,
and x-ray of connector center-pins to insure
that at least 95 percent of the center-pin
cavity was filled with solder. These techniques
have been adopted as standard production
practice.
2. Cable-Lacing
"Tack-Stitch", a new unique method for lacing
cables, was developed during the Ranger pro-
gram. The standard method is to lace the
harness wire into a circular bundle. With the
new lacing method, the harness wiring can
be formed into an oval or a fiat shape for
passing through decks and making tight bends.
The flatter harness configuration can also
be utilized within assemblies to permit smaller
overall dimensions of the completed unit. This
technique was particularly advantageous in the
TV Subsystem because of the close struc-
tural tolerances and compact design. More-
over, the "Tack-Stitch" is a more secure
and faster method of lacing. It is now the
company standard for all spacecraft and space-
craft assemblies.
3. Conformal Coating
Conformal coating of circuits was utilized,
instead of potting techniques, to allow non-
destructive rework and modifications. Methods
were developed to remove conformal coat-
ings from assemblies during repair or modi-
components. Special spatulas were designed
for this task.
4. Low-Temperature Soldering
Specially shaped soldering irons with con-
trolled heat were developed for removal and
installation of components. Experimental work
was done to evaluate the amount of heat
which could be tolerated on printed circuits.
It was found that a low-temperature solder-
ing iron, applied for a relatively long period
of time, would not damage the circuit boards;
whereas, a high-temperature iron would tend
to cause damage even when applied for a
short interval of time. Consequently, special
low-temperature soldering irons were
obtained.
5. Assembly Fixtures
Various holding fixtures were employed to
expedite assembly and to protect the equip-
ment during handling. These fixtures were
generally attached to the assembly, and, for
maximum protection, were not removed un-
til the assembly was integrated with the TV
Subsystem.
A set of special fixtures was developed to
facilitate assembly of the Camera Shutter
Assemblies. The fixtures are shown in Figure
2. The large fixture in Figure 2 was used
to hold the camera shutter during assembly.
The magnetic core guide was used to align
the magnetic core to ensure proper clearance
for the solenoid coil which was the moving
element of the solenoid. The coil positioner
was used to hold the solenoid coil in the
proper position within the solenoid housing
during soldering of the contact strips to the
coil. The contact-strip fixtures were used
4
Figure 2. Set of Special Fixtures Developed to Facilitate Manufacture of Camera-Shutter Assemblies 
5 
to hold the contact strips in proper align-
ment for soldering. These fixtures also
served as heat sinks during soldering. The
guide-alignment fixture was used to align
the shutter guides and to set the distance
between them. The detent guide was used
to align the detent springs with the shutter-
blade detents.
6. Assembly Status Board
Because of the urgency of the program, a
special material- routing plan was implemented
and maintained. Every assembly in the TV
Subsystem was listed on a tally board. A
complete minute-by-minute status could be
obtained from the tally board, including loca-
tion of the assembly, the specific operation
being performed on it, and the next step in
assembly. Material coordinators assigned to
the program maintained a smooth flow of
material f 'ore one operation to the next. By
reference to the tally board, the material
coordinators could determine what units re-
quired expediting and could then establish
operational priorities.
7. Look-Alike Assembly
Photographs of the assemblies were used as
a reference to ensure uniformityofwire dress,
component placement, and conformal coating.
This "look-alike" technique was not a con-
tractual requirement, but was employed to
ensure identical operation of all assemblies
of the same type. It also simplified the de-
tection of any irregularity which may have
occurred in an assembly. An 8x10 inch color
photograph was made of the first unit as-
sembled. The photograph served as a guide
for the assembly of subsequent units. This
technique has become a standard company
practice and photographs, now a part of all
documented manufacturing procedures, are
the primary medium for conveying informa-
tion to the manufacturing operators.
8. Harness Assembly Board
The first harness for the PTM was fabricated
on a plastic structure. In order to comply
with the JPL specification that all Cannon
Golden "D" and Bendix "pygmy" connectors
be potted, a potting procedure was devised
by materials engineering. The potting was
specified to be performed with the connectors
mated, in order to assure proper pin align-
ment. The potting was used to provide both
strain relief and protection for the solder
connections. It was necessary to mount the
harness on a special board to allow the con-
nectors to lie in the proper position for pot-
ting. The PTM harness which was formed
and fabricated on the plastic structure could
not be laid on a fiat potting board without
experiencing considerable deformation. It was
decided to fabricate future harnesses on a
fiat board rather than a mock-up structure
to avoid this deformation.
Manufacturing engineering, in cooperation with
,design engineering, developed a board which
permitted the fabrication of the harness to
the contour of the TV Subsystem structure.
D. TEST PROGRAM
The manufacturing test program in effect at
the start of the Ranger project was designed
to allow uniform testing by the use of stand-
ard techniques and equipment, and to relieve
engineering personnel of repetitive testing.
The severe reliability requirements of the
Ranger program necessitated a sharp increase
in the complexity and multiplicity of tests.
Individual manufacturing test procedures were
prepared for all assemblies of the TV Sub-
system and for the TV Subsystem itself. These
procedures were designed to uncover faults
in workmanship and components, and to re-
veal possible design problems. Special test
equipment was developed to implement the
procedures. The equipment c o n s i s t e d of
component-level test sets, equipment-group
test sets, and a TV-Subsystem-integration test
VOLUME 4a SECTION I
set. The special equipment andprocedures are
described in the following paragraphs.
1. Six-Camera Bench Test
A six-camera bench test was developed to
test the six TV cameras simultaneously. The
purpose of the test was to eliminate camera
interface faults and to optimize operation of
the cameras prior to integration with the TV
Subsystem.
The six-camera bench-test equipment simu-
lated the TV Subsystem electrical and mounting
interface for the cameras. It was a self-
contained test set which included all required
power, synchronizing signals, control circuits,
and measurement facilities. The only external
requirements were a ll5-volt, 60-cps source
and optical collimators.
2. Camera-Group Test Rack
A Camera-Group test rack was developed
specifically for the troubleshooting and align-
ment of the TV Subsystem Cameras, Camera
Electronics, Video Combiners, Camera Se-
quencers and Shutter Assemblies. The unit was
mobile to permit easy transport to the environ-
mental-test area and to permit its use as
support equipment at the launch site.
The test rack included provisions for a func-
tional check of the individual circuit boards
of the flight-model Camera Electronics As-
semblies. A system of cabling permitted any
circuit board in the test-rack Camera Elec-
tronics to be substituted for a flight-model
circuit board of the same type. Actual operat-
ing conditions were simulated to provide
meaningful test results.
The test rack incorporated protective circuitry
to safeguard TV Subsystem components under
test. A vidicon protective circuit constantly
monitored the deflection and filament voltages
of the vidicon. In the event of failure of one or
both of these voltages, the high accelerating
potential applied to the vidieon would be inter-
rupted immediately. Appropriate lamps on the
test-rack control panel visually indicated the
operational status of the vidicon. All input
power lines were filtered and fused to pro-
tect components under test from external
transients and overloading.
3. Moment-of-Inertia and Center-of-Gravity
Measurements
Special equipment and procedures were de-
veloped to measure the moment-of-inertia
and center-of-gravity of the TV Subsystem.
The test rig was essentially a bifllar pendu-
lum from which the TV Subsystem was hung.
A collimated light source and a photoelectric
cell connected to an electronic counter were
used in conjunction with a mirror attached to
the test rig to determine the period of oscil-
lation. A test bar with a known moment-of-
inertia was used to check the accuracy of the
test setup. The test rig with the test bar at-
tached is shown in Figure 3. The test setup
for measurement of the TV Subsystem moment-
of-inertia about the z-axis is shown in Figure
4. The setup for measurement of moments-of-
inertia about the x- and y-axes is shown in
Figure 5.
A protective cage was designed to safeguard
the TV Subsystem during setup of moment-
of-inertia tests. This case facilitated the ma-
nipulation of the TV Subsystem to any position
without imposing any undue stress on the
shroud or structure. The protective cage, con-
taining the TV Subsystem in the inverted posi-
tion, is shown in Figure 6.
4. Connector-Pin Retention
A pull-test was developed to determine if the
individual female terminals were exerting a
sufficient gripping force on the connector pins.
A method was also developed for repairing the
female terminals without removing the con-
nector or disconnecting the wiring. In this
method, a hardened copper sleeve was in-
stalled over the female terminal to restore
8 
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Figure 4. lest Setup for Measurement of Moment-of-Inertia about the Z-Axis 
9 
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Figure 6. TV Subsystem in Inverted Position in the Protective Cage 
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the proper tension. A kit of special tools was
developed to form the sleeves and to insert
them in the connectors. A container of methyl-
ethyl-ketone and an applicator brush were
included for cleaning the connectors. The kit
is shown in Figure 7. The tool used to form
the sleeves from flat stock is shown in Fig-
ure 8. Insertion of the sleeve into a female
connector is shown in Figure 9. The pin-re-
tention test and the repair technique have be-
come a standard procedure on all company
programs.
E. SPECIAL HANDLING PROCEDURES
Comprehensive procedures were developed for
handling material for the Ranger program from
the receipt of individual parts to the shipment
of the completed TV Subsystem. The primary
aims of these procedures were to ensure clean-
liness of the equipment and safeguard it from
damage.
1. Material Identification and Storage
A color-coding system was used to identify the
date on which each itemwas received. The rule
was to process parts on the day of arrival.
Any parts left over were processed first on
the following day. Parts were routed from the
receiving room to Purchased Material Inspec-
tion Quality Control and then to the Controlled
Stores Room. Here the parts were packaged
in clear plastic zipper bags or plastic boxes
and placed in drawers. The Quality-Control
approval ticket and an item-control serial
number were kept with the stored material to
permit tracing of the items to a particular
shipment. A section of the Controlled Stores
drawers displaying the packaged items and
their control-numbered tags is shown in
Figure 10.
Kits were prepared, as needed, from the parts
stored in the Controlled Stores Room. All parts
used in a particular assembly were placed in
white Royalite tote boxes with clear plastic lids
(Figure 11). Parts-traceability identification
and kit identification were included in the boxes.
Also stored in the boxes were a flow chart, an
outline of the manufacturing procedures, and a
logbook. As each step of assembly or cleaning
was performed, it was entered in the logbook.
2. Assembly and Transport Dollies
A special dolly (Figure 12) was used in the
fabrication of the TV Subsystem wiring harness
described in subsection C8. The harness board
could be tilted to any angle by a simple adjust-
ment of the dolly to permit easy access to any
part of the harness.
Specially designed carrying cases were usedto
transport the TV Subsystem wiring harnesses
into and out of eonformal coating, testing, and
other operations.
A pivoting dolly (Figure 13) was developed to
meet the transportation and handling require-
ments of the TV Subsystem.
The dolly served as an in-plant transportation
device for the TV Subsystem and as a functional
work fixture during assembly. It had provisions
for positioning the Subsystem at various angles
to facilitate assembly operations and the re-
placement of the batteries at the bottom.
An optical alignment dolly (Figure 14) was also
developed. It was primarily a precision fixture
for aligning the TV Subsystem cameras with an
optical target during testing. It was also used
to transport the TV Subsystem to other test
locations.
3. Shipping Container
A reusable shipping container was developed
for transporting the completed TV Subsystem
to Jet Propulsion Laboratory for integration
with the Ranger Spacecraft. The container
was designed to control shock and vibration
that would otherwise be transmitted to the TV
Subsystem during shipment. The internal at-
mosphere could be controlled by pressurizing
the container with an inert gas.
12
Figure 7. Female-Connector Repair Kit 
13 
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Figure 9. Installing Sleeve on  Female Terminal 
15  
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Figure 11. Tote Box for Transporting Parts 
1 7  
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Figure 13. Pivoting Dolly for TV Subsystem 
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Section II
Reliability
The reliability program for the Ranger TV
Subsystem was implemented in accordance
with the Ranger Product Assurance Plan of
February 15, 1962. This section describes
the program established by that plan and its
effects on the Ranger missions which followed.
Six principal program tasks are considered:
(i) reliability requirements study; (2) reli-
ability analysis and prediction; (3) parts se-
lection, evaluation, and control; (4) design
reviews; (5) failure reporting and analysis;
and (6) demonstration testing. To the extent
applicable, each is treated in reference to the
changing requirements of the initial system,
the split-system, and the post-Ranger VI TV
Subsystem.
A. RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
The first task of the reliability program was
a requirements study of the initial system to
determine the necessary reliabilitylevel. This
study included preparation of the mission pro-
file, development of a mathematical model,
determination of redundancy requirements,
and definition of mission successes. This study
was updated as necessary for the split-system
and the post-Ranger VI TV Subsystem.
1. Mission Profile
The mission profile of TV Subsystem operation
is outlined in Table 1. The mission profile
summarizes the events of a mission to the
Moon to obtain high-resolution TV pictures and
to transmit them back to Earth. Equipment
operation is compared for each of the three
Subsystem configurations.
a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
In the initial configuration, the operational
period of the TV Subsystem was limited to
the cruise and the terminal modes. Duringthe
cruise mode, the 15-point telemetry and the
battery heaters were the only units of the TV
Subsystem that were to operate. The terminal
mode consisted of a Turn On command, which
placed the Cameras, Sequencer, and Transmit-
ters in the operational mode. The Sequencer
was scheduled to time out a five-minute warm-
up delay and then switch the Transmitters to
full-power. Bgth F- and P-Camera video data
were to be transmitted for the next eight min-
utes. After the elapse of this eight-minute per-
iod, the F-Camera video was to be switched
from the Transmitter, and in the final minutes
of the mission, P-video data was scheduled to
be transmitted over both output Transmitters.
b. SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
In the split-system configuration, portions of
newly added equipment were made operable
during the cruise mode. These consisted of
(1) the Electronic Clock, (2) the Power Control
Unit, and (3) portions of the Distribution Con-
trol 15nit. The two video channels operated in-
dependently of each other. Switchover from
F-video to P-video during the last minute of
operation was deleted.
c. POST RA-6 CONFIGURATION
In the post RA-6 configuration, TV Subsystem
equipment operation was modified to permit
transmission of telemetry data continuously
from end of countdown (T) minus 15 minutes
until impact (I). TMs included activation at
T-15 of the LCVR, Temperature Sensor, 15-
point commutator, Telemetry Power Supply,
3-kc VCO, and parts of the Command Control
Unit. At injection, the Electronic Clock and
part of the Distribution Control Unit were acti-
vated as in the split-system configuration.
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d. SUBASSEMBLY QUALIFICATION
Using the mission profiles as the basis of re-
quired equipment operation, anticipated envi-
ronmental conditions were determined. The
environmental conditions, used in qualification
testing, are tabulated in Table 2. To ensure
proper performance of the TV Subsystem, qual-
ification environmental requirements were
made more severe than those anticipated during
the actual launch, parking orbit, cruise, and
terminal mode.
2. Mathematical Models
The second phase of the reliability require-
ments study was the development of the re-
liability mathematical model.
A complete reliability mathematical model
provides the probability of operation for each
assumed a priori condition (system state).
By use of system-state probabilities, the prob-
ability for attaining a specific degree of mission
success can be computed.
Three separate mathematical models were
prepared: (1) a model for the initial Subsystem
configuration, prepared early in the program;
(2) a revised model for the initial Subsystem
configuration prepared in conjunction with a
model for the split-system configuration; and
(3) a model for the split-system configuration.
Post-RA-6 configuration changes did not war-
rant the preparation of additional mathematical
models.
a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION MODEL
• 90-point telemetry; and
• 15-point telemetry.
(2) Approach
The mathematical model was based on the re-
liability function block diagram shown in Figure
15. Initially, two profiles were used: Profile
I, a 15-minute mission; and Profile II, a 40-
minute mission consisting of a 15-minute mis-
sion plus five 5-minute prelaunch turn-ons.
C ruis e-mode telemetry was considered opera-
tional upon turn-on at launch plus 16 hours; it
was further assumed, that in the worst case,
the overall mission could extend to 64 hours
(including a one-hour terminal phase) requiring
the telemetry to remain on for a possible 47-
hour period before initiation of TV turn-on.
Probability of success (Ps) symbols were de-
fined for each unit treated. Table 3 lists these
symbols to the component level. Subscripts are
used to denote the unit or function (For example,
PA represents the probability of success of F-
Camera A and its camera electronics). These
probabilities are based on the exponential dis-
tribution.
Ps = e"At = 1-Q
where
= failures per hour;
t = mission time in hours; and
0 = probability of failure.
(1) Scope
Four major items were considered in the initial
model:
• F-Cameras, A and B plus transmission;
• P-Cameras, Pl, P2, P3 and P4 plus
transmission;
(3) F-Cameras, A and B, plus Transmission Probabilities
The F Cameras, A and B, and Camera Elec-
tronics were considered redundant. The F-
Channel consisted of the Sequencer, Video
Combiner, Transmitter, Power Amplifier, RF
power output combiner, command and control
23
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TABLE 3
PROBABILITIES-OF-SUCCESS SYMBOLS OF COMPONENTS
Equipment Symbol Used
TV Cameras and Electronics:
Camera A (including color)
Camera B
VMANos. 1, 2, or 3
Camera 1, Free Running Sync.
Camera 1, 2, 3, or 4
Time Code Generator
1 Minute-to-go Switch
Test and Control Function:
Test Mode Switch
Command Switch and Drive Amp.
Prime Power Source:
Regulator and Batteries
Ccmmunications:
Transmitter 1 (or Transmitter 2)
Power Amplifier 1 (or Power Amplifier 2)
Transmitters 1 and 2, Associated Telemetry:
90-Point Commutator
225-kc VCO Nos. 1 or 2
Cruise Mode Telemetry
RF Combiner
Normal Emergency Switch
Control Programmer & Sequencer:
18-kc Oscillators and "OR" Gate
Camera A, B, Sequencer and P/S
Camera 1, 2, 3, 4 Sequencer and P/S
Counter Circuits
Pe
P
m
P.
orP,
P
P
P
q
P,
%
P
t
%
%
P.
P
g
P
O
P,
P.
!
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functions, and the prime power source. Prob-
ability of success of the complete F-Channel
as shown in Figure 16 was denoted by the Sym-
bol Px"
The combined probabilities of success of the F
Cameras, camera electronics, and transmis-
sion P× were thus stated as:
PAPx = Probability Camera A will
transmit video
PsPx = Probability Camera B will
transmit video
PAPsP× = Probability Cameras A and B
will transmit video
(PA + Ps - PA Ps ) P× = Probability at least one
F-Camera will transmit
video*
(4) P-Cameras P], P2, P3, and P4 Plus Transmission
Probability
(a) GENERAL
The four P Cameras were considered to be re-
dundant and to consist of the equipment illus-
trated in Figure 17. From Table 3 it is seen
that cameras 1, 2, 3, and 4 were denoted by the
symbols P7 , P2, P3, and P4 respectively.
The mathematical model for these four P-
Cameras utilized the probability theory con-
cept of "subsets of a set", that is N items
taken k at a time, written (N).** These
quantities are called binomial coefficients be-
cause of the role they play in the binomial
*The expression (PA + PS- PAPs ) was derived from the
equation:
P,o,ol = I - (1 - PA )(1 - Ps)
which governs redundant components.
• . II
**"Modern Probability Theory and Its Apphcatlons
E. Parzen.
theorem,
numbers P and
N •
which states that for any two real
O and any positive integer
N
k=O
In this case a set N of 4items, where k had
values varying from 0 to 4 was used. These
values substituted in the binomial expression
and expanded produced the following proba-
bility equation:
(p + 0) 4= p4 + 4p3Q + 6p2 Q2+ 4PO3+ O4
This equation is interpreted as follows"
p4= Probability that all 4 cameras
work; this can occur in 1 way.
4P 3 Q = Probability that only3 cameras
work; this can occur in 4_ ways.
5p2 Q2 = Probability that only2 cameras
work; this can occur in 6 ways.
4PQ 3 = Probability that only i camera
works; this can occur in 4_ways.
Q4 = Probability that no cameras work;
this can occur in 1 way.
(b) P-CAMERA PROBABILITY PRIOR TO
LAST MINUTE
All elements of the P-Channel prior to the
last minute were denoted by P :
Pw = P Ph P/ ProP P_ PP P P,
(see Figure 18)
Thus, the following expressions depicted the
reliability of the P cameras prior to the last
minute.
p4 % Probability that
at least 4 P
Cameras will
transmit.
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(p4+ 4p3Q) p =
(p4 + 4_ Q + 6P 2 Q 2) p
(p4 + 4p3Q + 6p2 Q 2
+ 4PQ 3) P =
Probability that
at least 3 P
Cameras will
transmit.
Probability that
at least 2 P
Cameras will
transmit.
Probability that
at least 1 P
Camera will
transmit.
(c) P-CAMERA PROBABILITY FOR LAST
MINUTE
In the last-minute of operation, the F-video
transmitter was switched to provide a redun-
dant transmitting facility for the P Cameras.
(See Figure 19).
Pz and Py were used to define the redundant
links of the transmitting channels. PR was
the probability of redundant transmitters i and
2.
P =_P), b
PR : 1-(1-P )(l-P)
P,, was the overall transmission capability for
P-last-minute video using redundant trans-
mitters.
Thus, the possible probabilities of receiving
P video during the last minute were as fol-
lows:
p 4 p Probability of at
least 4 P Cam-
e r a s transmit-
ting.
(p4 + 4p3) P_ =
(p4 + 4p3 Q + 6p2 Q2) P=
(p 4+ 4p3 Q + 6p2 Q2
+ 4PQ) Pv =
Probability of at
least 3 P Cam-
e r a s transmit-
ting.
Probability of at
least 2 P Cam-
e r a s transmit-
ting.
Probability of at
least 1 P Cam-
era transmit-
ting.
(d) P-CAMERA PROBABILITY IN FREE-
RUN MODE
The final aspect of P-Cameras operation con-
sidered was the free-run mode of operation of
the Pl Camera and its camera electronics
should a failure occur in the camera sequencer.
Both the probability of entering this mode and
the probability of success were examined.
The probability of entering the free-run mode
was clearly the probability of failure in the
loop, _ _ Pj. (See Figure 18). If the proba-
bility of success of this loop were defined as
PN = _ Ph _, Then the probability of failure
would be:
QNffiT-% = 7-(%P, Pj)
This was the probability of entering this mode
of operation. Once in this mode, there was
a probability, for the time period prior to the
last minute, for video transmission of Pl, as
follows:
P, = P,e. e. P,P,
If the failure in the sequencer which resulted
in the P1 Camera free-run mode of operation
also disabled the 13-minute timer, there would
not be a switchover and the previous equation
would define the probability of successful Pl
video transmission up to impact.
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If the sequencer failure did not affect the 13-
minute counter, then switch over would occur
and result in Pl video transmission over re-
dundant transmission channels for the last
minute of operation. This probability of suc-
cess was defined as follows:
P, = P,P.PR% P,
(5) 90-Point Telemetry Probability
The 90-point telemetry equipment is shown in
Figure 20. In its normal mode, PT and PT
• 1 2
were used as redundant transmatters fed from
separate Voltage Controlled Oscillators (VCO).
A single 90-point commutator supplied the input
for the VCO (See Figure 21). The probability
of success was defined by:
P,-, =P,-,
which for redundant transmission was stated as
follows:
PTR = 1 -- (1 -- PTz) (1 - PT2 )
= 1-(1-PT7)2
The complete 90-point telemetry transmission
was given as follows:
P, = 5 P,-R%P, P,
In the emergency mode, the VCO was deleted
from the circuit and the Pe term dropped from
the P T 7 and P r 2 equations.
(6) 15-Point Telemetry Probability
The last item considered was the 15-point
commutator and its associated telemetry. This
telemetry was for the cruise mode which went
into operation 16 hours after launch• The
cruise-mode telemetry operation (See Figure
22) was defined as:
PcM r = P{ P,
b INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION REVISED
MODEL
At the time of generation of the mathematical
model for the sl_lit-system configuration, a
revised model for the initial Subsystem con-
figuration was prepared to permit comparison
of the two Subsystems. This revised model is
presented here; the split-system follows in
paragraph c.
The functional diagram of the initial Subsystem
configuration (Figure 23) was used as the basis
of the revised model. Of a total of 60 possible
Subsystem states, 15 are described in detail in
the following paragraphs. These 15 states rep-
resent the possible failure-success combina-
tion of the four P Cameras andtwo F Cameras,
and assume no loss of telemetry. The remain-
ing 45 states were not considered in detail
because they are essentially identical to the
original 15 states and differ from these states
only as a function of the success-failure com-
binations of the two telemetry systems. As
depicted in Figure 24, State (1) is the condition
of complete data return; that is the condition
in which both F cameras, the four P cameras,
and the 15-point and 90-point telemetry sys-
tems remain operative throughout the entire
mission. Mathematically, State {1) can be ex-
pressed as follows:
State(I)= Probability of complete success (i.e,
probability of having 2 F cameras, 4P
cameras, and both telemetry systems
operating satisfactorily)
= (*OBattery"P4P • P2F • PHigh ....... t
pack cameras cameras voltage regulator
• PP video • PF video • PC ..... d e PHybrid
combiner combiner switch
• PDumrny • PL......... t • P1s-point T/M
load voltage regulator and VCO
• Pgo.point T/M • PFt ..... liter • PPt ..... liter
and VCO chain chain
• Pcontrol programmer, Isequencer and power supply
39
LL Q.Z
_h _
d o. i
w
i • o-°
_._ x_
¢_" I,- "_. I
w_O
_ollg
N
3_d
0_: _"
d
Z
I--
1- X_ a"o
Z
--t-
0
o_
@
o
0
E
p.
E
E
0
U
°_
0
O.
6
e-
°_
m
e-
P
E
o_
O"
w
E
0
0
.m
4O
VOLUME 4a SECTION II
z
<
0.
_I _ I
X _ I O?
---7---
_.; x_
212
>-
w 00
i u
i zo --
I_ >="
-F [
_et z
oi--_
_ i1: ),- i
u-_ N w .J
-F
>-
jo
_,z z
z_ tn
_>_ ___L
-t--
_ 0 D
_ w z
0 h- LU _- O: _ 0<_ 0 --
N Z I-" O
04 _j _ Z _0_ _ _ J _ O.
--'r W Z J U_ Z
0 z i I 0 0 Z _ _ _
I,- Led b'; t,_.l Ld
_o _- _ Z - J 0
(.5 bJ 00_ bJ ,_ <[ ,d[ _tLZ
z _ _-=e- r _ _ • o,<
ow '5 t_ _n z_-
W ,_ CI_UJtL. r,,, k- O'r _ L_l,k
0:: 0'_0 [i. "_ 01-- _-- Or.dO
Z
h
b.
,?,
J_
_ D:: u'_ I
o o g
L c
1
_,
_ w
mQ
J II1 Ld I
Z O
F_z
z _
i.- -1 Q
z q
zO >-
_ z
wz _J
T
o_-
z
9
O
t,-
O
I--
Z
C
oi
u
L"
@
E
°m
INPUTS FROM 1
TELEMETERED _' -,--I,
Pal NTS .,_
[_1 L15 CHANNEL MODE PRIMEAC JPL/RC A
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Figure 22. Diagram of Reliability Mathematical Model of Cruise-Mode Telemetry Operation
States (2), (3), and (4)areessentiallythe same
as State (1) and differ only as a function of the
number of P cameras that remain in operation.
State (5) is also essentially the same as State
(1). However, it is assumed that there are no
;)-camera returns. The probability equation
for State (5)* must be expanded as follows:
State (5) = Exact probability of having 2 F cameras,
0 P cameras, 1S-point T/M, and 90-point
T/M operating satisfactorily
: Same as State (1), except P4 P ...... is
replaced by
{[(_P..... ,.% ._. -_ ...... 4)camera 2 P camera 3
% (PA)]
÷[(e_...... ,.PP...... 2. %...... 2-eP...... 4)
 coo, + coo,.o,
Programmer Programmer J
seq. & P.S. seq. & P.S./
!
where:
PA =F(Pcontro/ • PP Video e PPT ..... itter%
I_ Programmer combi.e, channel I
L\ seq. & P,S. /
• F = (] - P)
'Pcontrol II Pp Video • Pp Transmitter I
Programmer Combiner Channel
seq. & P,S.
Control • "PP Video • PP Transmitter IProgrammer Combiner Channel
seq. & P.5.
Cco. .....Programmer Combiner Channel
seq. & P.S.
hanne • "PP Video • PP Transmitter
Programmer Combiner Channel
seq. & P.S.
Cpsontrol • PP Video • -'PP Transmitter Irogrammer Combiner Channel
eq. & P.S.
+
Pcontrol • PP Video • prop T ..... itter IProgrammer Combiner Channel
seq. & P.S.
+(P-'Control • -Pvideo " "PP T ..... itter ll
Programmer Combiner Channel
1_ seq. & P.S.
P."[(P%video"PPT..... itter1+(PPVide.
L\ Combiner Chain I \ Combiner
• PPTchain..... itter_', ,(P%combinerVide° • _Pch:::nsmitte)]
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PC:[(PP ...... 2 " PP ...... 3 " PP ...... 4)
+(PP...... 2 • PP..... , • PP...... ,)
+(PP...... , .PP...... , ._P...... 4)
...... 2 ° PP ...... S •PP ...... 4)
camera 2 • mP camera 3 • mp camera 4)
+(Pp ° R l Pp ]
...... , ...... 4 ...... 4)/
Programmer Combiner Chain
seq. & P.S.
The probabilities for States (6) through (10) are
expressed in the same manner as States (1)
through (5) ; however, as noted in Figure 24, the
success probability for 2 F cameras is replaced
with the success probability for 1 F camera.
The expression for State (11) reflects the prob-
ability for the failure of both F cameras. This
expression is as follows:
State (11) = Exact probability of having 0 F cameras,
4 P cameras, 15-point T/M, and 90-point
T/M operating satisfactorily
= rPo F • PHigh ....... t • PBattery • P4 P
L cameras voltage Pock Cameras
regulator
• Pp Video • Pcomrnand
cameras Switch
• PHybrid • PDummy • P1s.point T/M
load and VCO
• P90-point T/M • PP Transmitter
and SCO chain
• Plow.current 1voltage regulator
where
Po F
comeros
cam- • PF cam-
era A era B
PF Video
_ Combiner
I(• PF Transmitter Jr PF Video
chain I k Combiner
• PFT ..... itter_+( PFVideO
chain ]\Cornbi°er
• PF T ..... itterI JrlPF video
chain IkCombiner
• PFT ..... itter_l+[(PF .... • PF .... /
cha,. /J L\ero, .roe /
\era, eraSl\e,o" ._]j
itter_ + (PF Video
iiL\Comb•..... halo /\Combiner
chain / k Combiner
PFT ..... itter/1 t
chain /J9
The probability expressions for States (12),
(13), and (14) are essentially the same as that
for State (11), differing only in the number of
P cameras that remain in satisfactory oper-
ating condition. State (15) is the last system
state depicted in Figure 24. This state is that
of no video return but complete telemetry re-
turn. The expression for State (15)is as
follows:
State (15) - Exact probability of having 0 F cam-
eras, 0 P cameras, 15-point T/M, and
90-point T/M operating satisfactorily
cameras/k\mltter miller /
+(PF T ..... •PPT .... -_PFT ..... •_T ..... II
k mitter mitter/ kmitter mitter /j
• %,e,,'_.....d'Lw"%brid'%mm,
pack switch current load
voltage reg.
• P15.point " P9opoint "PHigh ....... t t
T/M and T/M and voltage reg I
VCO SCO !
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LEGEND FOR FIGURES 24 AND 26
PBattery Pack = Probability of at Least One Battery Operating
(See Exhibit 1 for Details)
P2 F Cameras = Exact Probability of Having 2 Full-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 2 for Details)
P_ F C.... a = Exact Probability of Having Just One Full-Scan Camera
(See Exhibit 2 for Details)
Po F Cameras = Exact Probability of Having Zero Full-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 2 for Details)
P4 P Cameras = Exact Probability of Having 4 Partial-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 3 for Details)
P3 p Cameras = Exact Probability of Having 3 Partial-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 3 for Details)
P2 p Cameras = Exact Probability of Having 2 Partial-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 3 for Details)
P7 P Camera = Exact Probability of Having 1 Partial-Scan Camera
(See Exhibit 3 for Details)
Po P Cameras = Exact Probability of Having 0 Partial-Scan Cameras
(See Exhibit 3 for Details)
PTransmitters = Probability of at Least One Transmitter
(See Exhibit 4 for Details)
P7 = Ps of High-Current Voltage Regulator From Terminal Maneuver to Impact
P2 = Ps of Control Program Sequencer and Power Supply
P3 : P_ of "'F" Video Combiner
P4 = P_ of ':P" Video Combiner
P5 = Operational Probability of Command Switch
P6 = Ps of Four-Port Hybrid
P7 = P_ of Dummy Load
P8 = Ps of Low-Current Voltage Regulator From Start of Cruise Mode to Impact
P9 = P5 of 15 Point T/M, Including VCO From Start of Cruise Mode to at Least
Terminal Maneuver
PTo = P of 90-Point T/M (Does Not Include VCO)
Pll = Ps of 90-Point VCO From Terminal Maneuver to Impact
(See Exhibit 5 for Details)
P72 = Ps of Both Transmitter Chains (Includes Modulators, Multipliers, Power
Supply, and Appropriate Accessories)
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-P°"-rE_-P'TP3-P,_P2--P"P"--_ PS--'----P'--P"--P'--P'--P'_--'P"--PT"--_'-M,TT.
_. CHAIN CHAIN
- NO, I NO. ZPs--P_
l_ M'TTE_
CHAIN
_NO. I
p3----P
L BITTER
CHAIN
' 3 "TRANS-
MITTER
CHAIN NO.I
CHAINo
I '1 F CAM "_ --TNANS-
BITTER
CHAIN NO. I
SAME AS STATE(_ FOR ASB CAM _..p
(_ PI,P3,PTRANS - P_,AND PAPORTIONS/ 3T
BITTER ¢ CAM-
CHAIN NQI _ ERAS
(_ DITTO ) P_;'_'--
CAM-
ERAS(_) D IT TO PI';'_'AME R A
FP3 -- PT N AN'_'TI_ I" P4"- PT_ r Pz- P,--i
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I s p 2 e I rP.-_ , l
I Lp._J Li-PII"_ CI_I_: I'-P:-'I " I--'--"P=--P.--P,'_'P*'_'Pa'--'P_n--"--'tPTRANIBTT,RE
,FCABERA L_J I .... L-J ....... [ -" -
I_ I.p3 p.1_ P2
/ AB- ILp_ i NOTE: SEE LEGEND IN TEXT
4 P CAB-
ERAS
Figure 24. Reliability Mathematical Model of the Initial Configuration of the Ranger TV Subsystem
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where
PO P cameras is as defined for State (5) and
P0 F ....... iS as defined for State (ll).
As a matter of reference, for no data return
from the Ranger TV cameras, the Subsystem
is as follows:
State (60) = Probability of no data return
=# +# +# +# +_
Batter), Hybrid Dummy Corn- Simultaneous
Pack Load mand Loss of all
Switch Video and T/M
Exhibit 1
--PET-- %2 PSCR.7 _
_PB7 --Ps-T-------%CR°7 _c--E;T-_2
OPEN
OPEN
--%n--------P_ %CRo7 %_--Z--
OPEN
--Po-i_--Po2 PSCR.7
OPEN
--PsEES-
--PB-T'-- P_ PSCR_7
SHORT
Psc-E-;T-.2
--PB, PB2 PSCR ., PS_FJ--
SHORT OPEN
OPEN
PS'CR-2"i--"
-%7----%,
OPEN
P
SCR _2 Ps-CETi---
-%2 %7 %CRo2
SHORT
Psc-_.7
--PE_---'--Ps7 PSCR.2
SHORT
-- P-_CR .I
OPEN
,.--o
Exhibit 1 (Continued)
P_.,,ery= lIPS'"PS2"PSCR.,"PscR.2]
+ [PB' °PB2° PSCR.'°F)SCR.2]
OPEN
__[P .P .P _.P_ .... P___ _]
' _" BI-" B2- I::M-_(-N_I" 3LN_*:
OPEN
+ , P_2 e_cR÷e.2 P_CR
\OPEN 21 SHORT .1
OPEN}/j
(%'_OPEN SCR+%'2 _ SHORT _2
Exhibit 2
F CAMERAS
TWO CAMERAS = PA ° PB =_PA--PB "----c
ONE CAMERA
--L___#A__pB_J
ATLEASTONE = [PA "Pe ]+[Pa (Ps)+P. (PA)]
L____%--
NO CAMERAS = (_ " Ps ) = _-----PA--PB ----_
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Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5
For t| = 13minutes
o--F'-- P '_P'--
xmtr xmtr C_W
#I #2 Gate
For t 2 = 2 minutes
_p". p" p"
xmtr xmtr CSW
# I #2 Gate
ti - P" P"tr xmtr CSW
#2 Gate
__. p,.
xmtr CSW
#2 Gate
__,, _,,
xmtr CSW
#2 Gate
.F," P,,_ P.__
xmtr xmtr CSW
#I #2 Gate
"_0
:l ftransmitters xmtr#1 xmtr#2 CSW
Gate )
t r/P" .P" .P" /1. _otr#,.mtr#2C'Wl,L\ Gate/I
+[_,,(p,, . _,,+_,, _,,
Lxmtr#l k xmtr#2 CSW xmtr#l CSWGate Gate
+_,, _,,_7
xmtr #2 CSW ] l
Gate / J
[_' .P" . p" 7 I4- 'mtr ,'_2 xmtr 21 CSW J
GateJ
pt = P prime probabilitiesreftect first 13 minutes
(t 1) of terminal mode.
P" = P double prime probabilities reflect last 2 min-
utes (t 2 ) of terminal mode.
vco 
i°u'_'l-- rVCO #1 P'VCO #2
P
VCO #1 VCO #2
Assuming VCO _1 = VCO #2
(atleo,t)=(p )_+2P
PiCO's " one - VCO #1 VCO.1 %co#,
c. SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION MODEL
The reliability mathematical model for the
split-system configuration was based on the
functional diagram of the configuration shown
in Figure 25. The graphic reliability model of
the system is shown in Figure 26. As in the
case of the revised model for the initial sys-
tem detailed consideration is given here to 15
of the 60 possible states. These states include
the various success-failure combinations for
the P and F cameras, but it is assumed that
the telemetry systems are fully operable.
The probabilities for States (1) through (15)
are as follows:
State (1) - Frobability of complete success (i.e., prob-
ability of having 2 F cameras, 4 P cameras,
and both telemetry systems operating satis-
factorily)
: r_attery" PReg " P2F
k No. 1 No. 1 Cameras
• Pcontrol Pro.
grammer Seq. c_
P.S. No. 1
• PLow. • PTS-po,n,
Current T/M
Voltage
Reg.
aPT ..... itter ePFVide° 1
A chain CombinerJ
• Denotes F camera chain probability
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K• a,ter " ego,ator" P
No. 2 No. 2 Cameras
• coo.Or.....-*'/:1':;0
Programmer mitter | |point
Seq. & P.S. B chain[
T/MNo. 2 J
• PDummy
Load
• PP Video
Combiner
• PHybrid
3 9c9c_
• Pc•remand • PDistribution I
Switch Control Units I
A&B J
State (2) = Exact probability of having 2 F cameras,3
P cameras, 15-point T/M, and 90-point TIM
operating satisfactorily.
Same as P camera chain in State (1), ex-
cept the 4 P camera configuration is re.
placed by the 3 P camera configuration as
given in Exhibit 3
State (3) = Exact probability of having 2 F cameras, 2
P- cameras, and all telemetry.
=Same as P camera chain in State (1)ex-
cept 4 P.camera'configurahon is replaced
by 2 P.camera configuration as given in
Exhibit 3.
State(4) = Exact probability of having 2 F cameras,
1 P camera, and all telemetry.
State (5) =
[Same as P camera in State (1) except 4
P-camera configuration is replaced by i
P-camera configuration as given in Ex-
hibit 3] •
Peq. & P.S
No. 2
Exact probability of having 2 F cameras,
0 P cameras and all telemetry.
[ F- camera-chain probability] • [Exact
probability of having 0 P cameras] •
[Sixty-four possible combinations in-
volving
**Denotes P-camera-chain probability
*** Denotes auxiliary-functions probability
VOLUME 4a SECTION II
PBattery' PReg. ' PP Video ' Pseq. & ' Pmtr
No. 2 No. 2 Combiner P.S.No. 2 B chain
and PDistribution 1 . Pgo.pt. " PHybrid " PDummy
& Control B j T/M Load
incl.
VCO's
• PCommand
Switch
State (6) = Exact probability of having 1 F camera.
4 P cameras and all telemetry.
= Same as State (1) except 2 F cameras
become 1 F camera. See Exhibit 2 for
just one F camera model.
State (7) = Exact probability of having 1 F camera,
3 P cameras, and all telemetry.
= [F cameras same as state (6)] • [P cam-
eras same as State (2)] multiplied by
the auxiliary.function probability.
State (8) = Exact probability of having 1 F camera,
2 P cameras, and all telemetry.
= [F cameras same as State (6)] • [P cam-
eras same as State (3)] multipliedby the
auxi ! i ary-f.nction probability.
State (9) = Exact probability of having 1 F camera,
I P camera, and all telemetry.
[F cameras same as State (6)] • [P cam-
eras same as State (4)] multiplied by the
auxiliary- function probability.
State (! 0) =-Exact probability of having 1 F camera,
0 P cameras, and all telemetry.
[F cameras same as State (6)] • [P cam-
eras same as State (5)] multiplied by
the auxiliary-function probability.
$3
State (11) = Exact probability of having 0 F cameras,
4 P cameras and all telemetry.
r
= PBattery /Po F • (Summation of all prob.
No. 7 L camera ability combinations
of the F Video Combiner, Seq. &
P._. No. 1, I xmtr A chain. DC{J A
portion, and Reg. No. 1)
+ P
2 F Cameras
P1 F Camera • (The summation of all 1
probability combinations of the F I
Video Combiner, Seq. & P.S. No. 1'/
xmtr A chain, DCU A portion, and Reg.|
No. 1 except the one case where|
everything is operating) J
,°Camera Chain Probability I
• PRedundant Low.Current Voltage Regulator
with High-Current Voltage Regulator No. 1
• P1s.pt. • P9o.pt. • PHybrid • PDummy
T/M T/M Load
commuta- Commuta=
tor e VCO tar _ VCO*s
8 amplifier
• Pc•remand • PDistribution.
Switch Control B
State (12) = Exact probability of having 0 F cameras,
3 P cameras and all telemetry.
= Same as State (11) except 4 P cameras
become 3 P cameras.
State (13) =
=
State (14) =
Exact probability of having 0 F cameras,
2 P cameras and all telemetry.
Same as State (11) except 4 P cameras
become 2 P cameras.
Exact probability of having 0 F cameras,
2 P cameras and all telemetry.
Same as State (11) except 4 P cameras
become 1 P camera.
State (15) = Exact probability of having just telem-
etry, both 15-point and 90-point.
= (Fcamera state same as in State(11)ex-
cept xmtr A chain is not included)
In "-"
U"camera state same as in 3tare(3) ex-
cept xmtr B chain is not included)
• Low.C....., Va,togeR gula,arwith"
High-Current Voltage Regulator
• P15-pt. T/M • Pgo-pt. T/M •PHybridOPDummy
Commutator Commutator Load
VCO & & VCO's
Amplifier
• PC ..... d • _PRedundant xmtr*s Ac_B_
Switch _ Chains - at least one/
For at least telemetry return, the reliability
of the split system is the sum of the fifteen
states enumerated above. The exact probabil-
ity states of the 1_ and F cameras are the same
as those given in Exhibits 2 and 3. The relia-
bility model for the battery pack in Exhibit 1 no
longer applies since each video chain has a
single nonredundant battery. The time-
sequenced redundancy of transmitter chains
no longer applies. There is no last-two-
minute switchover as in the initial Subsystem.
However, in considering 90-point telemetry
return, particularly in the absence of either
F or I_ video, at least one transmitter must
operate as noted in State (15) above.
State (60) is represented by:
•
s×stem \ No. 7 /No. 7 No. 21
\Short Short ]
+ rSimultaneous failure probabilities of no video out- 1
I put or lost transmission in P camera chain times I
kthe same effect in the F camera chain. J
For States (2) through (15) of the Split System,
there is a 0.0010276 probability that the Subsys-
tem will be in one of these fourteen conditions.
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PREG P_"_PF P P_P
-PB_ NOl VIDEO SEG & R S LOW-CURRENT 15-POINT
COMBINER NO I REGULATOR T/M a SCO
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
P_P
XM TR'_ BAT T NO.2
CHAIR
BATT NO2
8 REG NO 2 1
NOTINCLUDED
HERE
--DITTO PIf DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
BATT NO. 2
8 REG NO2
NOTINCLUDEO
HERE
C,SENO2 _ _*=ROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL COMBINATION INVOLVING F CAMERASF VIDEO COMBINER, SEO &PSNOI,XMTR A CHAIN,AND A -CURRENT PIS-PO[NTT/M PBA_NO 2
PORTION OF DISTRIBUTION CONTROL UNIT I REGULATOR
DITTO
DITTO
PREG NO'_"2_ P4_
DITTO
DITTO
L PROBABILLTY OF SURVIVAL COMB
J INVOLVING THE F VIDEO _'_PLow'CURRENT P
PREG NO I PBATT NO1 COMSINER,SEQ _ PS NOI J REGULATOR IS-POINT T/M
BATT NO 2
p _ • REG NO.2
XMTR NOT INCLUDED
CHAIN & HERE
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.p--
REG NO 2
pwp P P P P--P P P
P Vl OEO $EO 8, P.S XMT R "B" 90-POINT 4 - PORT DUMMY COMMAND ' Ol STRIBUTION
COMB;NER NO 2 CHAIN T/M HYBRID LOAD SWITCH 8 CONTROL
U N IT -'_"B "B"
PORTIONS
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
DITTO
PSED &PS.
]sNO, 2
SEO B P S
NO;'
DITTO
COMBINER NO 2
CASE NO I |
PROBABILITY COMBINATIONS OF P VIDEO COMBINER
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Figure 26. Reliability Mathematical Model of the Split-System Configuration of the Ranger TV Subsystem
5?
d. POST-RA-6 CONFIGURATION
Post-RA-6 configuration changes did not
change the mathematical model prepared for
the split system.
Irb_J .... I ....... I_.. •
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a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
As a result of failure mode and effects analyses
performed, areas for additional redundancy
requirements were found. The following re-
dundancy considerations were examined.
To prevent a failure in the sequencer
clock circuit or a sequencer power sup-
ply from disabling both the F and P Cam-
eras, a redundant, standby 18-kc clock
circuit was provided in the sequencer
along with a standby redundant capability
in the sequencer power supply. In addi-
tion, the Pl Camera was provided with a
free-running, self-synchronous capabil-
ity to provide operation in the event of a
sequencer failure.
An evaluation was made of two alternate
systems for transmitting video informa-
tion.
In the first method, which used a time-
sharing technique, the various outputs of
the cameras would be switched by the se-
quencer to the modulator. The output of
the modulator would, in turn, be switched
to one of two transmitters, only one of
which was to be in operation, the other
being in standby.
In the second alternative, both trans-
mitters operated simultaneously. The
outputs of the two transmitters were
multiplexed and coupled at the RF output.
The second method was selected for
use in the Ranger TV Subsystem. It
avoided the need for sequencer switching
and provided separate t r a n s m i s s i o n
paths prior to switchover, and redundant
transmission for P-Camera video after
switchover.
• An emergency telemetry mode was pro-
vided for use in the event of loss of
spacecraft stabilization or loss of high-
gain antenna lock. A real-time command
(RTC-7) was to be used to switch out the
video signals and to permit the 90-point
telemetry to directly modulate the trans-
mitters. Full transmitter power was to be
concentrated in the narrow telemetry
band to compensate for reduction in an-
tenna gain. If the original malfunction
corrected itself, RTC-7 commands were
to be used to switch the TV Subsystem
back to normal operation.
• The power requirements of the TV Sub-
system were supplied by two batteries
connected through isolation diodes. If
one of the batteries were to fail, the
other could have carried the entire load.
It was determined that it was not neces-
sary to make the RF combiner redundant.
The RF combiner consisted of the Four-
Port Hybrid and the Dummy Load, both of
which were passive devices with low fail-
ure rates.
The original Subsystem configuration
used only one High-Current Voltage
Regulator to supply regulated power from
the batteries to each of the two channels.
At that time, analysis indicated that a
single regulator with sufficient power
capabilities could reliably supply the two
video channels. Subsequent analysis for
the split system altered this conclusion.
b. SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Redundancy considerations examined in the
split-system configuration design included the
following.
Individual fuses were added to pro-
tect each of the camera and camera
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electronics assemblies to prevent a short
in a single assembly from resulting in
loss of complete channel capability.
Redundant inputs were provided for sup-
plying 6.3-volt power to the Video Com-
biner. The F-Channel Video-Combiner
circuits were supplied power from the
F a and F b Camera Electronics Assem-
blies. The P-Channel Video-Combiner
circuits were supplied power from the Pl
and P2 Camera Electronics Assemblies.
These insured continuous operation of the
F-portion of the Video Combiner in the
event of a failure of one of the F-scan
Camera Electronics Assemblies and the
P-portion of a failure of either the Pl or
P2 Camera Electronics Assemblies.
Overvoltage protection was investigated
for certain transistors in the Camera
Electronics assemblies and circuit
changes were made to limit the voltage
to acceptable values.
To prevent loss of telemetry in the ter-
minal mode due to failure of the Low-
Current Voltage Regulator, a relay was
added to the split-system design. Pre-
viously failure of the Low-Current Volt-
age Regulator caused loss of 90-point
telemetry in both the cruise and terminal
modes. The relay permitted the High-
Current Voltage Regulator to supply
power during the terminal mode.
C. POST-RA-6 SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The following redundancy changes were im-
plemented in the post-RA-6 configuration:
* Separate RTC-7 commands were pro-
vided to the relays of the gate circuits
of the SCR in the HCVR which isolated
turn-on with this command.
• A voltage regulator, which operated from
either the F or P unregulated power
source, was added to the Telemetry As-
sembly. This unit functioned only during
the terminal mode after warm-up was
commanded, and served to increase reli-
ability by eliminating the dependence on
the F-Channel High-Current Voltage
Regulator.
To assure that 90-point telemetry would
be obtained, the output of the 90-point
commutator was fed into the Channel-8
VCO as well as to the P-Channel for
transmission. This switchover tookplace
when either transmitter channel was
placed in warm-up.
The output of the 15-point commutator
was placed on the F-Channel for trans-
mission after this switchover tookplace.
This configuration was used to assure
receipt of diagnostic telemetry data
should a problem be encountered which
prevented high-power transmission.
4. Mission Success
The fourth phase of the reliability requirements
study was the formulation of a defnition of mis-
sion success and the establishment of a cri-
terion of that success. The definition, which
was derived during the initial configuration
work, remained unchanged throughout the en-
tire Ranger program. The criterion, called a
figure of merit, was evolved in the initial con-
figuration study and refined inthe split-system
effort.
a. DEFINITION OF SUCCESS
(!) Approach to Problem
Evaluation of the Ranger TV _bsystem design
goals in terms of subassembly performance
formed the basis of the definition studies.
These goals were to obtain high-quality, high-
resolution, television pictures of the lunar
surface; to obtain reasonable nesting of a se-
quence of television pictures, starting from a
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resolution of approximately350meters per
line pair (andalso initially a color image of
the lunar surface); and to obtain wide-area
coverage of the lunar surface.
It was realized that there were a number of
eauiDment combinations which would satisfy
the overall mission objectives to varying de-
grees depending upon the extent to which the
equipments operated successfully. Therefore,
it was decided to utilize a straightforward ap-
proach, examining each design goal from two
standpoints: the minimum of operating equip-
ments which would result in mission success;
and an ideal condition where all equipments
required for success of the design goals op-
erated successfully. In between these two
extremes would lie all other equipment com-
binations capable of satisfying the design goals
with varying probabilities of success.
The viewing area of the lunar surface as seen
by the P Cameras was analyzed as the basis of
determining camera requirements. As seen in
Figure 27, the area covered by the P Cameras
is divided into nine equal areas, each camera
covering four-ninths of the total. Camera Pl,
for example, covers the shaded portion of the
diagram. There was an overlap in the fields of
all four cameras in the area marked "A _'.
P3
P4
P2
Figure 27. Terminal Viewing Area
(2) Coverage Requirements and Mission Success
Analysis of the viewing area produced the fol-
lowing conclusions in terms of successfully
meeting the design goals.
(a) FIRST DESIGN GOAL
To meet the first design goal (to obtain a Mgh-
quality, high-resolution, television picture)it
would be necessary to have a P-Camera opera-
tive for the last or next-to-the lastframe. The
minimum number of operation P-Cameras re-
quired to meet this requirement would be three
out of four. With three cameras there would be
three chances in four (a 75-percent probability)
of having an op=rative camera called upon for
the last frame. There would be a 100-percent
probability of having an operative camera for
at least one of the last two exposures.
Table 4 lists the possible camera combinations
and the probabilities associated with each.
(b) SECOND DESIGN GOAL
To meet the second design goal (to obtain a
reasonable nesting of a sequence of television
pictures, starting from a resolution of approx-
imately 350 meters per line pair)the minimum
number of cameras required for successful
operation was one F Camera and any two P
Cameras. Only the F a camera would provide
the necessary coverage of the P-Camera area.
The minimum condition would be the F a Cam-
era and two P Cameras; the ideal condition
would be the F a Camera and four P Cameras.
(c) THIRD DESIGN GOAL
The third design goal (to obtain wide area
coverage of the lunar surface) could be met only
by the F Cameras. The minimum condition
would be successful operation of the F a camera;
the ideal condition would be successful opera-
tion of both the F a and F b Cameras.
6O
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TABLE 4
P-CAMERA COMBINATIONS AND COVERAGE
Camera(s) Operating
I, 2, 3, or 4
(1,2), (1,4), (2, 3) or (3, 4)
(1, 3) or (2, 4)
Any Combination of 3 Cameras
1, 2, 3, and4
Fraction of
Total Area
Covered
4/9
6/9
7/9
s/a
9/9
Percent of
Total Area
Covered
44
67
78
89
100
Probability of
Operable Camera
For Last Two Frames
0.25
0.50
0.5O
1.00
1.00
b. FIGURE OF MERIT
(1) Initial Subsystem Configuration
The figure of merit for mission success of the
various P-Camera configurations during the
final minute of operation was defined as:
F.M.=P A O
S c c
where:
Ps represents the previously derived prob-
abilities for the P Cameras;
A c represents the percentage of lunar area
covered, with values ranging from 44 to
to 100; and
0 c represents the probability of hawng an
operable camera for either of the last
two frames, with values ranging from
0.25 to 1.00.
B. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND PREDIC-
TION
The second major task of the Ranger TV Sub-
system reliability program for each of the
three configurations was reliability analysis
and prediction. In this subsection the results
of the reliability analysis and prediction are
considered: (1) the preliminary reliability es-
timate, (2) detailed reliability analysis, (3) fail-
ure mode and effects analysis, (4) computed
probabilities of survival, and (5) computed
figure of merit for mission success.
1. Preliminary Reliability Estimate
The preliminary reliability estimate was un-
dertaken and calculations were completed in
accordance with standard RCA Defense Elec-
tronic Product methods.* The following dis-
cussion summarizes those methods and the
results obtained.
a. METHOD
Preliminary circuit information on the type
and number of electromechanical parts to be
utilized in the Subsystem was gathered from
the designers. Assumptions were made as to
the electrical and thermal stresses which
would be applied to each part. These assump-
tions were based on the designers' estimates,
*_ts outlined in Volume 14, Defense Electronic Standards (Parts
Reliability Factors for Electronic Equipment).
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experiencewithsimilar circuitry, andthe re-
quirements of the applicable JPL environ-
mental specification. All failure rates were
expressed in percent of failure per 1000hours.
Calculations were made for ambient tempera-
tures of both 25 and 70 ° C to permit comparison
at these two temperature extremes which in-
cluded the worst anticipated condition. Typical
failure rates were obtained using equivalent
part types selected from the tables of Volume 14
of Defense Electronic Standards. All parts
were considered to have been derated in ac-
cordance with the policies established for the
Ranger TV Subsystem.
b. RESULTS
Total failure-rate estimates for the flight
equipment were 327.633 percent failures per
1000 hours at 25 ° C, and 422.036 percent fail-
ures per 1000 hours at 70 ° C. Expressed as
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)these
rates were equivalent to 306 hours at 25 ° C
and 236 hours at 70 ° C. Figure 28 presents
these data graphically as probabilities of
survival versus time from zero to 45 hours.
Table 5 summarizes the TV Subsystem parts-
countdown and failure-rate estimates by
components and equipment group. Detailed
breakdowns of the equipment groups are
similarly treated in Tables A-1 through A-6
in Appendix A, Volume 4b.
It is important to note that the above estimates
were approximations only at the time of cal-
culation and were significant only in reference
to the concepts and conditions upon which they
were based.
2. Detailed Reliability Analysis
a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The detailed reliability analysis for the initial
Subsystem was a refinement of the preliminary
prediction and was based upon actual cir-
cuit application data gathered from design
engineers.
>
_r
O
b-
.J
n-
o.
t.O000
0.9500
0.9000
08500
II
10 25 40 45
HOURS
Figure 28. Probability of Survival as a Function of Time
(1) Method
Each part in each assembly was analyzed to
determine its operating stress level. Using
the stress level an individual failure rate was
assigned. The failure rates of the individual
parts were then summed to obtain a total figure
for each assembly. Individual failure rates as-
signed were obtained, as in the preliminary
estimate, from Volume 14 of Defense Elec-
tronic Standards. Reliability calculations were
carried out using standard RCA methods.* All
failure rates were given as percent failures
per 1000 hours.
(2) Results
A total failure rate for the Subsystem of 476. 683
percent failures per 1000 hours at 70 ° C was
obtained. Expressed as Mean Time Between
Failures this figure represented an MTBF of
210 hours. Comparedto the preliminary failure
rate of 422.036 percent failures per 1000 hours
at 70 ° C, the newer figure represented an in-
crease of 13 percent. The magnitude of this
*As outlined in RCA Technical ll(,port TII59-416-1, Re, liability
Stress Analysis for Electronic l':quipment.
62
VOLUME 4a SECTION II
:j
0 O
I,- Q.
:E
>-
_- E.,
.,.I _ •
.-I
I.M
z .-
_ _o
II
@
-
,< -_ ,<
_ 0
i °"
"_ iS
ul
_'_ _ 0
_ I,- "N
,,n
E
!
c_
b-
c.O
o0
O_
c'q
C_
L_
C'q
Cq
b- 00
c_
L'.-
00 _:fl
L_
L_
_,D 00
C'_ _ L_
_4
C_
cq
O
cq
oo
o_o_ c_
L_-
c;
LO O'_
L_
_ C.0 b.-
c;c;
c_
L'_
L_ L_
00 _--_
00 b--
O
C--
I/'3
LO
L_ L_ L_
CO CO
CO 00 00
CO CO
00
CO
L_
00
O
c_
o
CO _>
L_ 00
c;
CO
Ili III
L_
O0
C'_
L_
C_
O0
C',1
C",1
L_
C_
4
c,,1 CO
CO
oo L_ -:y
,--_ C,,1
CO
L_-
L',-
L"-- (3O
L_
e--I
O0
4
CO
L'-. C,.-
C,,1
oO
I i
L"--
L"--
C%1
0
0", CO
CO
oo oo
CO
0 L_
CO CO L_
0(3
CO L_ L_
O0
O'3
;'--I
CO C'_
C',1
C_
L"
CO
C' '_
C'_ QO O0 b" O0 0'_
° o
L_
._ C_ L'-
o o
_r._ c,_ L_-
o _ _._
L_C_
° oL_
0 _ • •
_.__
_ oo
o _
0
r._ ._
L) r..)
o o
63
_.E
I-. L
_c. u
°_
O_ "
lU-..
a. >,. •
___.. _.. 0 _.
U _
<--
0
_Z _
_<
_ o0
t',-
0 _
0 0
o o
o _
o o
o _ t'.-
t'-- cxl
o _
'C),D o o
S _ _
64
VOLUME 4a SECTION II
change was not considered to be significant
because it represented a change in probability
of survival of only 1 or 2 parts in 10,000.
A summation of the TV Subsystem failure rates
at 70 ° C is presented in Table 6. Failure rates
for the various component groups are presented
in Tables B-1 through B-13 in Appendix B,
Volume 4b.
b. SPLIT-SYSTEM AND POST-RA-6 SUBSYSTEM
CONFIGURATIONS
The detailed reliability analysis for the split-
system and post-RA-6 Subsystem was not
updated because the equipment changes did
n o t significantly affect the values already
obtained.
3. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
On the initial Subsystem configuration, failure
mode and effects analysis was first performed
informally. While confined principally to func-
tional assemblies, lower level components
were, at times, examined. Assembly failure
was considered in regard to its effect on a
specific Subsystem function and compensating
provisions were considered. Where compensa-
ting provisions did not exist,or did not mini-
mize the effect of the failure mode ifthey did
exist, recommendations for design changes
were made. In the majority of these eases,
the recommendations were incorporated into
the Ranger TV Subsystem as it existed in the
initialconfiguration.
b. INITIAL CONFIGURATION VERSUS SPLIT-SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION
Prior to implementation of the split-system
configuration, a failure mode analysis was per-
formed comparing the initial Subsystem con-
figuration to the then proposed split-system
configuration. A description of this analysis
is given here; detailed drawings and tables
supporting the analysis are contained in
Appendix C, Volume 4b.
(1) Scope
The failure-effects analysis was performed in
two phases. The first phase comprised a com-
plete analysis on both the Subsystem and as-
sembly levels of the initial configuration. The
second phase comprised an analysis of some-
what less detail which primarily compared the
Subsystem-level failure modes and effects of
the initial configuration with those of the
split-system.
(2) Objectives
There were two objectives of the analysis.
The frst aim was to ascertain potential failure
modes of the Subsystem black boxes and the
effects on the initial TV Subsystem configura-
tion performance of the respective failure
modes. This procedure was followed to poten-
tial reliability problem areas and to develop
appropriate solutions for these problems. The
second aim of the analysis was to compare
the failure modes and effects of the initial
configuration and those of the split-system.
(3) Method
Established procedures were utilized to de-
velop and systematically tabulate data.
The first step in the procedure was the prep-
aration of a block diagram to graphically depict
the functional elements of the Subsystem or
the particular ,assembly component under con-
sideration. Each block was considered suc-
cessively. The ability of each of the respective
units to demonstrate either degradative or
catastrophic failure, or both, was ascertained
by considering the internal failure modes of
the unit.
Potential failures of each of the outputs were
tabulated on an analysis form together with a
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summary of all malfunctions that could di-
rectly result and their effects, whether or not
discernible, on the dependent Subsystem
blocks. Compensating provisions inherent in
the Subsystem design were taken into account
at this point. These provisions, which mini-
mized the effects of failures, includedredtm-
dant circuits or channels, backup switches or
power supplies. However, the use of high re-
liability and/or preconditioned parts was not
considered to be a compensating provision for
an assumed failure.
Assumed failures were analyzed in the light of
their ultimate effects on the performance of
the Subsystem. Particular emphasis was given
to such levels as effects on the missions and
effects on telemetry capability.
Ultimate effects of various failures were
ranked qualitatively by anticipated frequency
of failure occurrence relative to the frequency
of occurrence of other failures and by the
resultant relative levels of Subsystem or as-
sembly degradation. Potential failures which
represented serious deterrents to reliability
were exposed by qualitative rankings such as
those indicated above. Such exposure was of
great importance to the improvement of
reliability.
Appendix C, Volume 4b, contains the qualitative
development of assembly and subassembly
mission failure modes. A detailed listing of the
rankings used for the analysis appears in the
following paragraph (4). Whenever possible, the
failure-effects-analysis forms list both the
failure-class ranking which considers only
specific aspects of the mission, for example,
partial-scan capability, and the failure-class
ranking which considers the effect on the over-
all mission.
(4) Failure Class Factor and Failure Probability Factors
(a) FAILURE CLASS FACTOR
To classify this study, the Engineering Relia-
bility Activity made several assumptions.
These assumptions, based upon knowledge of
the TV Subsystem and the objectives of its
mission were as follows:
• The P-Scan Cameras would contribute
more to mission success thanthe F-Scan
Cameras; the F-Scan Cameras would
contribute more to mission success than
the telemetry and, in like manner, the
90-point telemetry would contribute more
than the 15-point telemetry.
• The contributions to the overall mission
success provided by each of the TV Sub-
system elements was assumed to follow
an rms function, that is,
Total Mission Success =
(P scan) 2 + (F scan) 2
+ (90 PT T/M) 2 + (15 PT T/M)2 1 _
• In addition, each of the P and F Cameras
was assumed to be related to the total
P or F mission phase by an rms function.
The individual telemetry points within the
15-point telemetry were assumed to be
equally important and are shown on the
grapl_ of Figure 29 as a straight line.
Likewise, each of the points of the 90-
point telemetry was assumed to con-
tribute linearly to the total 90-point
mission phase.
Based on these assumptions, a degree of deg-
radation was calculated as: degree of degra-
dation = [100 - (total mission success)]percent.
The range of degradation was divided into six
categories with each category being assigned a
code letter as shown in Table 7. This code let-
ter or failure-class factor as it was referred
to in this analysis also carried a subscript.
The subscript identified that portion of the TV
Subsystem to which the failure-class factor
applied. A subscript "o" was used for the
overall Subsystem and the subscripts "p",
"f", "T90", and "T15" for the partial-scan,
full-scan, 90-point and 15-point telemetry,
respectively.
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Figure 29. Mission Success as a Function of Equipment
Success
The failure-class factors shown on the failure
effects analysis charts were determined by
subtracting the percentage of total mission
success from 100 percent and entering the
result into the degree of degradation column
of Table 7. The individual failure-class factors
were determined by scaling the curve for that
function up to 100 percent. The desired point
was Lhen selec_ea irom the CUI'Ve, _UUl,l'_tgl,_Ll
from 100 percent, and entered into the degree
of degradation column.
(b) FAILURE PROBABILITY FACTOR
This factor was an estimate of the relative
probability of occurrence of a particular fail-
ure mode. The range of probabilities was divi-
ded into five levels starting from a factor of
one, which denoted the most probable failure
occurrence, and progressed to five which was
the least probable. Assigning a factor to a par-
ticular failure mode involved an examination of
such items as circuit function, past perform-
ance, and relative complexity of the circuit.
TABLE 7
DEGREE OF DEGRADATION
Overall
Task
A o
Bo
Co
D
O
E
O
F
o
Failure Class Factor
Individual Tasks
Partial-
Scan
Channel
A
P
ep
C
P
D
p
E
P
F
P
Full-
Scan
Channel
Af
Bf
C_
D_
E_
Ff
90-Pt
T/M
AT90
BTgO
CTgO
DTgO
ETgO
FTgO
15-Pt
T/M
AT1S
BT15
CTTS
DT1S
ETIS
FT15
Degree of Degradation =
100Cr/o-(Total Mission Success 07o)
76% to 100%
51% to 75%
26% to 50%
0% to 25%
0% to 10%
0% to 3%
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If a failure mode had combined a failure prob-
ability factor of 3 or less with a failure class
factor of A o or Bo, a serious situation would
have been indicated. No such failure modes
were found in this analysis.
(5) Resulting Changes to TV Subsystem
The primary concern of the split-system con-
figuration was a maximum probability of ob-
taining at least one good picture of the lunar
surface. The Subsystem changes implemented
to accomplish this purpose can be seen by
comparing the block diagrams of the initial
configuration (Figure C-1) andthe split-system
configuration (Figure C-2) in Appendix C.
The split-system involved two essentially in-
dependent operating channels. One channel
transmitted full-scan information, and the
other transmitted partial-scan information.
Telemetry was transmitted over both channels
for redundancy. An emergency-mode capability
permitted telemetry transmission through one
channel only, thereby allowing the other chan-
nel to transmit video information at any time
possible. The full-scan channel carried the
emergency information while the partial-scan
channel transmitted video information con-
tinuously. With these arrangements for a split
system, the probability of transmitting an
image of the lunar surface was increased.
The design philosophy of the split system in-
volved the additional consideration of obtaining
the maximum probability with a minimum num-
ber of changes to the initial configuration. To
this end, redundant circuitry was incorporated,
and only two assemblies (a Distribution Control
Unit and a second High-Current Voltage Reg-
ulator) were added to the initial configuration.
The remaining additions and modifications re-
lated primarily to the interconnecting harness
cables and power inputs.
(a) COMPARISON OF CONFIGURATIONS
A detailed analysis of the failure modes and
effects of both configurations is tabulated in
Appendix C, Volume 4b. The differences be-
tween the two configurations and between
their respective effects on mission capability
are described below:
Separation of Batteries and Addition of Second
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Independent operation of the two video channels
in the split-system configuration was achieved
by separating the redundant battery arrange-
ment and adding a second High-Current Voltage
Regulator. It was considered to be highly im-
probable that a severe catastrophic failure
would occur to the spacecraft. However, if
such a failure were to occur, the complete
isolation of the channels would preclude the
consequent draining of the central power sys-
tem and the complete loss of mission capa-
bility. In carrying this consideration one step
further, fuses were added to the inputs of the
assemblies so that a power short in a single
assembly would not result in the loss of com-
plete channel capability.
The changes had two additional effects:
• Failure of a single battery would have had
no effect on the operation of the two chan-
nels in the initial configuration. In the
split system, the same failure would
have disabled one of the two independent
channels.
• A single short in the silicon-controlled
rectifier would have produced complete
disablement of the initial configuration
TV Subsystem. In the split system, the
same failure would have disabled only
one channel.
Back-Up Arrangement for the Low-Current
Voltage Regulator
In the initial configuration, the Low-Current
Voltage Regulator powered both the telemetry
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andthe 225-kcVCO's.Thus,a failure in this
regulatorwouldhavecausedlossof telemetry
in both the cruise andterminal modes.In the
split system,a relay was addedwhichmade
possiblethe useof the High-CurrentVoltage
Regulatorto provide telemetry powerduring
the terminal modein the eventof failure of
the Low-Current VoltageRegulator.There-
fore, the probabilityof receivingthe 90-point
Telemetrydatawassubstantiallyimproved.
Video-Combiner Power Inputs
In the split system, the 6.3-volt inputs to the
Video Combiner from the Full-Scan Cameras
A and B electronics were combined into a diode
isolation circuit. Consequently, continuous op-
eration of the Video Combiner was ensured in
the event of a failure of one of the full-scan
camera electronics units. The occurrence of
such a failure in the initial configuration
would have disabled the full-scan portion of
the Video Combiner, causing loss of full-scan
video.
The same arrangement was incorporated in
the Partial-Scan Channel where two of the four
camera-electronics power inputs were com-
bined. One of the power inputs came from the
Pl Camera Electronics to ensure the free-
running capability of this camera.
Sequencer and Sequencer Power Supply
In the split system, the Sequencer Power Sup-
ply for each of the two channels was inde-
pendently powered via its respective regulator.
The outputs of the existing 18-kc dual clock in
the Sequencer were separated to provide in-
dividual operation for each channel. The last-
two-minute switchover capability was removed
in the interest of obtaining at least one good
picture of the lunar surface. Deletion of the
switchover capability insured receipt of video
information as long as either channel was
operative.
In the initial configuration, if switchover oc-
curred when the partial-scan cameras and/or
electronics were disabled, no video informa-
tion could be obtained. The addition of a second
relay in the Sequencer provided separate full-
power turn-on capability.
c. SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
As a continuing effort of evaluating the split-
system configuration, a detailed failure mode
and effects analysis was performed later in
the TV Subsystem program prior to the ini-
tiation of post-RA-6 effort.
(1) Scope and Objectives
The preceding analysis of failure modes and
effects was concerned with major assemblies
and did not delve into component or module
failures. To enlarge the scope of the analysis,
a lower level of Subsystem equipment was
investigated. At this level, it was possible to
ascertain the effects of a malfunctioning crit-
ical part on associated functions and ultimately,
its related effects on Subsystem performance.
(2) Method and Results
The failure mode and effects analysis included
all split-system modifications incorporated by
June 1, 1963. The results of the analysis were
tabulated along with proposed recommenda-
tions. These tabulations and accompanying
schematics are contained in Tables D-1 through
D- 9, and Figures D- 1 through D- 13, of Appendix
D, Volume 4b.
d. POST-RA-6 CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS
(I) Scope and Objectives
An extensive failure mode and effects analysis
was performed at the part level to determine
the effects of failure on the modification to the
TV Subsystem. The modifications were ex-
amined to ascertain whether performance
could be affected by any combination of criti-
cal operation and part failure occurring si-
multaneously.
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(2) Method
From the circuit schematics of the modifica-
tions, the effects of part failures on total
Subsystem operation was ascertained. The
symptoms manifested by each part failure in
all its most probable failure modes were de-
termined, together with compensating pro-
visions inherent in the design. Previously
developed procedures were utilized and the
data, then obtained, was systematically tabu-
lated. Where necessary to avoid confusion,
prefixes denoting particular circuit boards
were added to identify the parts analyzed and
tabulated.
(3) Results
(a) GENERAL
This failure mode and effects analysis revealed'
that no single part failure, in that equipment
analyzed, would completely inhibit TV Subsys-
tem performance and that total video could be
inhibited only by a multiplicity of failures.
Various levels of telemetry could be lost as a
result of individual failures, however, the
overall failure probability was lessened as a
result of the changes incorporated in the
Ranger VII configuration.
Four of the six functional groups of the TV
Subsystem were modified. These were the
Camera Group, Telecommunications Group,
Controls Group, and Power Group. The effects
of the individual modifications on TV Subsystem
performance are summarized in the following
paragraphs. Detailed tabulations and support-
ing schematics are contained in Tables E-1
through E-7 and Figures E-1 through E-7 in
Appendix E, Volume 4b.
(b) CAMERA GROUP
Video Combiner Assembly (A8)
The telemetry circuitry in the Video Combiner
was modified to obtain more useful information
from the telemetry points. Two DC differential
amplifiers were used as peak detectors to
monitor the level of the video outputs from the
P- and F-Channel cameras. This modification
involved six parts and seven probable failure
modes. Table E-1 lists the seven probable
part-failure modes and presents their effects
on TV Subsystem performance. In effect, 70
percent of the failure modes result in no video
telemetry, and the remaining 30 percent of the
failure modes result in a fixed upper (-5 volts}
level regardless of input and a noisy output.
The overall probability of these failures oc-
curring is negligibly small. Also, failures in
these areas, if they do occur, will not elimi-
nate video output. The schematics for the F-
and P-Channel Video Combiners are shown in
Figure E-I.
Control Programmer and Camera Sequencer
Assembly {A9)
The telemetry circuit was redesigned so that,
rather than telemetering the output of the
flip-flops, the outputs of the relay and relay
driver were sampled. The manual reset was
changed to a full-power command inhibit, and
a set of redundant full-power command relay
contacts were added.
The timer circuits for the F- and P-Channel
full-power turn-on were redesigned to change
the warm-up period from five minutes to 80
seconds. This resulted in an overall reduction
in the number of components in the circuits.
There was no analysis of this modification as
components were deleted rather than added.
The reduction of the number of components
in the timer circuits, of itself, enhanced the
reliability of the TV Subsystem.
Table E-2 lists the probable failure modes
and presents their effects on TV Subsystem
performance. The analysis is referenced to
the Modulator Controller shown in Figure E-2.
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(C) TELECOMMUNICATIONSGROUP
Telemetry Assembly (A26)
The major failure probability associated with
the modifications to the Telemetry Assembly
was the loss of 90-point teiemetry data. This
would result from certain failures in the telem-
etry regulator circuit. In the modification
program 15 parts with 28 associated failure
modes were analyzed. Approximately 33 per-
cent of these failure modes would result in
loss of 90-point telemetry. 17 percent would
result in unregulated-bus voltages appearing
in the telemetry circuitry. This, in itself, is
not a catastrophic failure but would cause
commutator speed-up and apply excess volt-
ages to the telemetry circuits. Stress levels
would be high and the calibration levels af-
fected, but the Telemetry Assembly would
continue to operate. The maximum effect of the
remaining failures would be the loss of 15-
point telemetry during cruise mode, or little
or no effect overall. The overall probability
associated with any of the assumed part fail-
ures, however, was very low, and when viewed
from the probability of the Telemetry Assem-
bly performing its intended mission, the modi-
fications made improved the reliability.
A summary of the failure-mode and effects
analysis performed on the modifications to the
Telemetry Assembly is listed in Table E-3.
A schematic of the modified Telemetry Assem-
bly is shown in Figure E-3.
Current Sensor Unit
A Current Sensor Unit was incorporated into
the TV Subsystem to enable a precise moni-
toring of the F- and P-Battery currents. The
circuitry required to implement this modifica-
tion consisted of a magnetic amplifier and
magnetic oscillator. A constant-current input
stage was also provided to limit the current
drain on the LCVR to 80 ma under worst-case
probable failure conditions. This modification
involved 23 parts and 46 probable part-failure
modes. In the failure mode and effects analysis
performed, approximately 50 percent of the
part-failure modes would result in erroneous
telemetry output data; approximately 33 per-
cent would result in no telemetry output; and
the remaining 17 percent would result in either
a fixed or a noisy output.
A summary of the failure mode and effects
analysis performed on the modifications to the
Current Sensor Unit is listed in Table E-4.
A schematic of the modified current sensor
unit is shown in Figure E-4.
(d) CONTROLS GROUP
Command Control Unit
The Command Control Unit, with the excep-
tion of the HCVR turn-on circuits, represented
a completely new unit. The failure mode and
effects analysis performed on new parts in this
unit is summarized in Table E-5. There are
20 parts with 40 associated parts failure modes
analyzed. Twenty-five percent of these failure
modes result in a loss of the 32-hour clock
pulse, 11 percent will cause the RTC-5 com-
mand to the clock to be inhibited, and approxi-
mately 3 percent of the failure modes will
cause a premature turn-on of the Channel-8
telemetry. The remaining failure modes will
have little or no effect on the operation of the
TV Subsystem.
A schematic of the Command Control Unit
is shown in Figure E-5.
Electronic Clock (A35)
Modifications to the Clock circuitry were
relatively minor. The failure mode and effects
analysis performed on the modified Clock re-
vealed that two major failure categories existed
as a function of the modifications. These were
the loss of the Clock turn-on and erroneous
telemetry readings for the various Clocktimes
as a function of voltage outputs. The most sig-
nificant of these was the loss of the Clock turn-
on; however, this is a back-upturn-on mode for
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the F-Channel. On a single failure basis, this
alone would not cause complete Subsystem
failure.
The erroneous telemetry would result from
digital-to-analog conversion failures. The
probabilities associated withthese failures are
very small, however, as the part quantities are
small (6 resistors, 2 gates, and 2 flip-flops)
and the part operating levels are only nominal.
Table E-6 summarizes the failure mode and
effects analysis performed on the modifications
to the Clock. A schematic of the modified Clock
is shown in Figure E-6.
(e) POWER GROUP
High-Current Voltage Regulators (A37 & A12)
The modifications to the High-Current Voltage
Regulators (HCVR) did not involve the electri-
cal performance of the regulators directly,
but rather were concerned with turn-on of the
TV Subsystem and with more meaningful
telemetry.
The modifications concerned with Subsystem
turn-on included the addition of anSCR-desen-
sitizing circuit and changes in the command-
logic circuitry to provide complete isolation of
individual channel turn-on at the command
source and in the relay circuitry. The telem-
etry modifications consisted of replacing a
portion of series-resistance networks with
zener diodes that act as constant voltage
sources in series with the Battery and Regula-
tor outputs. The modifications involved ap-
proximately 24 parts and 46 failure modes. In
the failure mode and effects analysis per-
formed, none of the parts failing singly in any
of their modes would inhibit the TV Subsystem.
Because of the high degree of redundancy pro-
vided, any single part failure would result only
in the malfunction of a redundant turn-on mech-
anism, in some loss of protection, or in a
reduction of safety margin. However, Subsys-
tem operation would not be inhibitedunless the
part failure were coupled with other failure.
A summary of the analyses for the P-Channel
HCVR is presented in Table E-7 and for the
F-Channel HCVR is presented in Table E-8.
A schematic diagram of the modified High-
Current Voltage Regulator is shown in Fig-
ure E-7.
4. Computed Probabilities of Survival
a. INITIAL SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Reliability associated with survival probability
was determined by computing individual sub-
assembly probabilities and substituting these
values in the appropriate places in the mathe-
matical model for the initial Subsystem con-
figuration.
(1) Method
Using initial Subsystem profile II (15-minute
mission plus five 5-minute prelaunch test per-
iods) and 70 ° C failure rates, probabilities of
success for each subassembly were calculated
based onthe exponential distribution (see initial
Subsystem mathematical model):
= e -_' = 1 - Q
The derived probabilities were substituted in
the mathematical model to obtain combined
probabilities.
For example the probability that camera A
would operate and transmit video (0.996947)
was determined by using its mathematical
model PAPx (which in turn, is equal to
PAC _ _ p PQPo _ Pg P__ P, )and substituting inthe
model the values from Table 8.
(2) Results
Probability of survival values for the F and
P Cameras equipments are given below.
(a) F-VIDEO TRANSMISSION
PAPx Probability that Camera A will
operate and transmit video
= O.996947
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TABLE8
PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS OF ASSEMBLIES
Equipments
TV Camera and Electronics:
Camera A (includes color)
Camera B
VMA 1, 2, or3
Camera 1, Free Running Sync.
Camera 1, 2, 3, or 4
Time Code Generator
1-Minute-to-Go Switch
Test and Control Functions:
Test Mode Switch
Command Switch and Drive Amplifer
Prime Power Source:
Regulator and Batteries
C ommunic ations:
Transmitter 1 (or Transmitter 2)
Power Amplifier 1 (or Power Amplifier 2)
Transmitter 1 and 2, Assoc. Telemetry
90-Point Commutator
225-kc VCO 1 or 2
Cruise Mode Telemetry
RF Combiner
Normal Emergency Switch
Profile II
Mission -f- 25
Minutes Test on Pad
Hours
0.65O0
0.6500
0.650O
0.6667
0.6667
0.6667
0.0167
0.4167
0.4167
65.6667
0.5834
0.6667
0.6667
0.6667
47.1667
0.5834
P
s
0.999782
0.999785
O.999975
0.999968
0.999789
0.999966
0.999999
0.999986
0.999975
0.997723
0.999924
0.999977
0.999887
0.999971
0.996869
0.999916
0.999999
Symbol Used
for Component
on Subsystem
%
P
rn
P
n
e,,%,%or%
P
P
%
P
r
P
s
P
t
P
o
P
b
%
P
e
P
g
P
o
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TABLE 8
PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS OF ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Profile II Symbol Used
Equipments Mission + 25 for Component
Minutes Test on Pad on Subsystem
Hours Ps
Control Programmer & Sequencer:
18-kc Oscillators and 'tOW' Gate
Camera A, B, Sequencer and P/S
Camera 1, 2, 3, 4 Sequencer and'9/S
Counter Circuits
0.6667
0.6500
0.6667
0.6667
0.999992
0.999730
0.999701
0.999830
q
P
i
Probability that Camera B will
operate and transmit video
= 0.996949
Probability that Camera A & B
will operate and transmit video
= 0.996731
(PA_Ps-PAPs)Px = Probability that at least one F
camera will operate and success-
fully transmit video
= 0.997164
Px=¢ PhPiP POP PbP P P Pt = Probability of suc-
cess of the F-Telem-
etry transmitting
channel
= 0.997164
(b) P VIDEO TRANSMISSION UP TO THE
LAST MINUTE
p4_ = Probability of at least 4 Camera
Transmission = 0.996289
(p4 +4p3Q) Pw = Frobability of at least 3 Camera
Transmission = 0.997135
(p4+4p3Q+6p2Q2)
• P= Probability of at least 2 Camera
Transmission = 0.997135
(p4+4p _+6P 20 2
+4pQ3 ) p = Probability of at least 1 Camera
Transmission = 0.997135
Probability of success of the P
transmitting channel= 0.997135
(c) P VIDEO TRANSMISSION DURING THE
LAST MINUTE
p4p = Probability of at least 4 Camera
Transmission = 0.996413
(p4+4pSQ) P = Probability of at least 3 Camera
Transmission = 0.9972S9
(p4+4pSQ+6p2
Probability of at least 2 Camera
Transmission = 0.997259
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(P4_4PSQ+6p2Q2
+4PQS)p v = Probability of at least 1 Camera
Transmission = 0.997259
.)
_- j t-,v = Probability of transmitting P
video during the last minute of
operation = 0.997259
(d) THE Pl "FREE RUN" MODE TRANS-
MISSION
The probability of failure of the sequencer:
The probability of P1 operating times trans-
mitting prior to the last minute:
P = P7 P P P Pb P P_ P P =0.997232
The probability of P1 operating and transmit-
ting if switchover occurs:
P=P7 P PRP P p P = 0.997356
(e) 90-POINT TELEMETRY
The 90-point telemetry has two probabilities
associated with its operation. These are Pj for
the normal mode and Pj for the emergency
mode.
P = Normal mode of at least one telemetry channel
J = 0.997486
Pj = Emergency mode of at least one telemetry
channel = 0.997516
The cruise mode telemetry Pc,nt = P_ P, =
0.994598 as the probability of success for the
entire cruise mode.
b. SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
For the split-system, reliability associated
with survival probability was determined in
the same manner as for the initial configura-
tion, that is, individual assembly probabilities
were calculated and substituted in the appro-
priate places in the split-system mathematical
model.
(I) Method
Using the split-system profile (a 15-minute
mission) and the 70 ° C failure rates computed
for the initial system, probabilities of success
for each assembly were calculated. The values
derived were then substituted in the mathe-
matical model for the split-system.
For comparison purposes, similar survival
figures were derived for the initial configura-
tion using a 15-minute profile and the initial
Subsystem model.
(2) Results
Results of the calculations are summarized in
Table 9 which compares the split-system with
the initial configuration.
Probability of complete mission success for
the split-system was determined to be 0.99378,
a slight reduction from the 0.99468 computed
for the initial configuration. On the other hand,
the probability of complete failure for the split-
system was only 1.5 x 10 -7 compared to
5.2 x 10 -5 for the initial configuration. Thus,
the probability of complete success for the
split- system was slightly reduced but the prob-
ability that some data would be returned was
significantly enhanced.
5. Evaluation of Mission Success
a. MISSION SUCCESS CALCULATIONS
Probabilities of mission success as defined in
the reliability requirements study were com-
puted for the minimum and ideal conditions of
each of the three design goals.
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TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE RELIABILITIES
Operating States
4 P's, 2 F's, all T/M
(State 1 only)
At least all T/M (States 1
through 15 inclusive)
The 15 video states of zero
90-point and all 15-point
T/M, summed.
The 15 video states of zero
15-point and all 90-point
T/M, summed.
The 15 video states of zero
15-point and zero 90-point
T/M, summed.
Exact State of no return:
State (60)
Initial
0.99468
0.99529
-s
4.96 x 10
Split-System
0.99378
0.99481
-5
4.92 x 10
-3
4.44 x 10
-4
2.19 x 10
-3
4.61 x i0
-4
5.28x 10
5
5.2 x i0
-7
1.5 x I0
(1) First Design Goal
To obtain high-quality, high-resolution, tele-
vision pictures of the lunar surface.
(3) Third Design Goal
To obtain wide area coverage
surface.
of the lunar
Minimum: At least 3P Cameras during last minute
= 0.997259
Ideal: At least 4P Cameras during last minute
= 0.996413
Minimum: PA = 0.996947
Ideal: PA " Pe =0.996731
(2) Second Design Goal
To obtain a reasonable nesting of a sequence of
television pictures, starting from a resolution
of approximately 350 meters per line pair.
Minimum: PA at least 2P = 0.996526
Ideal: PA at least 4P = 0.995680
b. FIGURE OF RELATIVE MERIT
The figure of relative merit for the P Cameras
was computed using the formula previously
developed.
F.M. = P A cOc
A composite bar chart for the values computed
from this equation is shown in Figure 30.
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6. Post-RA-6 Reliability Analysis and Prediction
a. POST-RA-6 APPROACH
Because of the failure of Ranger VI to return
video data before impact on the moon, post-
RA-6 reliability efforts were concentrated on
those functions of immediate assistance to the
redesign effort. Thus, the reliability predic-
tions and the mathematical models were not
formally updated although informal reliability
estimates were made. These estimates re-
vealed that the post-RA-6 Subsystem was less
likely to have a complete mission abort due to
the changes implemented.
Formal reliability effort included the post-
RA-6 failure mode effects analysis already
described (sub-section B3d) and a component
electrical stress evaluation. This evaluation
is described in the following paragraphs; sup-
porting tables are contained in Appendix F,
Volume 4b.
b. COMPONENT ELECTRICAL STRESS EVALUATION
As part of the redesign program, a reliability
stress reevaluation of the Ranger TV Subsys-
tem was completed. This study examined
specific applications of the individual compo-
nent parts and determined their reliability
using the electrical and thermal operating
conditions as judgment criteria. The details
and conclusions of this evaluation, which are
presented here, reflect the design status as it
existed on approximately April 4, 1965.
(1) Method
The stress evaluation was performed by meas-
uring the electrical operating conditions across
each component part. In areas of duplications,
such as flip-flop circuits and gating circuits,
a typical circuit was selected and subjected to
the measurement analysis. In RF circuits
where tuning was extremely critical, no meas-
urements were attempted. Table F-1 lists the
assemblies of the Subsystem tested.
The electrical operating conditions were de-
termined using the schematic diagrams and
the list of materials given in Table F-2. This
source of electrical data was supplemented
by thermal measurements and component part
testing to achieve a realistic evaluation of
specific part applications.
(2) Appraisal of Component Part Applications Operating
Conditions Versus Manufacturer Specifications
In analyzing the applications of the individual
component parts, each part was examined
with respect to its electrical operating stress
and its thermal environment. These operating
conditions were compared with the ratings
imposed by the manufacturers' specifications
of the individual parts, and the reliability as-
pects of the applications were then judged
accordingly. It was the objective of this review
to point out such applications as were clearly
out of the established derating policy. The de-
tailed data on the component parts and their
operating conditions are given in Tables F-4
to F-37. It should be noted that a dash in any
of the stress analysis columns indicates that
the value for that column was negligible.
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(a) ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONABLE RELI-
ABILITY
The questionable reliability areas, whereparts
exceeded the derating policy on the Ranger
program, are tabulated in Table F-3. Each
part-application level listed in Table F-3 was
reviewed with component-part specialists con-
cerning the reliability risk involved. This
review considered the risk from two aspects.
The first was Ranger mission and testing re-
quirements as opposed to those of longer-
lived spacecraft. The second was the decrease
in reliability if a part replacement was at-
tempted on completed assemblies to assure
meeting the derating policy.
(b) RESISTORS
The resistors listed as exceeding the derating
policy were not a serious reliability risk. The
most heavily operated units, contained in the
Sequencer Power Supply, were measured by
thermocouples to determine their body tem-
peratures. A review of temperature data
showed that resistors R16 and R45 in the
Sequencer Power Supply reached a stable tem-
perature of approximately 163 and 169 ° C,
respectively, while operating in thermal vac-
uum at +55 ° C ambient. Maximum body tem-
perature of 275 ° C (as a minimum value)was
permissible.
(c) CAPACITORS
The capacitors listed as exceedingthederating
policy were not considered a reliability risk.
The majority of the capacitors were tantalum
units with a series resistance offourohmsper
volt or greater. This allowed a self-healing
process to become effective during a scintilla-
tion mechanism, should it be encountered. The
remaining types of Mylar, mica, paper, cer-
amic, and glass were capable ofoperatingalso
at higher voltages, and more recent derating
policies increased these levels.
(d) TRANSISTORS
In this review, six transistors exceeded the
manufacturer's rating by factors of 125 to 240
percent of the BVze o rated value. There were
two points of concern. The first was the degree
of current limitation in the circuits in the event
that the applied voltage caused an avalanche
breakdown of the junction. The second was the
effect on the gain characteristics of the device
in the event that the units were broken down
but were current limited.
Both areas were evaluated. Limited testing of
the 2N930's showed that the BVEe o avalanche
level was greater than 15 volts. This repre-
sented a considerable safety margin over the
manufacturer's published ratings. In the Ran-
ger application none of the devices ever en-
countered this level; maximum level was 12
volts. A test was performed on a small number
of samples at a VsE of 20 volts and the power
dissipation within the diode junction was limited
to various levels. A control sample was op-
erated in a normal forward-bias condition. The
gain characteristics of the devices were meas-
ured before setup and after three days of
continuous operation. The reduction in gain
characteristics varied from three to five per-
cent and was evident in both the control sample
and all the samples operated in the breakdown
region. On this basis, the application of these
devices was accepted and the equipments re-
leased to production.
C. PARTS SELECTION, EVALUATION, AND
CONTROL
To insure the highest possible reliability of
parts used in the Ranger TV Subsystem, firm
policies and procedures were established for
the selection, evaluation, and control of the
components used. To implement these policies
and procedures, RCA Engineering Reliability,
Design Engineering, and Central Engineering
(at DEP) worked in close cooperation. The
activities of these groups included not only
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control of the selectionproceduresbut, also
the delineationof preconditioningprocedures
to further guaranteeproperpart operationin
its RangerTVSubsystemenvironment.
1. Parts Selection
a. INITIAL SELECTION
Individual parts selections were first made by
the respective design engineers in the following
order of preference established by RCA Re-
liability Engineering: (1) RCA Satellite Stand-
ards, (2) military approved parts, and (3) JPL
preferred parts. Lists of these selections were
each generated on a subassembly basis using
the Ranger Part Worksheet shown in Figure 31.
The "requested part" side of the worksheet
for each subassembly was completed by De-
sign Engineering.
b. REVIEW AND APPROVAL
The worksheets were then submitted to Engi-
neering Reliability for review action. Defense
Electronic Products Central Engineering,
working in close coordination with Engineering
Reliability, reviewed and approved or rejected
all parts listed on the worksheets. Factors con-
sidered in the approval cyelewere stress, part
history, Ranger environment, effect of sterili-
zation temperature (125 ° C), and vendor qual-
ifications. Parts rejected as reliability risks
were replaced with recommended approved
parts. Approved parts, in addition to meeting
the structural requirements cited above, also
were required to adhere to the functional
standards set forth in the Ranger derating
policy.
c. DERATING POLICY
A standard derating policy for all Ranger TV
Subsystem Parts was established by RCA En-
gineering Reliability. Highlights of the require-
ments are summarized below.
• Semiconductors. The power dissipated
by any semiconductor, averaged over a
thirty-second period, could not exceed
one-fifth of the room-ambient power rat-
ing of the semiconductor. In addition, no
semiconductor could ever be subjected
to a voltage transient exceeding four-
fifths of its rated breakdown voltages.
• Capacitors. No mica and ceramic capa-
citors could operate at a voltage in ex-
cess of 10 percent of their+25°C voltage
rating nor could tantalum capacitors op-
erate in excess of 70 percent of their
+ 65 ° C voltage rating.
• Resistors. The power dissipated by any
resistive element, averaged over a thirty-
second period, could not exceed one-half
of the +25 ° C power rating nor could it
ever be subjected to a voltage exceeding
four-fifths of its maximum rating.
• All other parts were reviewed on an
individual basis.
• Special Applications Releases. Design
engineers could request release from
the derating requirements of the pre-
ceding paragraphs when such derating
would seriously conflict with other design
parameters, The design engineer was re-
quired to furnish Engineering Reliability
with complete details of the component
application and the reason for the request.
Waiver requests were reviewed by com-
ponent parts specialists and were proc-
essed as described in Parts Classifi-
cation below.
d. PARTS CLASSIFICATION
All parts approved for use in the Ranger TV
Subsystem were classified either as standard
or nonstandard parts.
Standard parts were those parts selected from
the Satellite Standards manual and/or Military
Standard approved parts which met the mini-
mum part environmental specifications tabu-
lated in the Satellite Standard manual.
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Nonstandard parts were those which did not
meet the standard-part requirements, but for
which limited data of performance in a similar
environment was available. In special cases,
part performance was verified by qualifica-
tion testing.
All parts were grouped into lists of standard
(Table G-l) and nonstandard (Table G-2) parts.
Information was included to identify the sub-
assemblies in which the parts were used. These
lists were maintained throughout the program.
2. Part Preconditioning
a. INITIAL AND SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
A part preconditioning program was imple-
mented. The bake cycle, parameters measured,
acceptance criteria, and program results are
presented briefly here.
(1) Bake Cycle
High-population electronic parts were first
measured for the parameters listed in Table 11
and then subjected to a 168-hourbaking period
under specific conditions varying according to
the component. Table 10 summarizes the tem-
perature of the preconditioning cycle.
• O :',_, _,,e, Cr
Table 11 lists the parameters measured before
and after the 168-hour baking period.
(3) Accept-Reject Criteria
Criteria for acceptance and rejection were
based upon the extent of deviation from part
specifications, or upon the allowable percent
of change from the initial parameter meas-
urements for all preconditioned components.
Erratic behavior was also considered cause
for rejection; the final deeisionwasmade after
an engineering analysis on an individual device
basis, for example, on units drifting exces-
sively from measurements.
TABLE 10
BAKE-CYCLE CONDITIONS (INITIAL AND SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS)
Component Type Temperature (°C) Specific Conditions
Silicon Semiconductors
Tantalum Capacitors
Ceramic Capacitors
Other Capacitors
Carbon Composition Resistors
Other Resistors
Transformers and Coils
100
100
100
100
100
85
None
Appropriate polarizing voltage
applied
Not baked - Initial measurement
only
None
Initial measurement after a 48-hour
drying period before 168-hour bake
None
None
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TABLE ! 1
PARAMETERS MEASURED (INITIAL AND SPLIT-SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS)
Component Type Parameters Measured
Transistors
Diodes
General Purpose
Zener
Varactors
Capacitors
Tantalum
Dura-Mica, Ceramic,
Paper
Trimmer
Resistors
Chokes
Transformers
i Relays i
DC gain (Beta), leakage current, breakdown voltage
Leakage current, forward voltage drop
Leakage current, forward voltage drop
Leakage current, capacitance, breakdown voltage
Capacitance, dissipation factor, dc leakage
Capacitance, dissipation factor, insulation resistance,
dielectric strength (where indicated)
Capacitance (min. and max.), dielectric strength, and
insulation resistance
Resistance, or percent of deviation
Insulation resistance, in du c t an c e, Q, self-resonant
frequency, dielectric strength
Insulation resistance, dielectric strength
DC coil resistance, pull-in or drop-out voltage or cur-
rent, contact resistance, insulation resistance
Particular attention was given to semiconduc-
tors, for which additional accept-reject cri-
teria can be stated simply as follows:
Accept. Change in leakage current was
not greater than 100 percent; change in
Beta was not greater than 20 percent; all
parameters measured were within speci-
fication limits.
Reject. Change in leakage current was
greater than 100 percent and the absolute
value of the leakage current was greater
than one microampere; change in Beta
was greater than 20 percent.
• Special Cases. Where leakage current
was less than one microampere but its
change was greater than 100 percent, re-
jection or acceptance was determined on
an individual basis. The device was ac-
cepted if its behavior was typical of the
overall lot; it was rejected if its behavior
was abnormal with respect to the over-
all lot.
(4) Program Results
Table 12 summarizes the preconditioning ex-
perience during the initial and split-system
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TABLE 12
PRECONDITIONING RESULTS
Component
Capacitors
Resistors
Diodes
Transistors
Chokes
Transformers
Relays
Total
Total Quantity
9455
37502
9699
6765
1212
93
345
65071
Quantity
535
591
204
465
32
14
1841
Rejects
Percentage
5.65
1.57
2.10
6.88
2.61
4.O5
2.83
phases of the program. Rejections listed in the
table included both initial inspection and post-
bake rejects.
(5) Additional ProgramDevelopment
Until the Ranger VI configuration rework, the
only modification to the preconditioning pro-
gram was deletion of the bake cycle for carbon
composition resistors. The resistors were,
however, subjected to 100-percent electrical
inspection, as were all nonpreconditioned elec-
trical parts.
b. POST-RANGER VI CONFIGURATION
At the beginning of the Post-Ranger VI re-
work the preconditioning program was re-
viewed. Substantially, the same program was
maintained with changes principally in the
capacitor and relay areas. Capacitor types
were classified with temperature and time-
cycles conditions recommended by RCA part
specialists, Special relay tests were arranged
in consultations with both RCA and JPL parts
personnel The following paragraphs describe
the modified preconditioning program.
(1) General
All incoming parts and materials were 100-
percent inspected and tested. Semiconductors
were identified and permanent records were
maintained of all values recorded during the
incoming inspection.
All acceptable electronic parts were baked at
specified temperatures. After the bake cycle,
all electronic parts were 100-percent in-
spected. Traceability by part serial number
was maintained for certain critical semicon-
ductor applications.
(2) Bake-Cycle Conditions
Table 13 lists the components and conditions
of the bake cycle.
(3) Parameters Measured
The parameters measured before and after the
bake cycle are listed in Table 14.
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TABLE 13
MODIFIED BAKE-CYCLE CONDITIONS
Temperature Duration
Component Type (o C) (Hours) Conditions
Silicon
Semiconductor
Capacitors
Electrolytic
Tantalum (Wet Slug)
Paper, Plastic
Ceramic
Solid Tantalum
Others
Resistors
Carbon
Composition
Others
Transformer
and Coils
100
125
125
85
100
100
168
168
72
96
168
168
No voltage applied
Rated voltage applied
140% of rated voltage applied
140% of rated voltage applied
Rated voltage applied
No voltage applied
100
85
168
168
No baking. 100% inspection
(4) Special Tests
An acid indicator test was performed on the
seal of electrolytic tantalum (wet slug) capaci-
tors after each of the following temperature
cycles accomplished before the 168-hour bake:
30 minutes at -55 ° C, 15 minutes at 25 ° C, 30
minutes at 85 ° C, and 15 minutes at 25 ° C. A
thymal blue indicator, which changed from
orange to bright red in the presence of acid,
was used to detect leakage. Leaky capacitors
were rejected and removed from the lot. This
test was repeated after the 168-hour bake
cycle.
(5) Accept-Reject Criteria
Acceptance and rejection criteria were as
described for the initial and split-system
configuration.
(6) Special Cases of Preconditioning
(a) POTTER AND BRUMFIELD RELAY
TYPE SCIIDB
Each relay had its contacts cycled at a rate of
10 el operations per minute with 100 ma,
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TABLE 14
PARAMETERS MEASURED BEFORE AND AFTER BAKE-CYCLE
Component Type
Transistors
Diodes
General Purpose
Z ener
Varactor
Capacitors
Tantalum
Trimmer
Others
Resistors
Transformers
Chokes
Relays
Parameters Measured
DC gain (Beta)
Leakage current, forward voltage drop
Leakage current, forward voltage drop
Leakage current, capacitance breakdown voltage
Capacitance, dissipation factor, DC leakage
Capacitance (min. and max.), dielectric strength, insulation
resistance
Capacitance, dissipation factor, insulation resistance, di-
electric withstanding voltage
Resistance or percent of deviation
Insulation resistance, dielectric strength
Insulation resistance, inductance, self-resonant frequency,
dielectric strength
DC coil resistance, pull-in and drop-out voltage or cur-
rent, contact resistance, insulation resistance.
28 volts DC applied. The contacts were moni-
tored so as to indicate when the contact re-
sistance of any set exceeded 100 milliohms.
The apparatus was constructed to cut off when
a resistance failure was encountered. Any
relay experiencing a contact failure was
rejected.
Each relay was tested for dielectric with-
standing voltage (at sea level} as outlined in
MIL-R-5757. In addition to the requirements
specified in that document, a leakage current
of greater than one milliampere was a failure.
Only those units passing these tests were used
in equipment.
(b) POTTER AND BRUMFIELD RELAY
TYPE SLIIDB
A 100-percent initial inspection of the DC re-
sistance of each coil winding on this relaywas
made and recorded. Accept-reject criteria
were based on the detailed specification
requirements.
All parts were exposed to a temperature-
preconditioning cycle.
All samples were subjected to the low tem-
perature extreme -65 ° C for a minimum of
eight hours nonoperating. Samples were then
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immediately placed into a chamber at 125 ° C
for one-half hour nonoperating and then cooled
to room ambient.
All samples were then placed in a chamber at
125 ° C for three hours with a coil voltage of
39.6 volts applied to one of the latching coils
of each relay; the second coil was not ener-
gized. During this exposure to 125 ° C, the
relays were also operated by applying 22 volts
DC to each coil, alternately, for a minimumof
one hundred operations at approximately one
per minute. The 39.6 volts was removed from
the latching coil during the 100 operations at 22
volts DC and was reconnected for the com-
pletion of the three-hour test.
At the conclusion of the power test above, and
while the units were still in the chamber with
the temperature reduced and stabilized at
+25 ° C, each mating contact was checked for
closure using an ohmmeter. The coils were
then allowed to stabilize to room temperature
and DC resistance was then measured.
The relay was rejected if physical damage
resulted due to preconditioning, if DC resis-
tance changed by more than plus or minus
ten percent of initial value, if mating of con-
tacts was not proper, or if the dielectric with-
standing voltage test failed.
(c) ENVIRONMENTAL TEST FOR POTTER
AND BRUMFIELD RELAYS
Before environmental acceleration, shock, and
vibration tests were undertaken, contact re-
sistance of the normally closed contacts, pull-
in and drop-out voltage, and contact resistance
(closed) were measured. The closed contact
was then monitored during the following tests:
• Acceleration at 100g maximum for 2.5
minutes; three-axes, coil energized and
deenergized.
• Shock at 50g sawtooth for 5 ms; three
axes, coil energized and deenergized.
• Vibration (three axes) at 10 to 55 cps,
195 sine excursions for 2.5 minutes on
each axis; 55 cps to 2000 cps, 30g sweep
for 2.5 minutes on each axis. The pre-
test measurements were then repeated.
(d) SILICON CONTROLLED RECTIFIER
(SCR) C50 DR308
The SCR's, C50 DR308, used in the High-
Current Voltage Regulator were selected and
preconditioned by the vendor, General Electric,
to the following specifications:
Preconditioning
Eighty hours at 200 ° C storage; ten tempera-
ture cycles from -40 to +150 ° C; thermal
conductivity (OjcJ test; a 48-hour elevated
temperature blocking-voltage test performed
at 60 cycles AC, peak voltage; a bubble leak
test; and a radiflow test.
Selection Criteria
Forward leakage current (IFo M) equal to or
less than 0.8 ma at 75 ° C; turn-off equal to or
less than 50 microseconds at 75 ° C with a 50
ampere load; dv/dt greater than 30 volts per
microsecond at 75 ° C; holding current-10 to
-100 ma at 75 ° C; gate turn-on current 70 ma
at -40 ° C; di/dt equal to or greater than 80
amperes per microsecond.
(e) SILICON CONTROLLED RECTIFIER
(SCR) C35 DRS79
The SCR's, C35 DR879, (RCA drawing1721984)
used in the Command Control Unit were se-
lected and preconditioned by the vendor, Gen-
eral Electric, to the following specifications:
Preconditioning
168 hours at 200 ° C storage; ten temperature
cycles from -65 to + 150 ° C; thermal conduc-
tivity (_JC) test; a 48-hour elevated tempera-
ture blocking voltage test, performed at 60
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cyclesAC, peakvoltage;a bubbleleak test;
anda radiflowtest.
Selection Criteria
Forward leakage current (I zoM ) equal to or
less than 0.1 ma at 75 ° C; turn-off equal to or
less than 30 microseconds at 75 ° C; dr dr
greater than 30 volts per microsecond at 75 ° C;
holding current -10 to -100 ma at 75 ° C.
(f} TRANSISTOR SN 169
The SN 169 transistors (RCAdrawing8545229)
used in the X12 multiplier of the TV Subsystem
Transmitter were selected and preconditioned
by the vendor, National Semiconductor Cor-
poration (Clock Division) to the following
specifications:
Hermetic Seal Test
Prior to final electrical inspection each tran-
sistor was immersed in a solution of liquid
detergent (two percent by volume) in waterfor
a minimum of 24 hours at 70 psi gage pressure.
The transistor was then removed from the
solution, rinsed in pure water, and air-dried.
A final electrical inspection was completed
within eight hours after removal of the tran-
sistor from the solution.
High-Temperature Storage Test
The units were stored at a temperature of
200 ° C for a period of 340 hours. Measurements
of Ics o , BVcso, and hFE before and afterbake
were required to meet minimum specification
levels and those of Table 15.
Thermal Impedance
The junction-to-case temperature differential
with the case at 100 ° C could not exceed 70 ° C
per watt.
D. DESIGN REVIEW
The design of all equipments on the Ranger TV
Subsystem was reviewed in detail to evaluate
the technical approach, performance, and re-
liability. This review was accomplished in
accordance with established company proce-
dures for design review as an integral part of
the RCA engineering and product assurance
processes.
1. Types of Reviews
Four types of reviews were held, as required.
RF Test
Each unit was tested in an RCA X12 multiplier
unit (RCA Dwg. 8324675). The minimum power
output of the unit required at 240 Mc was 2.2
watts, IE was 150 ma maximum.
DC Burn-in Test
Each transistor was operated at four watts of
dissipation at a case temperature of 141°C for
a minimum period of 250 hours. I cso, BVcso ,
and h FE were measured before and after this
test. The transistor was required to meet mini-
mum specification levels and those of Table 15.
a. PRELIMINARY
After start of work and definition of atentative
Subsystem block diagram, preliminary design
reviews were held to assess the design concept
and the approach to the various program as-
pects. In these reviews the following were
considered: the complete Subsystem; the mis-
sion requirements; the specification perform-
ance goals; the failure mode analysis; the
reliability policies, estimates, and allocations
and safety factors; documentation control; the
power and weight budget; and identifying inter-
faces as well as the scheduling of the creation
of interface drawings.
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TABLE 15
ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS
Test
ICBO
BVcB 0
BVEB 0
BVcB 0
B
hFE
(curve
tracer)
Conditions
VCB = 70 volts DC
IE = 0
Ic = 500_ a
IE = 0
I E = 500 tt a
IC = 0
Ic = 1 ma
I s = 0
Vcs = 50 volts DC
IE = 0
_/ = 10 volts DC
• CB
Ic = 500 ma
Minimum
175 volts
2.0 volts
140 volts
10
Limits
Maximum
10 _a DC
12 pf
b. MAJOR
At the completion of breadboard testing and
before shopwork started, major design reviews
were held to evaluate the breadboard designs.
In these reviews each assembly was considered
in relation to: manufaeturability; use of stand-
ard parts; cost; reliability, stress analysis,
Subsystem and circuit recommendations; power
and weight parameters; and compatibility of
the design with contractual requirements.
c. FINAL
After completion of testing of the engineering
model, final design reviews were held. Con-
sidered in these reviews were the following:
circuit design; mechanical design, wire dress,
and packaging; malfunction reports; reliability
predictions, manufacturability; inhouse'capa-
bility, new facility requirements; compatibility
of design with contractual requirements; Sub-
system compatibility of the design; and
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completenessofthedrawingpackage,interms
of bothcontractualandinternal requirements.
d. SPECIAL
Special design reviews were held to resolve
design problems and changes through the bal-
ance of the program. These reviews were
called at the request of the engineering leader
or manager concerned, Manufacturing Engi-
neering, the Manager of Reliability Engineer-
ing, or the Project Manager.
2. Organization of Design Reviews
Design reviews were conducted by a design
review committee composed of a chairman and
committee members qualified to pass on the
merits of the subject matter discussed. Par-
ticipants in the review and their functions are
described below.
The Manager of the Technical Advisory Staff
was an ex-officio member and had overall cog-
nizance of all design reviews. He appointed the
chairman, scheduled reviews, assisted in and
approved selection of committee members, ap-
proved reports of the meetings, prepared
monthly summary reports for the Chief Engi-
neer, and estimated costs of the design review
programs.
The Chairman of the Design Review distributed
all technical material to the participants at
least one week in advance of the meeting, noti-
fied participants, obtained facilities and pre-
pared the agenda, chaired the meeting, assisted
in selection of committee members, wrote the
report of the meeting, and wrote the close-out
report when all outstanding items were satis-
factorily resolved.
The Technical Secretary was appointed by the
Chairman and assisted him in writing a report
within one week after the meeting and in iden-
tifying the action items.
The Engineering Reliability member, appointed
by the Manager of Engineering Reliability, had
cognizance of malfunction reports and relia-
bility predictions. He followed up on action
items within two weeks after the meeting.
The Manufacturing Engineering member, ap-
pointed by the Manager of Manufacturing En-
gineering had _ognizance of manufacturability
and of manufacturing costs.
The project member, appointed by the Project
Manager had cognizance of meeting specifica-
tions and performance goals, design and relia-
bilityrecommendations, and cost reduction.
Other RCA members were appointed by the
Chairman with the approval of the Manager,
Technical Advisory Staff from AED, other
RCA divisions, and the RCA Service Company
to provide design and reliabilityrecommen-
dations and to assist the chairman in writing
reports, when requested.
Non-RCA members were appointed by the Chief
Engineer or the Manager, Technical Advisory
Staff when required, to provide design and
reliabilityrecommendations. Other RCA mem-
bers and non-RCA members were usually top
level technical personnel from other divisions
of DEP and RCA and consultants from outside
RCA, invited as participants when deemed
appropriate by the Manager of the Technical
Advisory Staff.
3. Response to Design Review Recommenda-
tions
The following procedure was used to implement
the committee recommendation.
a° Within one week after the meeting, the
chairman issued a report to the design
activity listing the findings and recom-
mendations of the Review Committee.
b. The design activity gave careful con-
sideration to the recommendations and
prepared a written reply to the chair-
man with copies to committee mem-
bers. The letter clearly indicated the
proposals accepted or rejected. Where
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rejections were made, adequate reasons
were given. This reply was madewithin
two weeks from the issuance of the
Design Review report.
Alternately, the reply was communi-
cated to Engineering Reliability rather
than issued directly by the design ac-
tivity. In this case Engineering Relia-
bility prepared the report, listing only
the responses of the design activity.
Recommendations of Engineering Re-
liability were forwarded as a separate
report.
Upon receipt of the design activity's
reply, the Design Review Committee
considered the design activity position
on all of the recommendations in the
original Design Review Report. If all
items were resolvable, the chairman
issued a close-out report. Where dif-
ferences still existed, they were sub-
mitted to the Chief Engineer for final
re solution.
4. Initial Subsystem Configuration Design Re-
views
a. REVIEWS HELD
A total of 51 design reviews ranging from
preliminary to special, were held on initial
Subsystem Assemblies and subassemblies.
Table 16 lists these reviews by subassembly
and type of review, giving the date and loca-
tion of each.
b. COVERAGE AND RESULTS
To provide an indication of the coverage of the
reviews and the nature of the results produced,
summaries of the :lesign-review discussion
and/or resulting action on twelve assemblies
are listed in thisparagraph. These assemblies
were selected as illustrations only and the list
does not attempt to summarize the entire initial
configuration design-review effort. A complete
and detailed listing of design changes is con-
tained in the Design section of this report.
$ High-Current Voltage Regulator. Satis-
factory performance of a replacement
Zener diode type 4111 was monitored
during a 500-hour life test as a result
of review recommendations.
• Temperature Sensor. The use of matched
diodes was reviewed and adequate notes
were added to the control drawh_gs.
Thermal expansion of the thermistor and
its potting encapsulation were checked
and found to be compatible. The effects of
mounting thermistors in direct sunlight
were evaluated and it was found that
calibrations were not affected.
Structure. The results of the vibration
test were carefully reviewed. A torqu-
ing tabulation was produced which in-
cluded the mounting of all subassemblies
on the TV Subsystem structure.
TV Subsystem Thermal. The effect of
the sterilization bake on the surface
emissive properties were rechecked and
found to be negligible. The effects of
opening the camera aperture recess was
reviewed from a thermal standpoint.
An overall thermal evaluation was
performed.
Test Console. A time delay was added
to prevent a premature turn on without
proper filament warm-up time of the
Power Amplifier tube. The test-console
power-control relay was checked with
the Subsystem. Running-time meters
were added to record TV Subsystem op-
erating time.
Command Switch. The performance of the
units was checked at 80 ° C after 1-hour
temperature stabilization. Arc suppres-
sion networks for relay contacts were in-
vestigated and found unnecessary because
of the low contact-current levels. The
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TABLE 16
RANGER DESIGN REVIEW STATUS [INITIAL CONFIGURATION]
Equipment
High- and Low-Current
Voltage Regulators
Temperature Sensor
Structure
TV Subsystem Thermal Design
Preliminary
12/15/61
1/15/62
12/8/61
Major
4/19/62
3/20/62
3/15/63
4/16/62
Final
6/8/62
6/8/62
6/14/62
6/16/62
Batteries
Test Console
Command Switch
Video Combiner
Camera Mounting Bracket
Ground Equipment Control
Panel Demodulator
Ground Power Supply
Equipment
Camera and Camera
Electronics
Interconnecting Cables
Sequencer & Dual Power
Power Supply
Telemetry
Communications
1/25/62
1/12/62
1/12/62
1/16/62
12/13/61
1/16/62
1/11/62
1/17/62
1/12/62
12/7/61
1/25/62
12/13/61
4/19/62
5/4/62
4/13/62
4/12/62
4/17/62
5/29/62
3/29/62
4/6/62
4/17/62
1/15/62
1/17/62
4/16/62
4/16/62
8/29/62
8/29/62
8/27/62
8/27/62
5/4/62
6/15/62
9/6/62
5/8/62
8/8/62
12/22/62
8/15/62
8/15/62
Special
8/15/62
10/30/62
6/1/62
resistor in the base circuit of Q1 and Q2
was reduced from 100k to 22k.
• Camera Mounting Bracket. The tor-
sional rigidity of the camera mounting
bracket was checked fully loaded by vi-
bration testing. The effect of vibration
on a camera high-voltage capacitor
mounted in the harness was established
by vibration testing and found to be
acceptable. Mechanical i n t e r f e r e n c e
between the collimators and the struc-
ture, resulted in collimators being
repositioned.
Cable Interconnections. Spare wires in
the cable were properly terminated. Pro-
cedures were developed for installing
camera cables. The conformancetoJPL
workmanship specification was verified.
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It was noted that potting of connectors
made cables nonrepairable. JPL was
consulted and required cable potting.
Ground Power Supply, Block House
Panel, and Shelter Panel Preliminary
Review. Electrical specifications were
required and were produced. The maxi-
mum ambient operating temperature of
the equipment was determined to be with-
in the limits of the equipment capability.
The grounding philosophy for coax in the
OSE was verified.
5. Split-System Configuration Design Reviews
a. REVIEWS HELD
Because the split-system configuration evolved
from the initial Subsystem design which had
undergone prerelease design review, all split-
system reviews were considered to be special
design reviews. Thus, only a total of ten de-
sign reviews w e r e required on t h e split-
system. Table 17 lists these reviews byequip-
ments and dates.
Camera and Camera Electronics. During
dark-current sampling, peak-to-peak
video was too high. Designchangeswere
made to reduce this value. Power supply
spikes were reduced to acceptable levels
through improved grounding and shield-
ing. The video amplifier was redesigned
to improve performance. RFI filters
were added to power supply leads. The
shutter-drive circuit was AC-coupled to
the shutter coil.
Sequencer. Feasibility of replacing Q6,
Q7, and Q8 with a 12-volt zener diode
was investigated and rejected by the de-
sign group A resistor was substituted
for QS. A 150-ohm resistor and a 0.033
mf capacitor were placed across the con-
tacts of the "Full Power" relay inthe
sequencer. The thickness of the mica
washer under the power transistors in the
power supply was reduced from 0.020 to
0.002 inch.
Communication. The tube in the Power
Amplifier was changed from ML-7289/
3CX100A5 to ML 7855 for added
temperature-frequency stability. The
85 ° C double-case capacitors in the trans-
mitter power supply were replaced with
an approved part. All high-voltage con-
nector applications were rechecked for
voltage breakdown.
b. COVERAGE AND RESULTS
The split-system reviews covered both changes
necessary to implement the split-system and
its overall system concept and changes intended
to improve performance. Three of these re-
views are presented here for purposes of il-
lustration. As in the case of the initial Sub-
system, a complete and detailed listing of
design changes is contained in the Design
section of this report.
• Split-System Concept. The split-system
concept was reviewed and approved,
based on improving the probability of
obtaining mission video data. Itwascon-
eluded that relay performance in space
applications had been proved on the
TIROS program; no relay failures had
been reported on any RCA satellite or
subsystem during space operation. Test
data of fuzing operation in a thermal-
vacuum environment were discussed and
split-system fuzing philosophy and im-
plementation were approved.
Electronic Clock. Possible occurrence of
the activating pulse at the wrong time in
time-interval selectionwas examined and
methods to overcome this circumstance
were evaluated. It was concluded that
the situation did not warrant the major
redesign necessary to insure against this
occurrence. It was determined that the
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TABLE 17
SPLIT-SYSTEM DESIGN REVIEWS
Equipment
Split-System Concept
Electronic Clock (New Unit)
I Electrical
2/14/63
4/18/63
Type Review
Mechanical
2/14/63
5/3/63
Distribution Control Unit (New Unit)
Power Control Unit (New Unit)
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Camera, Camera Electronics, Sequencer
and Power Supply, Video Combiner
Transmitter
Fast Erase for F Camera
3/7/63
4/8/63
3/22/63
3/6/63
2/27/63
5/14/63
5/15/63
4/5/63
3/7/63
4/8/63
output transistors should be screened for
a leakage current (Ic) of 100 microam-
peres at a VcEo of -48 volts to provide
for an excessive initial turn-on voltage of
41 volts.
The Electronic Clock mechanical review
approved the use of bifurcated terminals,
mounting of the 2N1486 as in the other
subassemblies, maintenance of acces-
sibility of the time-interval connection,
a short cable length between the Clock and
the CCU and potting compounds as speci-
fied by RCA Specification 2020473D.
Power Control Unit. The use of bifur-
cated terminals was approved. The ef-
fects of surge currents on relays and
capacitors were examined and found not
to be a problem. The part-mountingtech-
niques were reviewed and, as a result,
checked during qualifieation te sting whe re
they were found to be satisfactory.
6. Post-Ranger Vl Configuration Design Reviews
a. REVIEWS HELD
Post-Ranger VI design reviews were also all
special reviews because the modified con-
figuration was also a further development of
the initial Subsystem. As in the case of the
split-system, only six additional design re-
views were required to cover the Subsystem
changes. Table 18 lists these reviews by equip-
ment and dates.
b. COVERAGE AND RESULTS
The Post-Ranger VI reviews were concerned
principally with changes in the command con-
trol circuits because of the failure of Ranger
VI to return video data before impacting on
the Moon. Other design changes were made
to improve performance of telemetry data and
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TABLE 18
POST-RANGER VI DESIGN REVIEWS
Equipment Dates Held
Command Control
Thermal Design, Block HI
Command Regulator, Current Sensor
TV Ground Support and Telemetry
Transmitter Power Supply and Sequencer
Current Sensing Unit
2/26/64, 2/27/64
2/25/64
3/6/64, 3/12/64
3/11/64
4/14/64
3/17/64
the thermal characteristics. Representative
portions of these reviews are presented here
for the purposes of illustrating review
coverage.
• Command Sequencer. Power turn-on
commands were established as (1) Cen-
tral Computer and Sequencer, (2) RTC-7,
and (3) Electronic Clock. For turn-off,
RTC-5 {a real-time command), whtchwas
a momentary closure, was agreed upon.
The RTC-5 command would also turn off
the Clock if the Subsystem were not
in warm-up. The possibility of locking
out the Clock turn-off circuit (activated
by RTC-5) for the first 32 hourswas dis-
cussed but tabled for further investiga-
tion. Subsequently, this lock-out was
implemented in the design.
• Thermal Design. During the Ranger VI
mission, recorded temperatures were
approximately 20 ° C higher than antici-
pated in the lower section of the Subsystem
and 10 ° C higher than anticipated in the
upper section. Although neither previous
tests nor the telemetry data indicated
that operation of the Ranger components
was adversely affected by these higher
temperatures, a special design review
was held to evaluate possible design
changes to produce lower payload op-
erating-temperatures. The proposed
modifications were discussed and action
items identified. These action items were
later implemented by the following
changes: (1) The absorptivityofthepaints
was reduced, producing a 30-watt re-
duction in solar input; (2) variation of
solar radiation input with the time of
launch was taken into account as a de-
sign parameter; and (3) telemetry points
were inserted on the 15- and 90-point
commutators to permit recording of the
temperatures on the third deck near the
camera electronics and the camera lens
housing.
Electronic Clock. The effect of leak-
age current of the output stage on the
energy available to activate relay K2
was investigated and found to be insignif-
icant in the worst case. Noise rejection
by drawing continuous current in the
emitter diode was evaluated; itwas found
that the noise rejection which would be
obtained would not justify the continuous
current drain. The 32-houroutput wire
was isolated from the other Clock leads
to minimize the probability of capacitive
coupling.
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E. FAILURE REPORTING AND ANALYSIS
One of the most important aspects of the RCA
Engineering Reliability Program was the
failure reporting and analysis procedure used
to document and analyze equipment malfunc-
tions. This procedure, extending from the
start of testing until after impact of the Ranger
Spacecraft on the Moon, was the avenue bywhich
failures were defined to permit subsequent
corrective action as applicable.
In this section, the failure-reporting and anal-
ysis policies and procedures followed in the
Ranger TV Subsystem program are described
both in terms of the initial and split-system
configurations and in terms of the modified
configuration. Following this description, rep-
resentative corrective actions resulting from
the failure-reporting and analysis procedure
are briefly discussed. Finally, tabulations
of malfunction history are presented for the
Ranger Subsystems and for supporting
equipment.
1. Initial and Split-System Configurations
a. SCOPE OF MALFUNCTION REPORTING
The failure-reporting and analysispolicies and
procedure required the reporting and subse-
quent analysis of all malfunctions detected
by RCA engineers and subcontractor personnel.
Each malfunction was reported separately on
its own malfunction report form, whether de-
tected separately or detected as one of m'Jltiple
malfunctions occurring, for example, during
troubleshooting or testing. Both part malfunc-
tions requiring replacement and nonpart mal-
functions requiring repair were reported.
b. PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MALFUNC-
TION REPORT
The malfunction report form was prepared to
permit recording of complete information for
subsequent failure analysis. In completingthe
malfunction report, the originator provided
the following data: (1) the name of the facility
originating the report, (2) the name of the
originator, (3) date of the malfunction, (4)
the equipment test environment, (5) the test
phase during which the malfunction occurred,
(6) total part or unit time, (7) total time out
of operation because of the malfunction, (8)
location of the malfunction within the equip-
ment, (9) a brief description of the malfunc-
tion, (10) repair action taken to correct the
malfunction, (11) abnormal equipment con-
ditions noted, (12) disposition of the replaced
parts, and (13) numbers of related malfunction
reports.
The malfunction report form was prepared in
triplicate. One copy was sent to Engineering
Reliability, the second copy to the cognizant
design area, and the third copy was retained
by the originator.
c. FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A failure analysis was performed by Reli-
ability Engineering on every malfunction re-
ported. This analysis not only resulted in
recommendations for corrective action but
provided an adequate basis for further reli-
ability analysis of equipment performance.
Where information furnished on the malfunc-
tion report was inadequate, a detailed
investigation was conducted. Results of this
investigation and other aspects of the failure
analysis were summarized on a failure analysis
report. More than one malfunction was
covered on a single report if the malfunctions
were closely associated. The completed re-
port then provided a comprehensive and readily
accessible summary permitting determination
of the exact cause of the failure, the effects
of the failure, and recommended corrective
action.
The completed report was forwarded to the
product assurance office together with a de-
scription of remedial action which had already
been taken or with suggestions for improve-
ment. Monthly summaries were reported to JPL
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covering all malfunction analyses processed
through RCA during the reporting period.
d. CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURES
To assist in monitoring, controlling, ana-
lyzing, and identifyingfailure modes, failures
were classified according to cause. Table
19 lists these standard failure modes and
their definitions.
2. Modified Split-System Configuration
To increase the effectiveness of the failure
reporting and analysis function in the modified
split-system (after Ranger V1) configuration,
certain procedural changes were made; basic
policy, however, remained essentially unmod-
ified. The changes effected included both in-
plant and field failure reporting.
a. IN-PLANT PROCEDURES
Additional emphasis was placed on expediting
reporting of the malfunctions, increasing the
depth of the analyses and maintaining adequate
controls. These controlswere to assure proper
implementation of recommended corrective
actions and to assure concurrence of RCA and
JPL on the adequacy of the analyses and the
corrective actions taken.
To secure this necessary emphasis the fol-
lowing steps were taken.
Responsibility for filling out the mal-
function report was assigned to Quality
Control personnel monitoring the re-
spective test areas or work areas.
e To assure prompt handling and awareness
of existing malfunctions, malfunction re-
ports were picked up from the Quality
Control area twice each day.
• The status of eachmalfunction report and
its analysis was reported weekly.
o Responsible RCA skill center sign-off
was required on the recommended cor-
rective action and on the status of its
implementation.
Sign-off by the Ranger Project Manager
was required to complete the analysis
report at RCA prior to submittal to
JPL.
• JPL sign-off.
In conjunction with these steps to emphasize
proper handling of MR's and analyses, the
malfunction report form was changed to AED
Form 300 and the analysis form was modified
to allow additional information to be added con-
cerning the status of the recommended cor-
rective actions. These forms are illustrated
in Figures 32 and 33 respectively.
After the Ranger VII launch, completed anal-
yses approved by RCA were submitted to JPL
on JPL Form 1798, Vendor Problem/Failure
Report, for their approval. A sample of this
form is provided in Figure 34.
b. FIELD FAILURE REPORTING
As the TV Subsystems were tested at JPL and
at ETR, a new procedure was established to
expedite the review and approval cycle.
Failures that occurred at the sites which did
not require that subassemblies be returned to
RCA for repair were analyzed by the space-
craft project engineer. Copies of the MR and
failure analysis were submitted directly
to JPL. Copies of both documents were sent
to RCA Reliability Engineering for review and
follow up as required.
Subassemblies returned to RCA for repair were
handled by Engineering Reliability in the same
manner as for an in-plant malfunction.
3. Representative Corrective Action
Corrective action resulting from the failure-
reporting and analysis program consisted of
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TABLE 19
FAILURE MODE DEFINITIONS
Mode
Random
Wearout
Design
Workmanship
Nonassignable
Under Analysis
Accidental
Secondary (Dependent)
Nonconfirmed
Test Method or Specifica-
tion Error
Definition
Achance failure in a controlled system whose
occurrence is unpredictable.
Failure due to deterioration as a consequence
of excessive use.
A failure which is remediedby a circuit, equip-
ment design, or part specification change.
A failure due to improper or substandard fab-
rication methods and quality control.
A failure whose exact cause cannot be deter-
mined, and insufficient evidence exists to
classify it in any other category.
A failure which is still under investigation.
A failure induced as a result of test error,
procedures, or handling. Failure due to im-
proper or careless manipulation of parts,
harnesses, or equipments either in their use
or repair.
A failure which is induced by another failure.
An apparent failure occurrence which cannot
be verified through subsequent analysis.
A failure which resulted from an error in a
test method or specification.
changes in both design and methods. Design
changes were effected by coordination of Engi-
neering Reliability with the Design Skill
Centers. Methods changes were effected in
conjunction with the activities whose methods
caused the malfunctions.
For the purpose of illustration, corrective
actions taken as the result of several mal-
function reports are discussed below. These
discussions are representative samples only
of the information contained in the Malfunction
Analyses Summary {Appendix H, Volume 4b)
which lists all such data from the start of split-
system testing.
As a result of a failure of the PTM in thermal
vacuum due to a premature power turn-on, the
test procedure was changed to require amini-
mum of eight hours of pump-down before power
could be turned on. In addition, battery cut-
off switches were added to the thermal-vacuum
test setup, permitting external battery switch-
ing. Pressure readings were monitored both
inside the unit and in the chamber.
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FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT PAGE 1 OF____
PROGRAM
Z I._ MALFUNCTION REPORT NO.
u
L
a-JEvET=u
NAME SER*_--
OPERATING TIME
7..7._ ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION
2_ DATE OF MALFUNCTION
__MO,_DAY__yR.
3_ TEST LOCATION/ENVIRONMENT
._ _, o, r-_ _._J UNIT
NAME SER,_--. NAME S ER.I_
OPERATING TIME HRS. OPERATING TIME HRS,
i 8 ] MALFUNCTION CATEGORY
1 [] SECONDARY (DEPENDENT)
• [] o.,G.
AI'-I AED
i [] VENDOR
S [] RANDOM
4 [] NOT CONFIRMED
._ PART DISPOSITION:
J
5 [] NON-ASSIGNABLE 8 [] ACCIDENTAL
6 [] WEAROUT A [] DESIGN
7 [] WORKMANSHIP B [] INTBGRATION
A_ ................ T. _ .....B DESIGN AED MFG*
C AID MANUFACTURING E [] TEST EQUIP, INDUCED
0 j COGNIZANT SKILL GROUP
S [] TEST METHOD
OR SPE¢,
ERROR
11_ RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION:
!
CORRECTVE
>_ ACTION IMPLEMENTION
PAGE 2 OF THIS FORM TO BE
bl COMPLETED BYs
0 I (_ PROJECTS
u 2 1"7 qC
8 [] DESIGN ENGINEERING
4 [] MANUFACTURING
RBPLY REQUIRED BY!
15_ COMPLETED BY:
3 I STRI BUTI OND!
{FOR ACTION)
6 I COMPLETED ON:
DI STRI BUTI ON
{FOR INFORMATION)
FIX CONFIRMED
FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT FORM
ASTRO'BLKCTRONI¢S DIVISION RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
DATE
ARO 2SO RBV* I/S4
Figure 33. Failure Analysis Report
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1T
VENDOR N ° 103553 V
[]F,,ghtCS/CS_r.No.___ [] PROBLEM/[B FAILURE REPORT
[] OSE (Complex Ser. No. __)
ECT: [] Ranger [] Mariner [] Other 3. LOG NO.
A) REFERENCE DESIGNATIONS B) NOMENCLATURE C) SERIAL NUMBER D) OPERATING TIME
4. SUB-SYSTEM
5. ASSEMBLY
6, SUB-ASSEMBLY
7. REPORTING LOCATION
[] JPL Sec, [] Vendor [] SAF [] AMR Other
PROBLEM/FAILURE NOTED DURING
B. _[_ Bench Testing [] In-P ...... Testing [] TA Testing [] FA Testing [] Sy ..... Testing J INITIAL DISTRIBUTION DATE
Specific Environment [] Other
9, DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM/FAILURE
Orlg[nator Date Cognizant Engineer
10. VERIFICATION & ANALYSIS
11. CAUSE OF PROBLEM/FAILURE
Design [] Piece Part Failure [] r_erator Error [] Damage (Mishandling) [] Adjustment
_] Workmanship [] Manufacturing II O.S,E, Failure [] Other
l FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT C) CIRCUIT SYMBOL
12.
[] Cognizant Engineer [] Design Review [] Vendor
U Material Review Board [] Quality Assurance [] Other
13. A) PIECE PART NAME & NUMBER B) SERIAL NO. D) MANUFACTURER
P
TI
[] Components Evaluation Group
E) DEFECT
m
x_
3E
PERSON COMPLETING SECTION 1T Signature Date
14. CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN
DI POSITION
15"_Reworked [] Redesigned []Readjusted [] Scrapped [] Other
16. EFFECTIVITY
[] This Unit _ All Unit, [] Other
Signature,
Cognizant Engineer
ECR No.
Signature
Sec. Date CognFzant Sec. Chief
17. REVIEW CONCURRENCE
Rei;oh ffty Coordinntor__
Space Proiect Engineer:
19. STANDARD & SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
18. CLASSIFICATION
Date [] Critical
Date ] [] Non-Critical
P/FR RELIABILITY STAFF JPL 1798 APR 64
Figure 34. Vendor Problem Failure Report
i01
A TV Subsystem failure which produced
numerous subassembly secondary fail-
ures and occurred during testing at am-
bient conditions in the integration test
area. The cause was shorting ofabattery
lead in the High-Current Voltage Regula-
tor by mou_ting screws. ,,,u_,_m_ screws
were, subsequently, carefully checked
when subassemblies were installed on the
structure. A change in wire size was
made in a ground- return wire in the High-
Current Voltage Regulator. The structure
was tied directly to the positive side of
the battery, and structure grounds were
improved.
A failure occurred on the PTM at JPL
when the mica dielectric of a capacitor
in the Resdel Power amplifier cracked.
As a result of the analysis and recom-
mendations, a change of the material was
made substituting Mylar for the mica.
The Mylar was heat treated at 125 ° C
for 4 to 6 hours before it was installed
in the Power Amplifier.
The vidicon pins were being bent. In
some cases, this resulted in a cracking
of the glass in the area of the pins due
to excessive mating and demating. The
final resolution of the problem was the
use of a buffer connector in the camera
head.
Repeated failures of the Q32 (2N718A)
transistor shorting in the high-voltage
regulator of the camera electronics was
resolved by changing the transistor type
to one with a higher rating, adding a limit-
ing series resistance in the emitter cir-
cuit, and isolation of ground returns.
The Q1 (2N916) transistors of the Pl
Camera G1 regulator were shorting from
base to emitter. A surge proteetingdiode
was added to the emitter circuit to pre-
vent the occurrence of this failure mode.
Failures in the transmitters IPA tubes
resulted in an investigation of the turn-
on transients of the transmitter power-
supply high-voltage circuits. Design
changes reduced the transients to ac-
ceptable levels.
Current-limiting resistors were added
to the -750-volt and +1000-volt relay
circuits to protect the relay contacts.
The 2N1656 transistor as used in the G1
regulator of the P- and F-typeCamera
Electronics were failing as a result of a
high-voltage stress between the collector
and emitter. To correct this failure mode,
a resistor and zener diode were addedto
limit the collector-to-emitter voltage.
As a result of material deposition on the
lenses of the cameras during thermal-
vacuum testing, an investigation of the
outgassing properties of Raychem wire
was conducted. The results of this in-
vestigation were negative and the use of
this wire for the Ranger TV Subsystem
application was continued.
Special tests were conducted in a thermal-
vacuum environment to evaluate the use
of silicone grease for heat-sinking of
transistors. The conclusion reached was
that silicone grease was required and was
satisfactory for heat sinking of transis-
tors in the Subsystem transmitter.
4. Malfunction History
The malfunction history of the Ranger program
is summarized in the tables of this subsection
and in the Malfunction Analyses Summary of
Appendix H.
a. TOTAL SUBSYSTEM FAILURES
Table 20 lists the failure totals of all Assem-
blies by equipment and types of failures for
the entire Ranger TV Subsystemproject.
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TABLE 20
TOTAL ASSEMBLY FAILURES DURING PROGRAM
Type of Failure
Equipment
o _ E
• -- e- I.
• c E Q : :O _ 0
O_ 0
_ ,_ _ o z
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Q
"0
0
O.
m
a
0
o
@
D
e,
m
D
e,
0
Z
o
D
@
°-
m
m
o
c
4-
o
Camera and Camera 571
Electronics**
Communications 386
Sequencer and Sequencer 114
Power Supply
Command Control Unit 8
Video Combiner 30
Battery and Regulators* 146
Total 1255
Percent of Total 100
145 153
104 79
50 31
1 4
11 2
38 32
349 302
27.761 23.94
I
0
1
6
48
3.82
]
24
15
2
1
6
28
224
17.75
I
98
73
18
1
1
18
92
7.55
I
36 66
34 43
2 6
0 1
9 0
14 4
138 68
[11.00 ]5.40
I I
35
23
5
0
0
6
35
2.78
I
14 0
15 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
*This category also includes Temperature Sensor, Electronic Clock, DCU, Current Sensor Unit, Current Trans[ormer Unit,
Thermal Control, and Harness Assembly malfunctions.
**This category also includes the Filter Assembly malfunctions.
b. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FAILURES
Table 21 lists the Operational Support Equip-
ment (OSE) failures for the entire Ranger TV
Subsystem project. The OSE failure-reporting
and analysis program supported the operation of
equipment at RCA, JPL, ETR, and Goldstone.
Malfunction reports and failed parts were sent
from these activities to RCA Engineering
Reliability for analysis. Completed analyses
were returned to each site for implementation
of corrective action.
c. MALFUNCTION ANALYSES SUMMARY
Details of TV Subsystem failures and recom-
mended corrective actions are contained in
Appendix H. These listings are arranged by
equipment, serial number, and chronological
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TABLE 21
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FAILURES
Total
Percentage
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D
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8.35%
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5.75% 15.2% 20.2% 20.4%
3
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o
23 0
6.0% 0
order of malfunction-report dates. Coverage
extends from the start of split-system con-
cept through the successful completion of the
Ranger IX mission. All Ranger equipment
are included.
d. FAILURE SUMMARIES OF FINAL FLIGHT MODEL
III TV SUBSYSTEMS
Tables 22 through 26 present data on the four
Ranger flight Subsystems, Ranger VI, Ranger
VII, Ranger VIII, and Ranger IX. Table 22
summarizes the significant dates of design,
test, and flight for each flight model and lists
the title, number, and issue date of its respec-
tive test report and flight evaluation report•
Tables 23 through 26 are failure summaries
of the subassemblies which were part of the
actual flight model TV Subsystem configura-
tions. For each piece of equipment, the mal-
function report number, the date of the
malfunction and the serial number are pre-
sented. Further details on particular malfunc-
tions can be found in Appendix H, Volume
4b.
F. RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION TESTING
AND ANALYSIS
The last task of the Ranger reliabilityprogram
was demonstration testing and analysis to ver-
ify the theoretical predictions of the previous
tasks. In this subsection, life tests on the TV
Subsystem and assembly level are described
and the significance of the test results is pre-
sented along with an analysis of failure rates
at the part level. The tests described here
are treated only in relation to their reliability
significance. Complete details of the engine-
ering test programs, particularly for the Life
Test Models, are contained in Section IV, Test
History of the TV Subsystem.
1. Assembly Testing at RCA
Life testing of the assemblies was performed
at the assembly level at RCA. Test condi-
tions (particularly test duration) were es-
tablished on the basis of obtaining the greatest
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TABLE 23
RANGER VI FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
P1 Camera and Camera Electronics 034/036
P2 Camera and Camera Electronics
P3 Camera and Camera Electronics
P4 Camera and Camera Electronics
025/025
2826
3271
3973
3974
3433
6/9/63
7/1/63
8/5/63
8/10/63
9/16/63
F a Camera and Camera Electronics
F b Camera and Camera Electronics
Video Combiner
Sequencer
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Command Switch
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
Low-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
019/019
018/021
032/029
020/041
001
OO7
5
OO5
016
008
014
8
012
007
018
No Failures Reported
2647
2648
3962
4002
2688
2689
2690
4262
3363
3361
4/17/63
4/17/63
7/6/63
9/7/63
6/25/63
6/25/63
, 6/25/63
' 11/24/63
6/7/63
5/26/63
No Failures Reported
3351
3355
3360
3226
3303
3304
2861
6/28/63
6/28/63
7/13/63
5/18/63
6/22/63
6/24/63
7/22/63
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
3227 5/9/63
2864 7/3/63
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
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TABLE 23
RANGER VI FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number
Four-Port Hybrid
Dummy Load
Telemetry Assembly
Temperature Sensor
Sequencer Power Supply
001
011/003
108
0O7
0008
Telemetry Processor
Telemetry Processor
Distribution Control Unit
Electronic Clock
Power Control Unit
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Filter Assembly
Harness Assembly
Batteries
OO8
022
001
001
001
009
003
001
67,68
MR Number Date
No Failures Reported
4267
2800
4268
1/15/64
1/25/64
1/16/64
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
3278 7/18/63
3352 6/23/62
No Failures Reported
3972 7/27/63
No Failures Reported
TABLE 24
RANGER VII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
P1 Camera and Camera Electronics 31/28 4234
3371
3372
3380
3802
3809
2178
2179
2195
2192
1536
12/8/63
7/28/63
7/28/63
7/28/63
5/4/64
5/5/64
5/13/64
5/13/64
5/15/64
5/22/64
11/14/64
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TABLE 24
RANGER VII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly
P2 Camera and Camera Electronics
P3 Camera and Camera Electronics
P4 Camera and Camera Electronics
F a Camera and Camera Electronics
Serial Number
36/34
21/39
37/40
F b Camera and Camera Electronics
Video Combiner
41/38
35/35
006
MR Number
3380
3554
4698
3990
2194
2646
2822
2823
2839
4590
4097
2196
2154
1539
2828
2829
2832
3979
4022
3991
3978
2624
3344
2824
3275
3276
3277
3939
2833
2834
2835
3936
3937
4785
3938
3930
3931
4800
Date
8/2/63
8/29/63
4/10/64
4/26/64
5/15/64
3/7/63
6/19/63
6/19/63
8/19/64
1/3/64
1/6/64
5/13/64
5/31/64
11/19/64
6/21/63
6/21/63
7/15/63
9/9/63
9/13/63
4/28/64
9/3/64
1/12/63
6/13/63
6/20/63
7/13/63
7/14/63
7/15/63
3/24/64
7/18/63
7/18/63
7/18/63
3/21/64
3/23/64
3/23/64
3/30/64
3/24/64
3/24/64
3/24/64
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TABLE 24
RANGER VII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
Sequencer 008
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
10
013
Transmitter Power Supply
Low-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Telemetry Assembly
Temperature Sensor
Sequencer Power Supply
Telemetry Processor
011/140
016
004
010
123/21
O08
006
3553
4795
3940
3950
4057
3929
3806
3948
2155
5877
5878
5879
3300
3926
2798
1673
1674
1675
10458
10459/3308
4O38
I
4O46
5886
5861
3825
3949
3818
2188
2897
2863
5887
2264
8/29/63
4/2/64
4/8/64
5/2/64
4/1/64
6/1/64
5/1/64
5/2/64
6/31/64
4/3/64
4/3/64
4/3/64
6/15/63
3/25/64
1/14/63
4/19/63
4/26/63
4/29/63
6/15/63
7/10/63
9/1/63
' i0/_0/63
3/25/64
3/26/64
4/1/64
5/2/64
5/8/64
5/19/64
5/2/63
7/25/63
3/26/64
12/17/64
3824 5/12/64
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
0009
011
109
TABLE 24
RANGER VII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number I Date
I
I
No Failures ReportedTelemetry Processor
Distribution Control Units
Electronic Clock
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Filter Assembly
Command Control Unit
Current Sensing Unit
Current Transformer Unit
Current Transformer Unit
Harness
Batteries
019
002
005
014
OO8
003
002
3
4
94,93
3357
3933
5931
3877
4700
4083
4475
4027
4724
4707
4056
4797
5820
No Failures
6/30/63
3/24/64
4/15/64
3/24/64
4/15/64
10/13/63
12/7/63
1/4/64
1/16/64
1/24/64
4/9/64
4/12/64
4/12/64
Reported
No Failures Reported
3928 I 3/31/64
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
No Failures Reported
amount of usable data consistent with the time
and costs involved. In most cases the test
duration was several times the length of the
actual MTBF for a single unit.
a. TESTS CONDUCTED
A 500-hour life test was performed on each of
three equipment groupings of assemblies, and
on five individual units. Before start of the 500-
hour life test, 40 hours of equipment testing
took place. Ten hours after start of the life
test the equipment was turned off and then
turned on again. This was done every ten hours
for a total of 50 times during the 500-hour life
test. A total of 500 hours of operation at am-
bient temperature and pressure was logged.
the specification requirements of each as-
sembly were met prior to or at the conclusion
of its life test.
Tests were conducted in three equip-
ment groups and by individual units. The
ii0
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TABLE 25
RANGER VIII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
P1 Camera and Camera Electronics
P2 Camera and Camera Electronics
P3 Camera and Camera Electronics
P4 Camera and Camera Electronics
F a Camera and Camera Electronics
42/42
22/22
40/37
48/48
38/32
4087
4090
4095
4692
3762
3763
3764
3900
3961
2125
1351
1352
5817
3345
4269
5818
4231
2840
3599
2268
3896
3989
3995
2376
3753
3754
3755
1338
1322
2259
4007
4009
4089
4651
3870
3884
1580
10/25/63
11/6/63
12/6/63
1/28/64
6/22/64
6/22/64
6/23/64
6/25/64
6/27/64
8/5/64
9/17/64
9/17/64
4/3/64
8/15/63
1/24/64
4/5/64
10/8/63
1/64
5/12/64
12/28/64
4/22/64
4/28/64
' 4/30/64
5/11/64
5/18/64
5/19/64
5/19/64
9/1/64
9/17/64
12/7/64
9/18/63
9/28/63
11/2/63
12/2/63
6/20/64
8/21/64
10/19/64
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TABLE 25
RANGER VIII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly
F b Camera and Camera Electronics
Video Combiner
Sequencer
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
Low-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
Serial Number
47/47
008
0003
013
205
020
013
011
206
302
015
MR Number
3964
4586
4587
4589
4474
4O93
3594
3781
3782
1578
3570
1358
1364
1368
4081
4100
3375
3379
3348
1689
4682
5835
3593
3903
4652
3796
4048
3971
4684
4695
4751
No Fmlures
No Failures
No Failures
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Date
10/2/63
11/20/63
11/20/63
11/20/63
11/23/63
11/25/63
5/3/64
8/24/64
8/24/64
9/29/64
10/2/64
lO/7/64
10/13/64
10/16/64
10/21/63
1/6/64
7/25/63
7/25/63
8/22/63
11/18/63
1/7/64
4/26/64
4/27/64
5/27/64
2/28/64
9/22/64
11/5/63
7/8/63
1/8/64
2/8/64
2/8/64
Reported
Reported
Reported
9/12/64
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TABLE 25
RANGER VIII FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
Four-Port Hybrid
Dummy Load
Telemetry Assembly
Temperature Sensor
Sequencer Power Supply
Telemetry Processor
Telemetry Processor
Distribution Control Unit
Electronic Clock
Current Transformer Unit
Batteries
006
301/301
006
008
0006
301
302
004
003
002
102/104
4491
2109
3882
5876
3771
3773
3787
2148
2307
3373
2950
3560
4080
No Failures
No Failures
No Failures
3862
No Failures
No Failures
1/3/64
6/20/64
6/20/64
4/2/64
7/6/64
7/11/64
8/31/64
10/28/64
2/4/65
7/23/64
9/20/63
9/20/63
10/14/64
Reported
Reported
Reported
] 8/8/63
Reported
Reported
Telecommunications Group consisted of the
Transmitter, Transmitter Power Supply, Te-
lemetry Processor, the Power Amplifier, and
the Dummy Load. The Camera Group consisted
of the F Camera and Camera Electronics, the
Video Combiner, and the Sequencer and Se-
quencer Power Supply. The Telemetry Group
consisted of the Power Supply, the 15-Point
and 90-Point Commutators, the 3-ke VCO,
two 225-kc VCO's, and the AC Amplifier. The
Battery, Temperature Sensor unit, Command
Switch, the High-Current Voltage Regulator,
and the Low-Current Voltage Regulator were
tested as individual units. The assemblies are
listed by serial numbers and test hours in
Table 27.
b. TEST RESULTSAND SIGNIFICANCE
Only one failure occurred during the 500-hour
life test. Thiswasthe shorting of an input tran-
sistor m the telemetry power supply. It was
classed as a randompart failure and considered
to be relevant in MTBF determination.
Based upon the assumption that this first and
only failure, occurring in a single assembly,
was representative of all the assemblies, the
MTBF's were stated as 420 hours. For a 15-
minute mission this was equivalent to a prob-
ability of success of 0.99940.
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TABLE 26
RANGER IX FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES
Assembly
Pl Camera _,_H r_,_era _1_.,_-_-_
P2 Camera and Camera Electronics
P3 Camera and Camera Electronics
P4 Camera and Camera Electronics
F a Camera and Camera Electronics
Serial Number
J-D/ J.D
039/033
43/43
049/049
044/044
MR Number
3342
3963
3375
3980
5813
3935
3830
3985
1783
3752
2120
4021
4711
2830
4105
4006
2117
3844
3760
3786
1346
3794
1354
4112
1356
1360
1367
2068
3892
3889
3896
2072
4582
4591
4686
4696
3600
3853
3780
1538
Date
_/_/6_
7/lo/63
7/23/63
9/lo/63
3/25/64
4/3/64
4/22/64
4/22/64
5/7/64
5/16/64
8/31/64
9/16/63
1/19/64
9/3/63
9/16/63
9/17/63
7/1/64
10/11/64
5/26/64
8/30/64
9/11/64
9/20/64
9/30/64
10/2/64
10/4/64
10/12/64
10/16/64
10/22/64
10/23/64
11/1/64
11/4/64
11/4/64
11/5/63
11/18/63
1/8/64
1/23/64
5/12/64
5/12/64
8/24/64
11/16/64
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TABLE 26
RANGER IX FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
F a Camera and Camera Electronics
(Continued)
F b Camera and Camera Electronics
Video Combiner
Sequencer
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Transmitter Assembly
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
Low-CurrentVoltage Regulator
044/044
014/014
009
005
011
211
301/158
012
009
1543
2263
2272
2943
2947
4008
2838
2112
2113
3772
3883
3792
1357
1371
1529
1547
2074
2073
1545
3279
2831
3261
3272
4786
4787
3981
3953
4273
3890
4693
4752
2114
2895
3307
10460
4775
11/30/64
12/14/64
2/1/65
8/8/63
8/25/63
9/22/63
10/11/63
6/28/64
6/29/64
7/9/64
8/18/64
9/19/64
10/9/64
10/20/64
10/29/64
11/19/64
11/21/64
11/22/64
11/27/64
8/8/63
5/5/63
7/8/63
7/8/63
3/26/64
3/26/64
4/19/64
4/23/64
2/7/64
10/5/64
1/28/64
2/11/64
6/30/64
4/23/63
7/10/63
7/10/63
4/14/64
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TABLE 26
RANGER IX FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
Transmitter Assembly 204
Power Amplifier
Transmitter Power Supply
Four-Port Hybrid
Dummy Load
016/145
O2O
003
027/005
Telemetry Assembly
Temperature Sensor
Sequencer Power Supply
Telemetry Processor
Telemetry Processor
Distribution Control Unit
Electronic Clock
High-Current Voltage Regulator
107
009
0005
021
006
005
007
015
2065
3774
3798
3799
10452
4461
4462
4545
3967
4492
No Failures
1544
4039
3765
3766
3767
3768
1542
2273
3356
4O75
1534
No Failures
No Failures
3980
4778
3788
2075
3559
4082
4685
4702
4798
7/6/64
7/10/64
9/24/64
9/24/64
5/3/63
12/6/63
12/11/63
12/11/63
1/4/64
1/21/64
Reported
11/30/64
10/2/63
6/23/64
6/23/64
6/29/64
6/29/64
11/27/64
2/2/65
6/28/63
10/10/63
11/12/64
Reported
Reported
4/17/64
4/17/64
9/3/64
11/29/64
9/17/63
10/12/63
1/8/64
1/8/64
4/16/64
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TABLE 26
RANGER IX FAILURE SUMMARY OF FINAL FLIGHT ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
Assembly Serial Number MR Number Date
Filter
Command Control Unit
Current Sensing Unit
Current Transformer Unit
Current Transformer Unit
Battery
Battery
005
007
006
023
022
109
107
No Failures
3778 I
3789
3790
No Failures
No Failures
2311
2313
Reported
8/11/64
9/13/64
9/13/64
Reported
Reported
2/23/65
3/7/65
The significance of this probability must be
qualified by consideration of the facts that it
was based on the above assumption, upon
limited test data, and upon selective testing.
For example, only one of the six Cameras and
Camera Electronics Assemblies and only one
of two Transmitters were tested.
2. Life Test Model Testing at JPL
Following successful completion of flight ac-
ceptance testing at RCA and the inauguration
of the split-system configuration, Flight Model
III-2 of the initial configurationwasdesignated
as the Life Test model (LTM) and shipped to
JPL for mission verification tests. These tests
were completed to evaluate the performaneeof
the Ranger LTM TV Subsystem over an ex-
tended period of time and to investigate special
problem areas.
a. TESTS CONDUCTED
Three series of mission verification tests were
conducted, each preceded by a Subsystem veri-
fication test. The Subsystem verification tests
were performed to document the condition of
the LTM before the mission verificationtests;
the mission verification tests were conducted
to evaluate performance in a space environ-
ment. At the conclusion of the mission verifica-
tion tests, a series of five special tests was
completed to investigate and isolate the cause
of momentary RF power fluctuations observed
during the mission verification tests. The se-
quence of these tests along with their environ-
mental conditions is listed in Table 28.
b. TEST RESULTSAND SIGNIFICANCE
(1) Distribution of Malfunctions
A total of 24 malfunctions was reported during
the testing at JPL. The distribution of these
malfunctions and type of failure are shown in
Table 29. Of these, only one was finally con-
sidered to be a relevant failure and was
classed as random. ItoeeurredwhentheCam-
era Electronics Serial No. 020 lost video as a
result of arcing of the 1000-volt circuit to a
+40-volt printed-circuit lead in the Low-
Current Voltage Regulator (Reported in
MR 2613). The total test time was 114 hours,
including both flight acceptance testing at RCA
and mission verification testing at JPL.
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TABLE 27
LIFE TEST OF ASSEMBLIES
Serial DurationA I-t__
_$$emmy N,,mk._. lu .....
Video Combiner
Camera and Camera Electronics
Sequencer and Sequencer Power Supply
Transmitter
Modulator
X12
X4
IPA
2nd IPA
Signal Sampler
Transmitter Power Supply
Telemetry Processor
Power Amplifier Housing/Resdel
Dummy Load
Telemetry Unit
Power Supply
15-Point Commutator
90-Point Commutator
3-kc VCO
225-kc VCO (2)
AC Amplifier
Low-Current Voltage Regulator
High-Current Voltage Regulator
Temperature Sensor Unit
Command Switch
Battery
003
012
003
OO6
014
004
012
012
011
015
008
013
o16/127
012
002
OO5
1007
1009
4011
1027A/1228B
B3
3
002
002
019
5O4
625
3,313
5O0
500*
545.75
540.32
500
500
500
*At 420 hours, an input transistor shorted in the power supply.
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TABLE 28
LIFE TEST MODEL TESTS AT JPL
Date
March 4, 1963
March 11 to 14
March 18 to 21
March 26
March 27 to 30
April 3 to 6
April 9 to 12
April 16 to 19
April 23 to 27
April 30 to May 5
May 6 to 9
May 13
May 14 to 17
May 20 to 23
May 28 to 31
June 5 to 8
June 11
June 12, 1963
Test Environment
SVT-1
NIVT-1
MVT-2
SVT-2
MVT-3
MVT-4
MVT-5
MVT-6
MVT-7
MVT-8
MVT-9
SVT-3
MVT-10
MVT-11
MVT-12
MVT-13
Special Test Nos. 1 and 2
Special Test Nos. 3, 4, 5
Ambient Temperature and Pressure
Ambient Temperature and Pressure
Ambient Temperature and Pressure
Ambient Temperature and Pressure
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg° Case Temp.
Ambient Temperature and Pressure
Thermal Vacuum Avg. Case Temp.
Thermal Vacuum Avg.
Thermal Vacuum Avg.
Thermal Vacuum Avg.
Thermal Vacuum Avg.
Thermal Vacuum Avg.
100 ° F
50 ° F
100 ° F
50 ° F
100 ° F
50 ° F
100 ° F
50 ° F
Case Temp. 70 ° F
Case Temp. 32 ° F
Case Temp. 130 ° F
Case Temp. 70 ° F
Case Temp. 70 ° F
(2) Results Assuming Four Failures
Originally, (as reported in the Ranger TV Sub-
system Mission Verification Report for the
Life Test Model) the number of relevant fail-
ures was considered to be four. Three of these
relevant failures occurred during acceptance
testing at RCA and one (MR 2613) occurred
during testing at JPL.
Therefore, the MTBF was calculated as:
114 hrs
- 28.5 hrs4
Using a two-tailed estimate with a 90% confi-
dence level, there was a five-percent probabi-
lity that the MTBF would be higher than the
upper limit and a five-percent probability that
the MTBF would be less than the lower limit.
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TABLE 29
CLASSIFICATION OF LIFE TEST MODEL FAILURES DURING JPL TESTING
Equipment
o
• t-
O "_
Z_
O
Type of Failure
Camera and Camera Electronics 4 0
Communications 18 2
Battery and Regulator 2 0
Total 24 2
Percent of Total 100 8.3
° }:E ® o =| • .-
"13 0 _" e- ul q.O Oo o .
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 5 4 6 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 6 5 6 1
8.3 4.2 25 20.8 25 4.2
1
0
0
i
4.2
Therefore, there was a 90-percent probability
that the MTBF was between the upper and lower
limit.
MTBF = 14.7 hrs < 28.5 hrs < 83.5 hrs
Using these MTBF's, the probabilities of sur-
vival (Ps) for a 15-minute mission was as
follows:
Ps = 0.9831 < 0.9913 < 0.9970
(3) Results Assuming One Failure
These four failures were reviewed again and
it was determined that three of the four fail-
ures which occurred were in the Second IPA
of the Transmitter Assembly. This Second
IPA was deleted from the Transmitter as a
design product improvement for the split-
system and modified split-system configura-
tions of the TV Subsystems. Therefore, the
number of failures relevant to these config-
urations was one.
The revised MTBF was calculated to be as
follows:
l!4 = 114 hrs
1
Using a two-tailed estimate with a 90-percent
confidence level, there was a five-percent
probability the MTBF was higher than the up-
per limit and a five-percent probability that
the MTBF was lower than the lower limit.
Therefore, there was a 90-percent probability
that the MTBF was between the upper and lower
limit.
MTBF = 39 hrs < 114 hrs < 2215 hrs
Using these MTBF's, the probability of
survival (Ps) for a 15 minute mission of
the split-system and modified split-system
configurations was calculated as:
Ps - O. 9936 < 0.9978 < 0.9998
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3. Average Part Failure Rate Analysis
As part of the reliability demonstration effort,
a special analysis of part failure rates was
performed and the results submitted to JPL
in October 1963. The analysis covered all
test time up to August 23, 1963.
a. FAILURE RATE CALCULATIONS
Average part failure rates were calculated on
a Subsystem basis using as parameters the sub-
assembly operating times, the number of as-
sembly parts, and the number of relevant
Subsystem failures. The TV Subsystems
included in the analysis were the PTM of the
initial Ranger VI through Ranger IX Subsystem
configuration, FM 1, FM 2, the LTM (a com-
posite group of assembly life tests}, the Block
III PTM, and FM III-1.
The failure rates were calculated using the
following formulas:
Assembly parts x operating time
Relevant failures
= Mean Time
Between
Failures
(MTBF)
_= Summation product of all assemblies
for a particular TV Subsystem Model.
105 = average failure rate percent per 1000
MTBF hours.
70s = conversion factor for failures per hour
to percent failures per 1000 hours.
Results of these calculations are presented in
Table 30.
b. SURVIVAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
Based on average part failure rates, proba-
bilities of survival were calculated for both
initial system configuration and split-system
configuration subsystems.
(1) Initial System Configuration
Using the revised initial system mathematical
model (see subsection A of this section} cal-
culations of survival probabilitywere made for
the PTM, FM 1, FM 2, and the LTM Subsys-
tems. The results of these calculations are
presented in Tables 31 and 32.
TABLE 30
AVERAGE PART FAILURE RATES
Total
Subsystem Total Part Hours No. of Relevant Failure
Failures Rate
PTM
FM 1
FM 2
LTM
Block HI PTM
FM III-1
i,895,151
1,636,720
i,539,649
8,865,248
1,772,977
1,582,527
0. 422
0. 367
0. 195
0o0113
0.169
0.063
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TABLE 31
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE FOR VARIOUS SURVIVAL STATES
OF MATHEMATICAL MODEL, PTM, FM 1, FM 2, AND LTM
Survival
State
5
I
I Description
4 P Cameras
2 F Cameras
All T/M
3 P Cameras
2 F Cameras
All T/M
2 P Cameras
2 F Cameras
An T/M
1 P Camera
2 F Cameras
All T/M
4 P Cameras
1 F Camera
All T/M
3 P Cameras
1 F Camera
All T/M
2 P Cameras
1 F Camera
All T/M
1 P Camera
1 F Camera
All T/M
[
I Math Model
0.994680
3.64 x i0"4
-8
5.02 x i0
2.43 x i0"12
-4
i. 66 x i0
-8
6.09 x I0
8.38 x 10"12
I
I PTM
0.965916
3.272 x i0"s
4.14 x i0"6
2.33 x i0"9
-3
i.497 x 1O
5.07 x 10.6
-9
6.42 x 10
I
FM 1
0.970333
2. 858 x i0"s
3.15 x I0"6
i.54 x i0"9
-3
i. 308 x i0
3.85 x i0"6
4.24 x I0"9
I
FM 2
0.984196
1.540 x i0"s
5.38 x 10"7
6.81 x 10 "1°
7.05 x i0
-4
i.i0 x 10.6
3.85 x 10 .9
4. 05 x10"16 3.58x i0"72 2.07 x 10 .72 4.88x 10"Ts
I
J LTM
0.999081
9.05 x 10 "5
i. 38 x i0"7
-12
4.61 x i0
-5
4.14 x i0
3.75 x 10.9
-12
5.72 x i0
i.91 x 10.76
Table 31 shows the probabilities for eight of
the mathematical model survival states for the
PTM, LTM, FM 1, and FM 2 comparedto pre-
vious mathematical model calculations.
Table 32 makes a similar comparison for var-
ious equipment groups of the TV Subsystem.
(2) Split-System Configuration
Results for the Block III split-system config-
uration survival state were 0.994620 for the
Block III PTM Subsystem and 0.994620 for the
FM III-1 Subsystem. These compared to a
mathematical model figure of 0.993780. State
1 represents operation of four P cameras, two
F cameras, and all telemetry.
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c. CONCLUSIONS
The average part failure rates obtained from
Subsystem and assembly testing approach, but
do not equal, the established failure rates used
for the mathematical model calculations. Of
necessity, the average failure ratesweretest-
limited compared to the established rates;
actual test time was significantly less than that
used in determinationofthe establishedvalues.
However they were sufficiently valid to permit
a degree of confidence that the mission require-
ments could be met with the equipment. Table
33 summarizes, in tabular form, the MTBF's
and survival probabilities (15-minute mission)
of the mathematical model and five Subsystem
configurations.
TABLE 32
SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES FOR VARIOUS TV CAMERA CONFIGURATIONS
OF MATHEMATICAL MODEL, PTM, FM 1, FM 2 AND LTM
Equipment
4 P Cameras
Exactly 3 P Cameras
Exactly 2 P Cameras
Exactly 1 P Camera
2 F Cameras
Exactly 1 F Camera
Math Model
O.999636
0.000364
5.04 x 10 -8
2.44 x 10.72
O.999833
O. 000167
PTM FM 1
O. 996616
O.003376
4.28 x 10"6
-9
2.40 x 10
O. 998451
O. 001548
O.997057
0.002937
3.23 x 10-6
1.58 x I0"9
O.998653
0.001346
FM 2
0. 998436
0.001562
5.45 x 10 "7
-10
6.91 x 10
0. 999284
0. 000715
LTM
0.999909
0.000091
1.38 x 10 .7
-12
4.61 x 10
0.999959
0.000042
I
TABLE 33
MTBF AND PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
Subsystem No. of Parts Total Failure Rate
Average Part
Failure Rate
_o/1000 Hrs.
MTBF Psfor 15 Min.
Math Model
PTM 1
FM 1
FM 2
Block ]II PTM
FM III-1
8094
8093
8093
8093
8602
8602
O.422
O.367
O.195
0.169
0.063
477
3415
2960
1568
1458
54O
210
29.3
33.8
63.9
76
204
0.99880
0.99153
0.99262
0.99600
0.99670
0.99880
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Section III
Quality Assurance
To assure that TV Subsystem hardware would
meet or exceed the quality standards required
for Ranger TV Subsystem missions, a compre-
hensive quality assurance program was es-
tablished. This quality assurance program
was set forth in the design proposal and later
defined in detail in the Product Assurance Plan
of February 15, 1962. This section describes
that program, its results, and their signifi-
cance.
A. QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM
1. Organization and Function
An effective and economical quality control
system was maintained to implement the
quality assurance plan. Fully integrated with
production planning and subcontract require-
ments, the quality control system considered
problems of design, interchangeability, re-
liability, manufacturing, and scheduling.
Thc system assured that adequate control of
quality was maintained throughout the entire
process of manufacture, including packaging
and shipping. It also provided a means for the
ready detection of discrepancies, together with
means for necessary corrective actions. All
supplies delivered under the Ranger contract
received 100-percent incoming inspection to
assure conformance with contractual require-
ments. Records of inspection and tests were
maintained in compliance with the RCAQuality
Assurance Procedures.
2. Policy and Procedures
The TV Subsystem quality control activities
were guided by RCA corporate and division
policy-and-procedures documentation.
a. CORPORATE LEVEL
The quality control system was established in
accordance with the policies contained in the
RCA Defense Electronic Products Procedures
Manual. These procedures provided for a
corporate central engineering group which
was responsible for preparation and dissemi-
nation of standards and specifications to guide
each division's quality control system. These
standards and specifications are contained
in the 14-volume set of RCA Defense
Standards.
b. DIVISION LEVEL
Governing the quality control system at the
division level was the Product Assurance
Manual. This manual contained the product
assurance organization, applicable RCA De-
fense Electronic Products procedures, divi-
sional operating instructions to implement the
DEP procedures, administrative notices, and
product assurancc practices. _ addition, the
manual provided Manufacturing Engineering
and Quality Control with a comprehensive set
of quality control procedures, policy state-
ments, and detailed specifications.
B. INSPECTION, MEASURING AND TEST
EQUIPMENT
1. Calibration Standards
Suitable gages, meters and test equipments
were utilized by quality control and test per-
sonnel to verify and check product require-
ments. These devices were kept in accurate
calibration at all times by comparison with
primary standards. The responsibility for the
control, maintenance and calibration of this
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equipmentwas assignedto ProductQuality
Control for all mechanicaltools, and to the
CalibrationandRepair activity for all other
test equipment.
Thesegroupsmaintainedsecondaryandwork-
ing _tandardscalibrated in accordancewith
manufacturers'specifications,Air Forcetech-
nicalorders, andRCAcalibrationprocedures.
All standardsutilized on the program were
traceableto theNationalBureauof Standards
in Washington,D.C.throughtheRCAMeasure-
mentEngineeringLaboratoryin Camden,N.J.
andtheAEDMeasurementsStandardLabora-
tory in Princeton,N.J.
2. Calibration Procedures
Incoming acceptance tests and calibrations
were performed on all testing equipment and
critical tooling utilized on the program. Cali-
bration schedules were established and records
were maintained for each piece of equipment.
Each piece had a calibration record label
affixed to reflect its status.
Ranger activities utilizing measuring and test-
ing equipment were notified when reealibration
or certification was required and delivery of
the equipment to the calibration activity was
arranged. Product Quality Control had
responsibility for policing Ranger test and
measuring equipment and assuringthat out-of-
calibration equipment was not being used.
Quality Control tagged such equipment and
notified the calibration activity for corrective
action.
C. PURCHASED MATERIAL INSPECTION
1. Scope of Program
To insure that vendor and subcontractor parts
would perform satisfactorily under the exacting
Ranger mission requirements, a comprehen-
sive subcontractor quality control program
was established. This program determined
conformance of purchased parts and materials
to their applicable specifications, standards,
and drawings through an intensive system of
purchased material inspection. This inspection
was performed at RCA plants and at subcon-
tractor facilities as required.
.... 114_TT .___l-r"
parts were required to conform to RCA speci-
fication 96409-A. Supplier Quality Control.
This specification called for the vendor to
maintain a quality system which established
and enforced adequate controls, provided ob-
jective evidence that the controls were effec-
tive, and produced sufficient inspection and
test data to assure that control of quality was
being maintained and that the vendor product
conformed to the contract requirements.
2. RCA Incoming Inspection
a. INSPECTION PROCEDURE
Each lot of parts and materials coming into
RCA was processed by receiving and pur-
chased material inspection (PMI) personnel
according to standardized procedures. Parts
performance data were kept by PMI to record
the results of its inspection of received parts.
A Material Discrepancy Report (MDR) was
completed for any parts, materials or sub-
assemblies which did not conform to re-
quirements of inspection; disposition of the
material was indicated thereon. Vendors and
subcontractors were informed of any such re-
ports concerning their products. Effective
follow-up procedures were instituted to in-
sure vendor and subcontractor compliance
with applicable drawings, specifications and/
or standards.
b. DETAILED FUNCTIONS
The flow of both electronic and nonelectronie
materials through receiving to the ultimate
user is shown in Figure 35. The responsibil-
ities of each station shown in the flow chart
are described in the following paragraphs.
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(1) Receiving
All parts and materials received from vendors
or subcontractors were logged in through the
receiving section.
(2) Purchased Material Inspection
All parts and materials coming out of the
receiving section were routed through the PMI
section. The PMI section inspected and tested
all parts and materials for conformance with
specifications, drawings, and standards.
Accept-reject criteria for each lot conformed
to inspection instructions. All parts and ma-
terials not in conformance with specifications,
drawings, and standards were set aside in an
area in the PMI section to await disposition.
Accepted mechanical parts and raw materials
went directly to the stock room, while elec-
tronic components were processed through the
preconditioning cycle.
(3) Electronic Component Preconditioning
All electronic component parts were put
through the preconditioning cycle as specified
in Section II Subsection C2 of this volume.
(4) PMI Retest
The PMI section tested electronic components
after preconditioning. The procedures for test
after preconditioning and the accept-reject
criteria are detailed in the same reference
mentioned in item (3) above. All the electronic
components considered acceptable after pre-
conditioning were transferred to the stock
room.
(5) Stock Room
The stock room stored all parts and materials
coming from PMI.
(6) Manufacturing Control
The Manufacturing Control section assigned
the work to be done to the production facility.
This included supplying the production facility
RECEIVING
PURCHASED MATERIAL
iNSPECTION (PMI)
MECHANICAL PARTS N_ID
ELECTRONIC PARTS _ _ RAW MATERIALS
PMI RETEST
_ STOCK ROOM
_ MANUFACTURING CONTROl_
Figure 35. Incoming Mate6ais Inspection and Routing
with all the applicable drawings and additional
production instructions.
3. Field Quality Control
Where complex parts and assemblies were
procured through subcontracts, a field quality-
control specialist was assigned to the vendor's
plant. During his visits he performed avendor
survey, reviewed and approved the vendor's
quality control manual, conducted in-process
inspections, and surveyed vendor operations
for conformance to RCA requirements. He
also represented RCA on vendor material-
review boards, monitored electrical and
mechanical testing, performed final inspection,
and gave shipping approval.
Field quality-control specialists represented
RCA at six subcontractors in this manner. The
subcontractors and subcontracted equipments
are listed below:
Batteries
Structure
Power Amplifier
Electric Storage
Battery Co.
Lavelle Aircraft Corp.
Resdel
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Intermediate Power
Amplifier
Dummy Loads
Commutators
Resdel
Douglas Microwave
Instrument Div. Lab
Fifth Dimension
D. IN-PROCESS QUALITY CONTROL
In-process inspection was maintained in all
RCA plants by means of the procedures of their
respective quality control manuals. Travel
tags and inspection reports were utilized to
properly route and document acceptance of
material throughout the assembly process.
These records were maintained by the quality
control department so that inspection and per-
formance status of the various units was
readily identifiable at all times.
1. Operations
a. INITIAL AND SPLIT-SYSTEMS
Quality control inspectors and a qualitycontrol
specialist performed the principal inspection
operations.
The specialist's duty was to see that the
manufacturing and engineering activities were
complying "with the Ranger project policies
and procedures. The specialist was also re-
sponsible for monitoring of all acceptance
tests and for reporting deficiencies in the
manufacturing processes which could have
caused a degradation of the product. These
deficiencies were reported to the product
assurance engineer who saw that corrective
action was taken.
The quality control inspector's duties were to
perform the detailed acceptance inspection of
the Ranger hardware for conformance of the
material to the drawing and workmanship re-
quirements at fixed predetermined points in the
production flow. The JPL quality assurance
representative performed surveillance over
all manufacturing operations and was notified
by the QC specialist of all acceptance tests.
b. POST-RA-6 SYSTEM
For the post-RA-6 program, the scheme of
operation was modified to provide for a
specialist's review in series with the inspec-
the JPL quality assurance representative per-
formed a lO0-percent tollgate inspection after
each quality control specialist review. All
acceptance-level testingto PTM, Qualification,
and flight units was witnessed 100 percent by
the quality control specialist. JPL quality
assurance witnessed tests on a surveillance
basis.
2. Manufacturing Procedures and Flow Charts
Manufacturing procedures and associated flow
charts were established for each unit fabri-
cated or assembled for the TV Subsystem.
These procedures and flow charts were
inspection-oriented to show the points atwhich
quality control inspection or test monitoring
occurred. Figure 36 shows a typical flow
chart of the type prepared for each assembly
on the program.
Upon the initiation of the Ranger rework
program, immediate effort was placed on
completing a set of flow charts to govern the
movement of hardware through the disassem-
bly, inspection, rework and reassemblyopera-
tions. The basic flow chart for all assemblies
and the characteristics for each inspection
station are summarized in Figure 37 and
Table 34. The flow chart used in controlling
operations during integration of the TV Sub-
system and the associated operation descrip-
tions are presented in Figure 38 and Table 35,
respectively. Table 36 summarizes all Ranger
flow charts and checklists. Corrective action
was taken by quality control to eliminate
repetitive discrepancies, violations of speci-
fications and to correct those operations which
evidenced lack of control. The procedure em-
ployed in effecting corrective action was the
initial issuing of a Quality Hold Notice (Figure
39), which required the management of an
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Figure 36. Typical Assembly-Level Flow Chart of Manufacturing and Quality-Control Sequences
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TABLE 34
SUMMARY OF BASIC ASSEMBLY LEVEL FLOW CHART
CHARACTERISTICS FOR RANGER REWORK PROGRAM
Step Step Characteristics
Number
1
4
Disassemble: Manufacturing will disassemble, per disassembly instructions,to such
an extent that all printedboards and components will be exposed for a workmanship-
and-damage inspection.
Manufacturing will institute a new log book for each unit as received from me-
chanical integration. This log book will be marked with the unit name, drawing
number, part number, and revision letter. The flight number and a star will also
be placed on the cover. Manufacturing will affix a travel tag to each unit at dis-
assembly. The unit will be kept in a plastic bag with its log book and paperwork.
Manufacturing will make an entry in the log book for all operations, tests, and
review dispositions affecting the unit.
Inspection: A complete inspection will be performed by inspection for workman-
ship, degradation due to extensive testing, and connector pin withdrawal force.
See Ranger workmanship specification GER-7, Special Inspection Instruction 011
(attached), Ranger Retrofit Special Inspection Instructions (attached). Make log
book entry at completion of inspection.
Quality Control: Quality Control will perform surveillance over the disassembly
and inspection of the units.
UPR Review: The Quality Control Specialist will review the UPR discrepancies.
He will make the decision "for rework" or "not for rework" based upon his good
judgment, technical consultants, and other sources at his command. He will
check the travel tag and log book for completion and make his entry to the log book.
The Specialist will submit the unit to the customer with form AED 268. Such sources
at his command are Manufacturing Engineering and Design Engineering groups.
JPL: The customer will perform his inspection.
Rework: Manufacturing will perform the items designatedfor rework on the "UPR"
and JPL's "IR". He will use standard repair methods and procedures from Manu-
facturing Engineering. All outstanding discrepancies except those involving con-
formal coating will be reworked in this step. Those items requiring conformal
rework and correction will be completed and released by inspection, prior to the
application of the newly imposed conformal coating.
Inspection: An inspection of the outstanding items on the UPR will be performed.
The inspector will make his entries on the associated paperwork.
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TABLE 34
SUMMARY OF BASIC ASSEMBLY LEVEL FLOW CHART
CHARACTERISTICS FOR RANGER REWORK PROGRAM (Continued)
Step Step Ch_racted.stics
Number
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Quality Control: The Quality Control Specialist will survey the rework and inspec-
tion. When all is in order, he will make submission to the customer using AED
Form 268. One copy will be kept in a loose-leaf binder by Quality Control and
the original will go to the customer.
JPL: The unit is submitted to the customer. Quality Control will stamp the travel
tag when the submission sheet is returned accepted by the customer.
Conformal Coating: Manufacturing will conformally coat to the following specifi-
cations: JPL Specification RCA-50261-PRS, and JPL Procedure A90539. Manu-
facturing will make the appropriate log book entry.
Inspection: An inspection of the conformal coating will be performed.
Quality Control: The Quality Control Specialist will survey the application of the
conformal coating and inspection. When all is in order he will submit the unit with
AED form 268.
JPL: The unit is submitted to the customer for inspection of the conformal coating.
The Quality Control Specialist will stamp the travel tag when the submission sheet
is returned accepted.
Photograph: Quality Control photographic facilities will take color photographs of
the conformally coated areas of the unit. Photographs will be representative of
the latest flight configuration in all cases. The photographs shall be taken in such
a manner that the components placement, wiring, soldering, and details of work-
manship are clear. This shall include photographs showing connector details,
units joined by connectors, cables and harnesses and any critical items that are to
be permanently sealed.
Assemble: Manufacturing will assemble the unit. The travel tag will be stamped
by the operator and an entry will be made in the log book.
Inspection: A final mechanical assembly inspection will be performed and the dis-
position of the inspection noted in the log book. Also inspect for cleanliness,
chassis finish, identification, and spot bonding.
Quality Control: The Quality Control Specialist will perform surveillance of the
assembly and inspection. He will make submission of the unit to the customer.
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TABLE 34
SUMMARY OF BASIC ASSEMBLY LEVEL FLOW CHART
CHARACTERISTICS FOR RANGER REWORK PROGRAM (Continued)
Step Step Characteristics
Number
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
JPL: Theunitis submitted to the customer. Quality Control will stamp the travel
tag when the submission sheet is returned.
Test: Bench testing will be performed by Manufacturing Test or Engineering to
verify conformance to the Ranger Test Specification.
Quality Control Surveillance: The Quality Control Specialist will be present for
the acceptance Bench Test. He will verify that all is in order and will notify JPL
that the test is to be performed.
JPL Surveillance: The customer will perform his surveillance of the test with the
Quality Control Specialist.
Quality Control Final Acceptance: The Specialist will review all data, UPR's,
Travel Tags, log books, and the unit for his approval for acceptance to Integra-
tion. He will make submission to JPL for their final acceptance.
JPL Final Acceptance: JPL will perform their final acceptance inspection.
To Integration: Release unit with a "Don't Break" seal affixed.
Note: Testing may be modified by R.T.R.B. Direction.
operation to bring undesirable situations under
control and to report to quality control the
actions taken.
If corrective action was not forthcomingwithin
the specified time, quality control had absolute
authority to stop the operation in question
until the appropriate remedial measures were
taken.
3. Documentation
Documentation of basic in-process inspection
and test monitoring was accomplished through
the use of the travel tag, the unit performance
record, the environmental test summary, and
the equipment logbook.
a. TRAVEL TAG (FIGURE 40)
The travel tag was used for identification,
process control, and quality control. The tag
was prominent and identified parts not having
nameplates. It indicated to the quality control
inspector that all previous steps in the manu-
facturing process had been completed and
controlled. The tag also served as a record
of completion of necessary product quality-
control inspections.
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TABLE 35
SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION
Step
Numbel
4
8
9
i0
ii
Operation Description
Preparation & Weighing of Assemblies
Prior to installation all units are weighed with their associated hardware.
Quality Control Surveillance
Prior to installation Quality Control verifies the weights, and records all informa-
tion specified in Check List i00.
Mechanical Integration
The TV Subsystem is assembled in the Ranger Integration Area.
Quality Control Surveillance
Quality Control surveillance of the assembly operations assuring correct electri-
cal connections and correct torque on hardware using Check List.
Initial Power Application & Checkout
Electrical debugging is performed using initial power application and checkout
procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
Quality Control assures that the debugging procedures are followed.
Voltage & Current Distribution
Verifies proper operation of the F and P Transmitters, F and P Sequencers, all
cameras, LCVR, and Clock.
Quality Control Surveillance
Noise Immunity Tests
The subsystem command and control circuitry is tested for noise immunity.
Quality Control Surveillance
Communications Equipment Alignment & Calibration
The communications is aligned and calibrated.
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TABLE 35
SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION (Continued)
Step
Number
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
Operation Description
Quality Control Surveillance
Camera Alignment & Calibration
The calibration of the ground support equipment is verified, after which the cam-
eras are aligned and calibrated.
Quality Control Surveillance
Telemetry Calibration
The output of the Subsystem telemetry is calibrated.
Quality Control Surveillance
Preparation for Test
The Subsystem is prepared mechanically less top-hat, omnidirectional antenna,
shrouds & batteries; also calibration of the operational support equipment is verified.
Quality Control Surveillance
Systems Test
The Subsystem is tested in accordance with the test procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
JPL QA Surveillance
Mechanical Previbration Preparation
The batteries, top hat, omnidirectional antenna and shrouds are installed.
Quality Control & JPL Inspection
Electrical Previbration Preparation
The Subsystem is tested in accordance with the applicable procedure, after which
the following plugs are installed: 30P13, 30P8, 30P9.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
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TABLE 35
SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION (Continued)
Step
Number
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Operation Description
Transport to Environmental Area
The Subsystem is transported to the Environmental Area. Cable 23W25 is in-
stalled in jack 30J1.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
Vibration Test
The Subsystem is subjected to vibration in accordance with the applicable test
procedure.
Transport to Integration Area
The Subsystem is transported to the integration area.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
Post-Vibration Test
The Subsystem is checked out with the applicable procedure.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
Removal of Shrouds
The shrouds are removed for inspection.
Quality Control Surveillance
Quality Control & JPL Inspection
Quality Control inspection is performed to verify that there was no mechanical
degradation due to vibration.
Mechanical Pre-Thermal-Vacuum Preparation
The Subsystem is prepared in accorance with the applicable procedure. The
pressure in the Dummy Load and P.A. 's is verified.
Quality Control Surveillance
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SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION (Continued)
37
38
39
4O
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Operation Description
Electrical Pre-Thermal-Vaeuum Preparation
The Subsystem is tested in accordance with the applicable procedure.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
Transport to Environmental Area
The Subsystem is transported to the Environmental Area.
Quality Control & JPL Surveillance
Thermal Vacuum Tests
The Subsystem is subjected to thermal vacuum in accordance with the applicable
test procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
Transport to Integration Area
The Subsystem is transported to the Integration Area.
Quality Control Surveillance
Removal of Shrouds
The shrouds, top hat, omni-antenna, and batteries are removed.
Quality Control Surveillance
Quality Control Inspection
Inspection is performed to verify there was no mechanical degradation due to
thermal vacuum exposure. Pressure is checked in dummy load and P. A. is.
Review of Shutter Operations
A review is made of shutter-operating times; all shutters with greater than
250,000 operations are replaced.
Removal of Cameras for Shutter Replacement
The cameras are removed in accordance with the applicable test procedure.
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TABLE 35
SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION (Continued)
Step
Number
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
59
60
61
Operation Description
Quality Control Surveillance
Shutter Replacements
The shutters are replaced per the applicable assembly drawings.
Quality Control Inspection
Microphonics Test
The camera heads are checked for microphonics with the applicable procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
JPL Quality Assurance
The replacement of the shutter assembly is inspected by JPL Quality Assurance.
Installation of Cameras after Shutter Replacement
Any cameras removed for shutter replacement are installed in accordance with
the applicable procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
Camera Array Alignment
The cameras are aligned in accordance with the applicable procedure.
Quality Control Surveillance
Camera Alignment and Calibration
The cameras are aligned and calibrated in accordance with the applicable proce-
dure.
Quality Control Surveillance
For the post-RA-6 system, a traveler flow
chart (Figure 41) was utilized which offered
greater flexibility in programming the unique
operations required for each assembly, in
addition to providing the controls afforded by
the control tag.
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TABLE 35
SUMMARY OF FLOW CHART OPERATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR
RANGER TV SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION (Continued)
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Operation Description
Outdoor Pictures
A. Subsystem mounted to align fixtures
B. Subsystem transported to site
C. Take pictures
D. Subsystem transported to Integration Area
Quality Control Surveillance
Final Acceptance Test
A. Subsystem prepared for test
B. Subsystem tested
RCA Quality Control Surveillance
JPL Quality Assurance Surveillance
Final Mechanical Assembly
Final Inspection by RCA Quality Control and JPL Quality Assurance
Final Electrical Check
Quality Control Surveillance
Package Subsystem for Shipment
Quality Control Surveillance
Deliver to JPL
b. UNIT PERFORMANCE RECORD (FIGURE 42)
The unit performance record (UPR) was de-
signed to aid both quality control and manu-
facturing. It served quality control as a record
of all inspections performed and reflected
ultimate acceptance of a given unit for each
inspection station. It also provided manufac-
turing with detailed defect descriptions neces-
sary to perform rework.
The unit performance record was used through-
out the entire program with only the addition
of chronological numbering during the post-
RA-6 phase to facilitate the cross-referencing
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TABLE 36
RANGER FLOW CHARTS AND CHECKLISTS
PQCC No. Flow Charts
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Black Box Retrofit (Disassemble and Rework)
Black Box Reassembly
Black Box Testing and Delivery to Integration
Harness Retrofit
Transmitter Retrofit
Telemetry Chassis Retrofit
Transmitter Power Supply Retrofit
Power Amplifier Retrofit
TV Subsystem RA-7
TV Subsystem PTM
TV Subsystem RA-8
Not used
Special Rework Cycle RA-8 TV
Camera Electronics-Special Rework of A 3 Frame
Video Amp Board (10-7-64)
PQCL No. Check Lists
1
2
3
4
5
6
100
101
102
103
104
1041%
105
106
107
108
109
110
2OO
118
120
121
Black Box - Inspection Station 2; Flow Chart 1
Black Box - Inspection Station 3; Flow Chart 1
Black Box - Inspection Station 11; Flow Chart 1
Black Box - Inspection Station 1; Flow Chart 2
Parts Replacement PTM and Flight Models
Black Box Test - Flow Chart 3; Station 1
TV Subsystem Mechanical Assembly Inspection
Pre-Test inspection TV Subsystem
Pre-Turn-on Inspection TV Subsystem
Surveillance of Electrical Test TV Subsystem
Final Inspection - TV Subsystem
Inspection Before Weighing - TV Subsystem
Delivery to JPL - TV Subststem
Inspection Check List of Cameras
Trip Recorder - TV Subsystem
Delivery to ETR - TV Subsystem
Visual Inspection Upon Arrival at ETR - TV Subsystem
Initial Inspection Before Test at ETR - TV Subsystem
Visual Inspection Upon Arrival at ETR - TV Subsystem
Final Inspection at ET.R - TV Subsystem
Black Box Packing and Shipping
All Shutters
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QUALITY CONTROL HOLD NOTICE
JNO.
TO: DATE:
REFERENCE "Quality Action Notice" No.
ACTIVITY AFFECTED:
Date
PROJECT
OPERATION: I_] IN-PROCESS ]_ TEST
I-1F,NAL 710T.ER
EQUIPMENT:
DWG. SERA<IT
D PART(S) N COMPONENT(S) I--7 SYSTEM(S) NO.(S) NO.(S)
Quality Control acceptance of the above equ pmen_/operation is withheld at the point(s) indicated pending correction of:
CC: AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE:
QUALITY CONTROL MGR. DATE
Cause for above condition:
TO BE COMPLETED BY ADDRESSEE
Corrective Action taken:
Effectivity date:
Signature Title Date
AED 287 (3/65)
Figure 39. Quality Control Hold Notice (Front)
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(TO BE COMPLETED BY QUALITY CONTROL ACTIVITY)
Corrective Action verification performed:
Results observed/recorded:
Corrective Action
D Accepted
D Rejected
_] Acceptance Withheld (State reason (s)
Signature Title Date
Figure 39. Quality Control Hold Notice (Back)
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/i I
I I
MISSING PARTS S.O.
$.0.
E.R.
E.R.
Figure 40. Equipment Travel Tag
of UPR's to the JPL Inspection Report.
c. ENVIRONMENTAL TEST SUMMARY
(FIGURE 43)
The purpo se of the environmental test summary
(ETS) was to document the performance of an
environmental test and to clearly reflect the
acceptance or rejection of the test results by
quality control. This form was completed by
the product quality control specialist at the
time that the test was being monitored. It was
through the use of this document that the JPL
test results summary forms were completed
on environmental tests prior to the post RA-6
program.
d. EQUIPMENT LOG BOOK (FIGURE 44)
A separate equipment log book was maintained
by RCA for each assembly and for each TV
Subsystem. The log books contained a life
history of the unit from the start of electrical
tests through the completion of the environ-
mental program.
New log books were initiated for each black box
as they were disassembled for the post-RA-6
phase of the program. Thus the log books
contained not only test information but also
manufacturing and quality-control process in-
formation. In addition the log book served as
the focal point for accumulation of the high
level of documentation maintained during the
post-RA-6 program.
Each serialized unit had a log book, which
accompanied the unit through all phases of the
assembly and test operation. Contained in the
log book were a copy of test data for both
environmental and acceptance tests to Ranger
Test Specifications; test result summary forms
for tests performed during the post-RA-6
program; all unit performance records; all
traveler flow charts and quality control check
lists; time of "power on" equipment; and a
copy of each malfunction report. Entries were
in sufficient detail to permit an understanding
of the stated action or else they provided a
complete reference to the document in which
this detail could be found. Each entry was
dated and either signed or stamped by the
operator or inspector.
The log book and appended data and records
for each unit were reviewed for completeness
as part of the final quality-control approval.
The unit log book was then filed in the Ranger
quality documentation file. When a unit had
been released to the TV Subsystem integration
area for final assembly into the TV structure
and, at a later date, was removed from the
integration area, it was necessary that the unit
and the logbook be approved by the quality
control office before the unit could be resub-
mitted to the integration area.
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PROJECT RANGER
TRAVELER FLOW CHART
Page 1 of 2
UNIT SN DRAWING REV.
OPERATION OPER. STAMP DATE OPERATION OPER. STAMP DATE
Disassembly Quality Control
QC Inspection JPL
Quality Control Photo
JPL Conf. Coating
Rework or
Assembly
Pre Cure
Inspection
QC Inspection Cure
Post Cure
Quality Control Inspection
JPL
Conf. Coating
Pre Cure
Inspection Photo
Cure
Quality Control
JPL
Post Cure
Inspection
Quality Control Test
JPL QC/JPL
Photo Pre Vibration
Conf. Coating Vibration
Assy./Inspection
Quality Control
Pre Cure
Inspection
Post Cure
Inspection
Post Vibration
Pre Thermal
Vacuum
Figure 41. Traveler Flow Chart (Page 1)
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UNIT
PROJECT RANGER
TRAVELER FLOW CHART
I I
SN
OPERATION OPER. _'I'AMP DATE OPERATION
Thermal Vacuum
Post Thermal
Vacuum
Final
Quality Control
Final JPL
DRAWING
I
OPER. STAMP
Page 2 of 2
REV.
I
I DATE
Figure 41. Traveler Flow Chart (Page 2)
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REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT INSPECTION
DATE I TIME AM PM
QUANTITY NOMENCLATURE M.I. No.
CONTRACT NO
REMARKSz
J LINE OR SERIAL No.
BUILDING FLOOR
DRAWING OR SPECIFICATION
M, OR S 0 No.
ACCEPTED SIGNATURE DATE
REJECTED
Figure 42. Unit Performance Record (Back)
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@ DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTSASTRO-EL ECTRONICS DIVISION
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY TES........ N_ 0852
ENVIRONMENTALTEST SUMMARY
PROJECT
NAME
ITEM
NAME
T EST ED
TO ENV,
SP EC.
S/ N
YES []
NO []
TEST
EQUIP.
CAL.
AED REV, ITEM
OWG° • SPEC.
TEST REV° TEST
SPEC, # PROC.
ETR
VISUAL
INSP.
YES []
NO []
TEST ENV.
FACILITY FAC,
LOG
REV°
REV.
YES []
NO []
TYPE
ENV.
TEST
LIST DEVIATIONS TO SPEC. IN COLUMNS BELOW
I TIME (MIN,)
I
I I
DATE //
TYPE OF TEST
QUAL. []
ACCEPT []
RETEST []
OTHER
REMARKS:
DES
LOG
ACCEPTED
AED 292 - 3'64
DESIGN ENGINEER
L_ REJECTED []
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER MALFUNCTION REPORT ,1_
QUALITY CONTROL DATE
HOLD [] / /
Figure 43. Environmental Test Summary
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (THIS PAGE)
LOG NUMBER SYSTEM SERIAL NUMBER
EQUIPMENT LOG FOR
(Subsystem, Major Unit, Etc.)
EQUIPMENT SERIAL NUMBER (S)
29
DEIICRIBE OR REFERENCE:
OPERATING, MAINTENANCE TEST AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION
DATE AND SIGN EACH ENTRY
(I)
TYPE OF CUMULATIVE
TIME: OPERATION OPERATING TIME
AND (3) (4)
HOURE OF
OPERATION STANDBY ON
(2) y' i/ STANDBY ON
Figure 44. Equipment Log Book
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4. Central File
From the start of the program, product quality
control maintained a documentation file on
UPR's and travel tags, alongwith a chronologi-
cal file of the environmental test summary
form. The equipment log books were maintained
by the cognizant design engineer. At the start
of the post-RA-6 program this procedure was
modified to provide a central log book and
quality control file containing all documenta-
tion associated with the acceptance of Ranger
assemblies. This acceptance data, in addition
to including the documentation already de-
scribed, included 8 x 10 color photographs,
malfunction reports, copies of JPL inspection
reports, copies of JPL test summary forms,
and material review actions.
5. Documentation Package
All deliveries of spacecraft after the start of
the post-RA-6 program were supported by a
comprehensive documentation package. The
package was a reproduction of much of the
data included in the central file and involved
several volumes for each shipment. The con-
tents of the documentation package are shown
in Table 37.
7. Malfunction Reporting
The product quality control activity monitored
all black-box acceptance-level and spacecraft
tests performed at RCA, JPL (Pasadena) and
ETR. The quality control personnel reported
all malfunctions to the reliability engineering
activity and Ranger product assurance engineer
by the issuing of a quality control notice
(Figure 45). This notice identified the problem,
equipment and date of the malfunction. The
malfunction report was prepared after the
problem had been isolated, and provided a more
detailed malfunction description (See Relia-
bility Section for details and illustration).
For the post-RA-6 program, the above proce-
dure was modified to eliminate the use of the
quality action notice. Quality Control was as-
signed the responsibility for preparing the
malfunction report at the time of a malfunction
occurrence.
8. Inspection Techniques
Various inspection techniques were developed
to control the quality of the Ranger assemblies.
a. PIN RETENTION
6. Photographic Documentation
Photographic documentation of assemblies re-
quired by the contract was performed and sub-
mitted from the start of the program. For the
post-RA-6 program this effort was repeated.
Photographs were taken of all modules, re-
worked qualification test units, PTM and flight
units. Three 8 x 10 colored photographs and
their negatives were transmitted to JPL. The
photos were representative of the latest flight
configuration and were taken so that component
placement, wiring, soldering and workmanship
details were clear.
Pin-retention tests were performed on all
connectors assembled on a unit on cable
harnesses and were identified as having been
tested by using a dot of green paint on the
body of the connector. A complete pin-retention
test was repeated on every connector of the
TV Subsystem prior to shipment to JPL.
b. ULTRAVIOLET TRACER
An ultraviolet tracer was placed in the ure-
thane conformal-coating material as an in-
spection aid. Inspection was performed using
a black light and the ultraviolet tracer aid in
determining the thickness of the eonformal
coating on components and terminals.
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TABLE 37
CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTATION PACKAGE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Contract definition and acceptance form. AED-273 6/62
_,,_ ..... .-._¢nted nonconformances. AED-269 6/62
Supplementary contract definition. AED-270 6/62
Supplementary contract definition. AED-270 6/62
Packaging, packing and shipping. AED-279 6/62
List of ship-loose items. AED-274 6/62
._onformance verification - Control drawing acceptance criteria conform-
ances. AED-277 6/62
Conformance verification - Acceptance test data. AED-278 6/62
Certificates of compliance for special processes and materials.
AED-280 6/62
Age-sensitivite items. AED-281
Equipment time records. AED-282
Request for customer inspection. AED-268
Inspection check lists 100 - 101- 102- 103- 104- 104A- 105 - 106-
107 - 200.
Unit performance record (UPR).
Material review action (MRA). AED-411 2/63
Perpetual inventory operating time of shutters and 15- and 90-point com-
mutators.
Record of shutter changes and shutter log.
Cumulative operating time of complete TV Subsystem.
Log of batteries consisting of all pertinent test data by individual serial
number.
Weight by black box. (pounds and ounces)
Test Results Summary Form.
One copy of all failure reports.
One copy of all ECN's not incorporated on drawings at time of shipment
from RCA.
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QUALITY CONTROL NOTICE
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT: Failure Report
DATE OF FAILURE
EQUIPMENT
DATE:
TIME OF FAILURE
DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE
co: Engineering Reliability
Project Product Assurance
A. W. Anastasia
AED-529 2/64
SIGNATURE - QUALITY CONTROL
Figure 45. Quality Control Notice
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c. QUALITY CONTROL "DON'T BREAK" SEALS
After quality control acceptance of all units
and prior to bench test, the quality control
specialist affixed a serialized "Don't Break"
seal to the L_nit. The seal was placed on the
unit in such a manner as to preclude the un-
authorized opening of the unit without dam-
aging the seal. The serial numbers of the
seals were recorded in the equipment log at
the time the seals were affixed to the unit.
In the event that a unit had to be opened, the
quality control specialist was the only person
authorized to break the seal. When the seal
was broken, a UPR and log entries were com-
pleted, indicating the reason for the breaking
of the seal.
d. WEIGHT OF BLACK BOXES
Each black box was weighed before it was
mounted on the spacecraft. The weight of each
assembly was recorded in the spacecraft inte-
gration equipment log and on PQC check list
100.
E. MATERIAL REVIEW
Reviews were held both to establish the status
of nonforming materials and to determine the
extent of retesting required following rework"
performed after flight acceptance.
1. Nonconforming Material
a. CLASSIFICATION
Material found to differ from specifications
requirements or found to be incapable of
standard repair was diverted from normal
material movement and handled as noncon-
forming material. Its review, control, and
disposition were accomplished in accordance
with the quality control manual procedures
pertaining to the coordinated standard repair
list, preliminary material review, and formal
material review. On all such material the
Ranger product assurance engineer and the
JPL quality assurance representative were
contacted and advised of the nonconformance.
b. REVIEW PROCEDURE
Each of the RCA Divisions assembling equip-
ment for the Ranger TV Subsystem maintained
a standard repair list which itemized satis-
factory repair to certain manufacturing de-
fects. If material required repairs beyond the
scope of the standard repair list, a preliminary
review was conducted by the quality control
specialist and the engineer concerned to es-
tablish which of four courses of action should
be taken. Possible actions were (1) to scrap,
(2) to complete operation, (3) to use "as is"
(JPL reserved the right to require formal
material review board (MRB) action on this
category), and (4) to hold for formal MRB
action.
In the post-RA-6 program, the category of
preliminary review was eliminated and all
repairs beyond the scope of the standard
repair list were submitted for formal review.
Formal review was accomplished by a Ma-
terial Review Board composed of the JPL
project engineer, the RCA quality control
engineer, the RCA equipment engineer con-
cerned with the Ranger project staff product
assurance engineer. Concurrence of all board
members was requisite to approval of action
recommendations.
c. MATERIAL REVIEW ACTIONS
A summary of the formal material review
items cove_'ed during the course of the post-
RA-6 program is presented in Table 38below.
A total of 196 review actions were conducted
on the equipment forming the RA-7, -8, and-9,
and spares 1 and 2 Subsystems.
2. Test Review Board
When Ranger assemblies required rework
during or after flight acceptance test, a test
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TABLE 38
SUMMARY OF MATERIAL REVIEW ACTIONS
MRA Classification Number of Percentage
MRA's of Total
Workmanship or deviation from drawing: Use "as is"
Workmanship: Repair beyond scope of standard
repair list
Design: Drawing change required
Deviation from specification: Use "as is"
Deviation from specification: Specification revised
Deviation from flow: Use "as is"
Test error and/or test equipment problem
60
43
16
46
9
18
4
196
30.6
21.9
8.2
23.5
4.6
9.2
2.0
100%
review board was responsible for establishing
the level of retest necessary to recertify the
unit. The board was composed of the design
engineer concerned, the equipment project en-
gineer, the Ranger product assurance engineer,
and the JPL resident engineer. Concurrence
of all board members was required to establish
the extent of retest necessary. A sample of a
review board action memorandum is shown in
Figure 46.
During the course of the program, 170 test
review actions were conducted on equipment
after satisfactorily passing an initial flight-
acceptance test. Included in the 170 were 27
review actions which were written against
complete equipment groups (for example Cam-
era and Camera Electronics). Table 39 lists
the reasons for review action and the type of
test performed.
F. FIELD SUPPORT
Field support of the TV Subsystem was pro-
vided at JPL (Pasadena) and at the Eastern
Test Range (ETR) by Product Quality Control
at a level comparable to that maintained in the
integration and test areas at RCA.
1. Assembly Support
Quality control specialists assigned to field
support were responsible for performing in-
spections and test monitoring on flight hard-
ware at predetermined points in accordance
with JPL and RCA test procedures and as-
sembly operations.
All material received from RCA was inspected
upon arrival at the field site (either JPL
Pasadena or ETR). No material was mounted
on the Subsystem without approval of the
quality control specialists. Upon completion of
assembly operations, an inspection was per-
formed on flight hardware before the equip-
ment was released for acceptance testing.
2. Testing Support
Tests conducted on the TV Subsystem were
monitored 100 percent by the quality control
representative. Inspections and acceptance
tests performed in the field were submitted
to JPL on AED 268 form (Request for Customer
Inspection). Rework, modifications, and/or
ECN incorporation required in the field were
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Distribution
INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE
Location Varied .n__*.e .Jmn.uary 6, 1965
From Review Board
Subject
Location AED RTRB 132
1.0 A s s e mbly
1.1 Name: Sequencer
1.2 Serial Number: 0002
2.0 Description of Failure and/or Defect
2.1 Malfunction Report No. 1527 dated 10/27/64
2.2 List of Failed Components or Defect
None: Video gate not switching off during horizon
blanking of P1.
2.3 Description of Repair Action
Replace Inter Frame connecting cable.
2.4 Disposition of Repaired Assembly
Inspection RCA and JPL Q. C.
Perform paragraph 4.3 of RTSP 1121.
Distribution:
J. Graham (5)
S. Flood
R. Kramer (5)
K. Tate (JPL)
D. Kindt (JPL)
Project Staff
R° Ficken
B. Mulholland
G. Paxton
A. Gravel
F. Beisel
Attendees: At JPL 12/30/64
D. Kindt, R. Smith, B.P. Miller, G. Abrams
R. G. Abrams
Chairman of the Review Board
Figure 46. Sample of Review Board Action Memorandum
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TABLE39
REVIEWBOARDACTIONS
TestPerformed
Complete flight
acceptanc e
Performance only
Vibration and
performance
Thermal vacuum
and performance
Qualification
Thermal
Special
engineering
Inspection only
Total
Percentage of
total
Redesign
17
16
5
1
12
58
34%
Reason for Review Action
Realignment
1
2
2
4%
Parts
Replacement
25
39
10
7
6
93
55%
Correction
of Defect
Total Percentage
of Total
-- 42 24%
9 65 38%
1 16 10%
1 11 7%
-- 12 7%
-- 8 4%
-- 5 3%
1 11 7%
12 170 100%
7% 100%
inspected and retested. The quality control
specialist monitored all the required opera-
tions.
Prior to launch, the quality control specialist
completed the Ranger TV Subsystem Prelaunch
Checklist 118. Completion of this list verified
the acceptability of the conditions checked.
Some typical conditions checked were the
pressurization of the Power Amplifier As-
sembly, the correct mating of all harness
connectors, the proper amount of torque ap-
plied to mounting hardware, the conditions of
potting and conformal coating, and the proper
installation of batteries and camera equipment.
3. Reporting and Documentation
Malfunction reports were issued whenever a
failure occurred on the TV Subsystem. They
were completed at the time of failure, distrib-
uted to the field, and "forwarded to the Engi-
neering Reliability activity at RCA. Quality
Control assured that a JPL Problem/Failure
Report was completed for each RCA malfunc-
tion report.
Narrative reports were submitted to Product
Assurance on a weekly basis. These reports
contained results of inspections performed,
descriptions and results of tests monitored, the
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number of malfunctionreports issued, and
other pertinent information.Whenan emer-
gencyarosewhichrequiredimmediateaction
by anactivity at RCA,QCnotifiedthe activity
by telephonewithoutdelay.
Recordswere maintainedfor all inspections
andtests monitoredbyqualitycontrol.These
consisted of unit performancerecords, re-
quests for customer inspection (AED-268)
quality control checklists, equipmenttime
records, qualitycontrollog books,andequip-
ment logbooks.Copiesof theserecordswere
forwarded to RCA Product Quality Control
departmenton aweeklybasisfor filing in the
Rangerdocumentationcontrolcenter.
4. Equipment Return
The quality control specialist monitored the
packaging, packing, and shipping of all RCA
hardware from JPL to ETR and material
being returned to RCA for rework or modifi-
cation and test. The applicable JPLpaperwork
was delivered with the shipment.
G. WORKMANSHIP STANDARDS AND
SPECIFICATIONS
1. Documentation of Standards
Workmanship standards for the Ranger TV
Subsystem equipment conformed to the re-
quirements of Defense Electronic Products
standards as modified by contract agreement.
These workmanship standards were set forth
in RCA Specifications on Design, Manufactur-
ing, and Workmanship for Ranger Television
System dated March 10, 1962, after athorough
review of the JPL specifications by RCA
Central Engineering. This document provided,
in one publication, a list of all applicable
specifications and copies of those specifica-
tions generated to supplement existing RCA
standards. It was divided into three sections:
design and drafting information, manufacturing
information, and workmanship and quality
control information.
2. Manufacturing Specifications
Table 40 lists the type, number, and title of
the applicable manufacturing specifications.
3. Workmanship Requirements and Practices
The general specification for Ranger Work-
manship (Specification 8030001) governed, al-
though certain additional requirements applied.
Among these were use of the following: thermal
wire strippers; bifurcated terminals on printed
circuit boards; hard-mountingtechniques; non-
fungus-nutrient materials; locking-type nuts
for all fastenings; deburring to remove sharp
edges on sheet metal parts; and stamping or
stenciling of nameplate information on flight
hardware. In the following paragraphs certain
of these workmanship practices are described
more fully.
a. PRINTED WIRING TERMINAL BOARD TECHNIQUE
Ranger electronic components were packaged
utilizing printed wiring terminal board tech-
niques. This technique employed a printed
wiring board as a base, on which components
were mounted to terminals, which in turn had
been mounted to the printed wiring board and
soldered normally (See figure 47a).
b. MATERIALS
The base material of the wiring boards was a
copper-clad glass-epoxy laminate. All solder
used was 60/40 (tin/lead) composition con-
forming to specifications QQ-S-571. Flux for
soldering was rosin base. No acid fluxes were
used in preparation or during soldering. Ter-
minals were of the bifurcated type, gold-
plated, and mechanically secured to the base
material by rolling.
c. COMPONENT MOUNTING
Components lay on the wiring board and were
secured by a coating fillet applied during the
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Type of
Specification
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
M anufacturing
Manufacturing
TABLE 40
MANUFACTURING SPECIFICATIONS
Number Title
1985983
2020255
2020303
2020376
2020388
2020389
2020390
2020391
2020394
2020401
2020473
_A A_A
_v20"_,-_
2020476
2020479
2020483
2020487
Finish, Black Epoxy-Polyamide Coating
Bonding with Epoxy Adhesives
Repair of Printed Wiring Boards
Application of Urethane Coating to Printed Circuit
Boards
Treatment for Making Polyethylene Bondable
Chemical Cleaning of Printed Circuit Boards
Mechanical Cleaning of Printed Circuit Boards
Circuit Screen Printing of Wiring Boards
Etching of Printed Circuits (Mechanized)
Screen-Resist Stripping
Bonding and Coating Printed Circuit Assemblies
Lmmersion Tin_ Plating of Prhlted Circuits
Electrostatic and Magnetic Shielding of Camera
Electronic Frames
Soldering by Means of Flux-Cored Solder Preforms
Chemical Treatment for Magnesium Alloys
Insulating Tubing--Heat-Shrinkable--Application of
Irradiated Polyolefin_
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board-coating operation (see Figures 47b and
47c). Leads of the components located above
the terminals were bent down to be secured
in the terminals (see Figure 47d). More than
one lead was placed in a bifurcated terminal
provided that the maxim-ram capacity of the
terminal was not exceeded. Maximum ter-
minal capacity was reached when more than
one-third of the top lead was protruding above
the top of the terminal (see Figure 47e).
d. PAD REQUIREMENTS FOR PRINTED
WIRING
Pads were designed to enable final product
requirements to be achieved. Thus, when pad
sizes were chosen, consideration had to be
given to allowances for human error and fabri-
cation tolerances. The minimum pad diameter
was determined by adding the maximum ter-
minal body diameter to 0.055 inch (fabrication
tolerance plus twice the minimum pad exten-
sion beyond the body). For example, for a
maximum terminal body diameter of 0.095 inch,
the minimum pad diameter would be 0.150
inch (0.095 + 0.055 = 0.150). When pads having
diameters greater than minimum were utilized,
the pads were trimmed where required to
facilitate routing of printed wiring conductors.
When trimmed, however, the diameter re-
maining was no less than the minimum pad
diameter for that terminal (See Figure 47f}.
e. DIMENSIONAL TOLERANCESOF PRINTEDCIRCUITRY
The following minimum dimensions were the
minimum requirements for printed circuitry
used on the Ranger program.
Path width 0.032 inch
Clearance between
printed wiring and
other conductors .......... 0. 030 inch
Printed wiring radius ....... 0. 036 inch
Printed wiring fillets ....... 0.036 inch
Printed wiring
clearance to board
edge ................... 0.065 inch
Clearance to cut-outs
or holes within board
(excluding terminal
holes) ................. 0. 040 inch
Terminal-to-terminal
clearance ............... 0. 060 inch
f. SECURING OF COMPONENTS (SPOT-POTTING)
All terminal boards were treated with a coating
which had no deleterious effects on the as-
sembled terminal boards or upon parts within
assemblies. Components were secured by
adhesives which similarly had no deleterious
effects. A fillet of potting between the compo-
nent and board was used wherepossible. Where
potting would not adhere, the materials were
encapsulated. All coatings and adhesives were
oil-proof and nonfungus-nutrient.
g. POST-RA-6 CONFORMAL COATING
As part of the post-RA-6 program, RCA
Manufacturing Specification 2021015 was used
to delineate conformal coating requirements.
The specification was divided into six parts as
follows:
2021015-1
2021015-2
2021015-3
2021015-4
2021015-5
2021015-6
Coating of uninsulated conductors
which are subjected to less than
300 volts;
Insulation of back side of Cannon
D connectors;
Coating of uninsulated conductors
which are subjected to more than
300 volts;
Spot bonding of parts, wires and
other special requirements;
Potting of harness connectors;
Fabrication of P- and F-type
shutter isolators.
160
VOLUME 4a SECTION III
SOLDER
(a)
COMPONENT
BIFURCATED TERMINAL
PRINTED WIRING PAD
BASE LAMINATE
(b)
NO RELIEF BENDS
5
(c) COATING FILLET
(d) i I
(e)
I/3 OF TOP LEAD
DIAMETER MAX
t
MIN. DIA.-- _'F._ 4",--!-I-- GREATER THAN MIN.
_TRIMMED PAD
(f)
Figure 47. Mounting Techniques
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Section IV
Summary of Ranger TV Subsystem Test Program
A. INTRODUCTION
The testing philosophy applied to the Ranger
TV Subsystem consisted of operation veri-
fication at the assembly and subsystem levels.
The testing program was designed to demon-
strate performance, verify design, and ensure
the delivery of reliable equipment. Both elec-
trical and environmental tests were performed
at the assembly and subassembly levels to
ensure proper operation when integrated with
the Subsystem. The electrical testing was
designed to evaluate the operation at ambient
conditions prior to testing under environ-
mental conditions. Electrical tests were also
performed during some environmental tests
(e.g., thermal-vacuum), and after the com-
pletion of environmental tests.
Environmental testing was performed to dem-
onstrate the capability of the TV Subsystem to
reliably meet the required design charac-
teristics in the environments anticipated dur-
ing its operational life. A prototype model
of each of the assemblies was subjected to the
qualification tests in order to obtain type-
approval for the use of similar assemblies in
the proof test model and the flight models.
Similar qualification tests were conducted on
the m_chanical test and thermal control models
in order to demonstrate the adequacy of the
structural configuration and the thermal-
control techniques. Electrical and environ-
mental tests of the proof test model
demonstrated the operation of the overall TV
Subsystem. All flight model and spare as-
semblies were subjected to acceptance tests,
as were the flight models of the overall TV
Subsystem, to demonstrate the electrical per-
formance of the assemblies and the Subsystem
after exposure to the space environment.
The environmental tests conducted on each sub-
assembly and on the complete TV Subsystem
were performed in accordance with the gov-
erning specifications. These specifications
determined the required configuration of the
test unit, the types and levels of testing to be
performed, and the required mechanical, elec-
trical, and optical performance to be obtained
during and after the tests.
Assembly-level tests were conducted either
for qualification (type approval) or for ac-
ceptance of assemblies to be installed as
part of the TV Subsystem. Qualification tests
were performed on one prototype assembly of
each type to demonstrate conformance to the
detailed specifications. The environmental
tests performed as part of the qualification
testing were intended to simulate the actual
environments to be experienced by these as-
semblies, with an appropriate margin of
safety.
The assembly-level test environments for
qualification and acceptance testing are de-
fined by RCA Specification 1171807,
"As s embly- Level Environmental Specification
for the Ranger TV Subsystem." This document
governs all environmental testing to be per-
formed at the assembly level. The specifica-
tions are summarized in Volume 1 of this
report. Figures 48 and 49 illustrate the
sequence of major events during testing of
the PTM and flight models respectively. Figure
50 is a flow chart of Ranger TV Subsystem
environmental tests performed from January
1962 through December 1964. These tests
were performed in accordance with RCA
Ranger Specification RTSP-ll01. "TestSpec-
ification for the Environmental Testing of
the Proof Test Model and the Flight Models
of the Ranger TV Subsystem v'.
Environmental testing of the TV Subsystem
at RCA was performed without the JPL Ranger
Spacecraft; the command capability of the JPL
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Figure 48. Sequence of Major Events During Testing of PTM
l ASSEMBLY
CAMERA
CALIBRATION REAL-TIME I
66 HR THERMAL- I
VACUUM MISSIONJ
_ _IMoD'FYCAMERASI
AND i
I REcAL'BRATEI
I_ ABBREVIATED I
THERMAL-VACUUM
TEST
ABBREVIATED I
THERMAL-VACUUM I
TEST J
VIBRATION ]
X AXIS
ONLY
L_ REWORK
TRANSMITTERS
I
I ABB.EV'ATEDI
_THERMAL-VACUUM I
/ TEST I SHIP TO
JPL
Figure 49. Sequence of Major Events During Testing of Flight Models
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Figure 50. Flow-Chart of Ranger
Ranger Spacecraft was simulated by the RCA
operational support equipment. Figure 51
shows the TV Subsystem test configuration
without the JPL Ranger Spacecraft. Collimated
light sources were used to stimulate the cam-
eras during testing. The procedures for elec-
trically testing the TV Subsystem during and
after environmental exposure are detailed in
RCA Ranger Specification RTSP-ll00, "Test
Specification for the Ranger TV Subsystem".
The hardline video output capability of the
RCA Test Connector was not used in the final
(system-test) configuration. Instead, the TV
Subsystem was commanded via the RCA/JlOL
Interface Connector, and the video and telem-
etry outputs were provided to the RCA op-
erational support equipment from the RF
output connector.
TV Subsystem Environmental Testing
When the TV Subsystem was installed on the
S_,J_,_ _, the function wasRanger ....... ** .....01w3 ,ILII III C_..IL IU
assumed by the Spacecraft. Externally gen-
erated commands could be provided by either
the RCA Command Console or the JPL opera-
tional support equipment. During system
tests, the hardline video output from the RCA
Test Connector was furnished to the RCA
operational support equipment when the TV
Subsystem was in the warm-up mode. The
output from the RF Output Connector was
used during full-power operation, and video
and telemetry data were relayed to the RCA
operational support equipment via the Ranger
Spacecraft and JPL operational support equip-
ment. Figure 52 illustrates the TVSubsystem
test configuration with the Ranger Space-
craft.
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TO OSE 4 ,HARD-LINE VIDEO 225 KC TELEMETRY
RF VIDEO 225 KC TELEMETRY
TO OSE 4
MANUAL SWITCHING
P SYNC DISABLE
SEQUENCER RESET
COMMAND SWITCH
POSITION
TO OSE q
I RCA OSE
CONTROL |
CONSOLE |
CHANNEL _ TELEMETRY
RF OUTPUT
RTC SIMULATE COMMANDS INTERFACE-J
I. WAR M - UP CONNECTOR ATORS
2, EMERGENCY
3.EMERGENCY OFF
4 ZERO
CC AND S SIMULATE COMMANDS
I. CRUISE MODE ON
2. WARM-UP
3. FULL POWER
REDUCED POWER COMMAND
TURN OFF COMMAND
BATTERY CHARGER
BATTERY MONITOR
Figure 51. TV Subsystem Test Configuration (Without Spacecraft Bus)
HARDLINE VIDEO
AND 225 KC TELEMETRY
TO RCA OSE ,_ VIDEO IAMPLIFIER
COLLIMATORS
7.
RF VIDEO .._
AND 225 KC [TELEMETRY
RCA TEST CONNECTOR
RF OUTPUT CONNECTOR
RCA /JPL iNTERFACE CONNECTOR
RTC-7 COMMAND
_CC ANDS COMMAND
RFVIDEO AND 225KC TELEMETRY
COMMAND
CONSOLE
_RTC 7
B
SYSTEM TURN OFF
BATTERY CHARGE I I I
BATTERY MONITOR I JPL I I OSE
REDUCED POWER COMMAND o I
RTC-7 SIMULATE I i
CHANNEL-8 TELEMETRY
RF VIDEO AND 225 KC TELEMETRY
Figure 52. TV Subsystem Test Configuration (With Spacecraft Bus)
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In the launch pad test configuration (see Fig-
ure 53), the TV Subsystem was commanded
by the spacecraft CC&S. Externally generated
commands were provided to the spacecraft
from the blockhouse through the umbilical
connector. The video and telemetry test out-
puts were relayed from the launch area to
RCA receiving equipment at the AM building,
and were displayed on the RCA operational
support equipment. All launch-pad testing was
performed in a reduced-power mode; GO-NO-
GO test lamps in the Agena shroud were used
to stimulate the cameras during this testing.
B. PROOF TEST MODEL (PTM)
1. PTM Tests at RCA
Electrical and environmental evaluation, and
acceptance testing, of the PTM was performed
during the period from May 9 through August 1,
1962. The chronological sequence of all the
tests is given in Table 41. Two catastrophic
failures occurred during the tests: one took
place during thermal-vacuum testing; and the
other just prior to the final acceptance test.
The catastrophic failure in a thermal-vacuum
environment was the result of the TV Subsys-
tem being turned on prematurely in a partial-
pressure environment that was conducive to
arcing inside several assemblies. Several
theories were advanced as to the cause of the
arcing; the prime suspect was believed to be
the occurrence of heavy glow discharge re-
sulting from the presence of high voltage in a
rarefied atmosphere. Control of the battery
voltage was lost when the arcing occurred,
and this resulted in damage to several as-
semblies. The operation of the TV Subsystem
in any environment other than the vacuum of
outer space was not a requirement of the
Ranger mission profile. Thereafter, all care
and caution was taken to ensure that the
SHROUD
i
JPL OS E
AM BUILDING I
"GO - NO-GO"
TEST LAMPS
IN SHROUD
RF VIDEO
AND 225 KC
EMETRY
T
RCA OSE 1
AM BUILDING
RCA TEST CONNECTOR
RF OUTPUT CONNECTOR
/JPL INTERFACE CONNECTOR
RTC-7 COMMAND
AND S COMMAND
UMBILICAL
CONNECTOR
LAUNCH SHELTER
BATTERY CHARGER]
TURN OFF POWER
SUPPLY
RTC-7 COMMAND
SYSTEM TURN-OFF COMMAND
BATTERY MONITOR
BATTERY CHARGER SENSOR SELECTOR
BLOCK HOUSEI
Figure 53. TV Subsystem TestConfiguration (Launch Pad)
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environmental test conditions did approach
those of a perfect vacuum.
On July 25, 1962, following a series of RFI
tests, a number of minor changes were made
to the PTM. In the course of this work, the
High-Current Voltage Regulator was removed
from the structure to replace a loose terminal
lug. At the completion of the modifications, the
PTM was to be checked. When the PTM was
placed in the warm-up mode, the sequencer
prematurely cycled the equipment to full
power. Shortly after the turn-on, a popping
noise was heard andthe power to the Subsystem
was turned off. Investigation revealed that one
of the battery cables was hot and several as-
semblies were damaged.
After considerable investigation, it was de-
termined that the probable cause of failure
was accidental grounding of the battery "hot"
side. There is evidence that when the High-
Current Voltage Regulator was replaced in
the structure a mounting screw had cut into
the heat sink of the SCR. Extensive circuit
and failure analyses, together with failure
effects analyses, were inconclusive in pin-
pointing another possible cause. All damaged
components were repaired, inspected byQual-
ity Control, subjected to electrical checks,
and reassembled into the structure. The PTM
was then tested through all modes of operation
on internal and external power for a 24-hour
period before predelivery acceptance test.
Conditions causing the earlier catastrophic
failure could not be reproduced.
2. PTM Tests at JPL (August 1, 1962 through
January 31, 1963)
Only a few minor difficulties occurred during
the Mission Verification Tests, and the PTM
performed normally during all the tests.
3. Block III PTM Tests at RCA (April 3 through
June 17, 1963)
The Block III Proof Test Model was the first
TV Subsystem modified to permit independent
operation of the F- and P-Channel camera-
communications chains. This configuration,
known as the split system, was capable of
either independent or simultaneous operation
of F- and P-Channels. In the modified PTM,
the partial-scan and full-scan channels were
completely independent and powered by indi-
vidual batteries and voltage regulators, thus
providing a reduced probability that an equip-
ment failure in one chain would affect the
performance of the other chain. A Distribution
Control Unit (DCU) was incorporated to pro-
vide power distribution and fuse protection
for the redundant capability. In addition, an
Electronic Clock was provided for full-scan
channel turn-on, and a Power Control Unit
(PCU) for remote Subsystem turn-off.
The Block III PTM was built to demonstrate
the operation of the TV Subsystem after the
extensive redesign to achieve the split-system
configuration. The purpose of testing was to
demonstrate the normal and failure-mode
operation of the TV Subsystem. Table 43 out-
lines the tests which were performed at RCA.
The results of the PTM tests demonstrated
that the split-system design fulfilled the de-
sign objectives. The PTM was shipped to JPL
on June 20, 1963.
The purpose of tests performed at JPL was
to verify the performance of the electrical
equipment in the TV Subsystem PTM when
integrated with the Ranger Spacecraft Bus.
The tests were designed to verify satisfactory
operation of the PTM in ambient and simu-
lated space environments. The tests were per-
formed at JPL between August 1, 1962 and
January 31, 1963, and are listed in Table 42.
4. Block III PTM Tests at JPL (June 22 through
October 21, 1963 and November 9 through
December 5, 1963)
The Block HI PTM of the Ranger TV Subsys-
tem was delivered to JPL on June 21, 1963.
After it was mated to the Ranger Bus, the
PTM was subjected to a series of Mission
and System Verification Tests performed in
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TABLE 42
SUMMARY OF PTM TESTS AT JPL
AUGUST 1, 1962 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1963
Description of Test
TV Subsystem Verification Test
Spacecraft Verification Test
Space Science Camera Test
System Verification Test No. 1
Backup Function Test
VSWR Test
System Verification Test No. 2
Spacecraft-SFOF Compatibility Test
Space Science Camera Test
System Verification Test No. 3
Precountdown Dummy Run
Countdown Dummy Run
Vibration Tests
TV Subsystem Verification Test
Thermal-Vacuum Test
RFI Test
Mission Verification Test No. 1
Mission Verification Test No. 2
Mission Verification Test No. 3
RF Shorting Tests
Mission Verification Test No. 4
Vibration Test
Special Thermal-Vacuum RF Test
System Verification Test No. 4
Test Procedure
RCA Specification RTSP-1100
JPL Procedure 3R212.00
JPL Procedure 3R220.00
JPL Procedure 3R300.00
JPL Procedure 3R305.00
JPL Procedure 3R300.00
JPL Procedure 3R318.00
JPL Procedure 3R220.00
JPL Procedure 3R300.01
JPL Procedure 3R304
JPL Procedure 3R309
JPL Procedure 3R311.00
JPL Procedure 3R300.01
JPL Procedure 3R301.00
Special Test
JPL Procedure 3R302.00
JPL Procedure 3R302.00
JPL Procedure 3R302.00
JPL Procedure 3R302.00
JPL Procedure 3R311.00
Special Test
JPL Procedure 3R300.07
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accordance with JPL test procedures as listed
in Table 44. The two-fold purpose of the tests
was to determine the compatibility of the TV
Subsystem with the Ranger Bus, and to evaluate
the performance of the complete Ranger PTM
_ ......... _ an _,_,,_,_, period u, _,ulu in
a simulated space environment. Special tests
were also conducted, as necessary, for the
investigation of special problem areas.
5. Block III PTM Tests at Goldstone (October 23
through November 8, 1963)
The Block III PTM TV Subsystem arrived at
the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility (DSIF)
at Goldstone, California, on October 21, 1963.
The tests performed on the Block III PTM
and the applicable test procedures are listed
in Table 45. These tests were performed to
evaluate the Deep Space Instrumentation Fa-
cility operation during simulated missions.
The operation of the TV Subsystem was both
normal and satisfactory throughout these
tests.
Upon the saccessful completion of testing at
JPL and at Goldstone, the PTM TV Subsystem
was placed in its shipping container for stor-
age at JPL. The PTM TV Subsystem was re-
turned to JPL on November 9, 1963 after the
satisfactory completion of the DSIF checkout
tests.
6. Block III PTM Tests at RCA {March 23
through March 31, 1964)
The modified Block III PTM of the Ranger TV
Subsystem was the first Subsystem to in-
corporate the design changes resulting from
the study undertaken as a result of the Ranger
VI flight. These changes can be summarized
as follows:
• Modification to the command and control
circuitry to both prevent the possibility
of inadvertent turn-on of the TV Subsys-
tem until after the spacecraft separates
from the Agena and provide a method
of rapid Subsystem turn-off; and
• Modifications to the Telemetry Assem-
bly, and modifications and additions to
the telemetry sensors to improve the
readability and usefulness of the telem-
etry data.
In addition, a special method of inspection of
the Subsystem assemblies was implemented
to determine the effects of life and usage on
the equipment. As a part of this program, all
exposed terminals were coated and all ex-
posed connectors were potted on all flight
equipment to minimize the possibility of an
accidental short. Because of the urgency of
the modified Block Ill PTM test program,
engineering models with exposed terminals
were used on the Subsystem for some of the
testing.
The testing and checkout of the modified Block
III PTM TV Subsystem at RCA commenced on
March 23, 1964, and was completed on March
31, 1964. This testing and checkout cycle veri-
fied the satisfactory operation of the modified
PTM TV Subsystem. Table 46 lists all major
tests performed during this period.
7. Modified Block III PTM Tests at JPL(April 2
through September 1964)
The modified Block Ill PTM arrived at JPL on
April 2, 1964, and the electrical testing of the
TV Subsystem was started immediately. The
testing was continued until the launching of
the RA-7 Spacecraft. A chronological listing
of the tests performed on the modified Block
III PTM is given in Table 47. The PTM was
placed in a storage container during the later
part of July 1964, but was reactivated in
August of the same year. The PTM was up-
dated to the Ranger VIII configuration, and
a number of tests were performed before it
was again placed in the storage container.
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C. FLIGHT MODEL NO. 1
1. Flight Model No. 1 Tests at RCA
(August 17 through October 16, 1962)
Testing of Flight Model 1 began August 17,
1962 at RCA. The communications equipment
and cameras had been bench-tested and inte-
grated with the structure.
The first Subsystem test was performed on
September 12, 1962; Flight Model 1 was sub-
jected to thermal-vacuum testing prior to
vibration testing to permit the incorporation
of certain mechanical design changes in the
Camera Assembly. The thermal-vacuum test
consisted of two stages: {1) A 66-hour "real-
time" simulated mission (without the use of
collimators} for the purpose of verifying the
thermal configuration of the TV Subsystem;
and {2) An abbreviated mission {with the use
of collimators} to verify the electrical per-
formance of the Subsystem in a simulated
thermal-vacuum environment. Flight Model 1
successfully completed the 66-hour "real-
time" mission test.
At the conclusion of thermal-vacuum testing,
a Subsystem test was performed to evaluate
the effect of the thermal-vacuum environment
on the TV Subsystem. Following this test, an
improvement program was initiated involving
the following circuit modifications:
A black-clip circuit was installed to
prevent noise spikes from interrupting
the sync;
Shutter apertures were enlarged to ob-
tain 0.004-second exposures on the
partial-scan cameras;
Shock-absorbing isolators were installed
on all camera shutters;
Double-cased tantalytic capacitors al-
ready in the power supplies were re-
placed by single-cased tantalytic
capacitors;
• Camera-switchover logic was changed
to two-tone logic {from the original
three-tone logic}; and
• The RC time-constant of the emergency
data input to the modulator was changed
to improve emergency telemetry.
Following the adoption of these improvements,
the necessary adjustments were made to re-
integrate the cameras and communications
equipment.
On September 28, 1962, following a Subsystem
test and a simulated mission, Flight Model 1
was mounted in the thermal-vacuum chamber
for an abbreviated thermal mission. When
the vacuum-chamber door was closed, a bat-
tery lead was caught; this caused a short and
resulted in damage to the Subsystem harness
and one battery. After replacing the harness
and battery, and performing another Subsys-
tem test, the Subsystem was returned to the
thermal-vacuum chamber on September 29,
1962; the terminal maneuver and simulated
mission in thermal-vacuum were performed
on September 30, 1962. The chamber was re-
turned to ambient conditions and a final simu-
lated mission was performed to verify the
fully operational condition of the Subsystem.
The tests that were performed at RCA are
listed in Table 48.
2. Flight Model No. 1 Tests at JPL
(December 11 through December 18, 1962)
Flight Model 1 was delivered to JPL on Octo-
ber 18, 1962 after successfully completing
environmental and electrical testing at RCA.
At JPL, the Subsystem was mated with the
Ranger VI Spacecraft, and successfully under-
went Subsystem and System tests. The tests
performed at JPL are listed in Table 49.
D. FLIGHT MODEL NO. 2
1. Flight Model No. 2 Tests at RCA
(October 24 through November 1, 1962)
Flight Model 2 was assembled and delivered
to the electrical test area on October 24, 1962.
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The test plan and test objectives were the
same as those for Flight Model 1. The tests
comprised: electrical tests, vibration tests,
initial thermal-vacuum tests, investigation of
the RF failures, final thermal-vacuum tests,
and acceptance tests.
During the initial thermal-vacuum tests, it
was discovered that an oily film covered the
Subsystem thermal shroud. The source, cause,
and method of eliminating this film from fu-
ture tests were investigated by the materials
engineering group at RCA. While the results
of the investigation were inconclusive, recom-
mendations were made concerning thermal-
shield polishing. Also, it was determined that
some of the film was due to the oil from the
diffusion pump. Environmental test engineers
eliminated this source of contamination.
Each time the Subsystem was operated during
the initial thermal-vacuum tests, the RF power
failed. Therefore, RF failure tests were run
to determine the exact cause of failures be-
fore continuing with the thermal-vacuum test-
ing. The results of these tests showed that
the right-angle connectors, the signal sam-
plers, and the RF power connectors and cables
were breaking down either independently or
together whenever the TV Subsystem was
placed in the full-power mode of operation.
The problem was eliminated by removing the
signal samplers and all right-angle connectors
{except the one inside the Dummy-Load pres-
sure vessel} and by applying DC-4 silicone
grease between the connector shell and the
cable during the assembly of coaxial cables.
After the modifications were made, the final
thermal-vacuum tests were started and four
simulated missions were performed in the
thermal-vacuum chamber; no RF power fail-
ures were experienced. However, the video
display of the P1 Camera deteriorated pro-
gressively throughout the four simulated
mission tests. An investigation made at the
end of testing showed that the light output of
the P1 Camera collimator dropped from 1250
to 335 footlamberts because of flaking of the
reflective coating from the bulb of
the collimator.
A final Subsystem test was run in accordance
with the applicable specification. The results
of this test were satisfactory, and Flight Model
2 was accepted for delivery to JPL.
2. Life Test Model (LTM) Tests at JPL (March
4 through June 12, 1963)
When the split-system design was adopted as
a modification to the Ranger TV Subsystem
project, the original, nonredundant configura-
tion Flight Model 2 was redesignated as
the Life Test Model. It was shipped to JPL
on February 19, 1963, for mission verifica-
tion testing.
Tests were conducted at JPL to evaluate the
performance of the LTM TV Subsystem over
an extended period of time in a simulated en-
vironment. Additional tests were conducted to
investigate special problem areas. The tests
performed at JPL are summarized
in Table 50.
Upon completion of the mission verification
tests {MVT) at JPL, the LTM was returned
to RCA on July 5, 1963, for an evaluation of
the effects of the testing at JPL.
The principal objective of the LTM test pro-
gram was to evaluate the performance of the
TV Subsystem over an extended period of
time and under various environmental condi-
tions. Even though this Subsystem did not
incorporate the Block HI modified split-system
design, the following general conclusions were
drawn:
• Performance of the Subsystem, although
not always optimum, was generally ade-
quate because data on the lunar surface
would have been obtained if any of the
tests had been an actual mission;
• Evaluation of data from the mission veri-
fication tests corroborated the desir-
ability of the split-system design
improvements which would o p t i m i z e
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performance and improve the probability
of successful missions;
• General working knowledge of the TV
Subsystem was acquired by the test
teams ; and
• Improved test procedures and techniques
were developed.
The experience gained during the test pro-
gram on the LTM led to the incorporation of
several modifications in the cameras for the
Block HI effort; these modifications resulted
in improved overall picture quality and cam-
era reliability.
A situation referred to as shutter microphonics
existed in the LTM full-scan cameras. This
problem was evidenced as a transient in the
full-scan video readout; the display showed 12
such transients in each full-scan camera
photograph. It was correlated with the actuation
of the shutters for the partial-scan cameras.
This problem was eliminated by installing an
electrostatic shield between the moving shutter
vane and the vidicon faceplate. The Block HI
camera redesign was directed toward a gen-
eral improvement of parts application in each
circuit to achieve maximum camera reliability.
The vidicon connector design, referred to as
the top-hat connector, was changed to a
bulkhead-r,-.ounted Cannon connector and re-
lieved the handling stresses induced on the
vidicon during assembly of the connector to
the vidicon. The redesign also provided for
damping out shock inputs to the vidicon end
which reduced the microphonics. Reduction of
shutter cross-talk in the full-scan cameras
and reduction of handling stresses on vidicons
were two improvements made in the Block IH
TV Cameras as a direct result of the experi-
ence gained with the LTM.
The LTM was also utilized for the testing,
evaluation, and use of the modified Four-Port
Hybrid and of the TNC connectors for the
elimination of RF arcing. This arcing was as-
certained to be one of the causes of the RF
power fluctuations. The LTM tests led to the
development of improved techniques for the
recording of test data, the calibration of
equipment, and the demonstration of the im-
portance of a complete test record {which
included the observation of the Spectrum
Analyzer for the determination of amplitude),
frequency with respect to a calibrated JPL
Beacon, and the level of intermodulations. In
this regard, the value of a calibrated external
RF signal for the calibration of the Spectrum
Analyzer display was demonstrated. The test
teams developed a technique to calibrate the
Brush Recorder so that a 4-db decrease in
RF power output could be detected on the
strip chart.
E. FLIGHT MODEL II1-1
1. Flight Model II1-1 Tests at RCA (July 7 through
August 22, 1963)
After the conversion of Flight Model 1 into
a split-system configuration, this TV Subsys-
tem was designated as Flight Model {FM) III-1.
The tests performed on this Subsystem to
verify its operation are listed in Table 51.
Only minor difficulties occurred during TV
Subsystem Test 1, thermal-vacuum test per-
formed on August 4, 1963, and Camera Cali-
bration Check 3. The Subsystem performed
normally. On August 21_ 1963, Flight Model
III-1 was given a complete Subsystem test for
customer approval of the Subsystem. The F-
Channel telemetry was found to be erratic
because of a broken connector in the Inter-
mediate Power Amplifier; it was corrected.
All other assemblies functioned properly. On
the basis of these tests, witnessed and ap-
proved by JPL representatives, Flight Model
III-1 was accepted for shipment to JPL.
2. Flight Model II1-1 Tests at JPL (August 26
through December 15, 1963)
The purpose of the testing program at JPL
was to verify that Flight Model III-1 of the
Ranger TV Subsystem was in flight-ready
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condition before shipment of the RA-6 Space-
craft to the Eastern Test Range (ETR). This
testing program (summarized in Table 52) be-
gan on August 26, 1963 with a quality-control
inspection and a Subsystem test performed to
document the condition of the TV Subsystem
after delivery to JPL and to establish its op-
erational capabilities before starting System
Verification Tests.
A total of six System Verification Tests, de-
signed to verify the electrical performance of
the entire Ranger Spacecraft, were performed.
Other special electrical tests were conducted
separately on the TV Subsystem, either to
ensure proper Subsystem operation before a
system test or to perform necessary calibra-
tion and analysis. In addition, environmental
tests and a simulated-mission test were per-
formed to demonstrate that the spacecraft
was capable of operation in space. During the
testing at JPL and RCA, the P-Channel was
operated for a total of 163 hours, 50 minutes,
and the F-Channel was operated for 152 hours,
5 minutes. All malfunctions were documented,
repaired, and the test was then repeated to
verify Subsystem and System operation. Flight
Model III-1 was shipped to the Eastern Test
Range on December 15, 1963.
3. Flight Model II1-1 Tests at ETR (December 28,
1963 through January 25, 1964)
Prelaunch checkouts were performed on the
TV Subsystem at the Eastern Test Range
(ETR) and on the operational station equip-
ment (OSE) at the Deep Space Instrumentation
Facility (DSIF) at Goldstone, California. A
series of thirteen checkouts were performed
on the TV Subsystem beginning on December
28, 1963 and ending on January 25, 1964; these
tests are summarized in Table 53.
A series of two operation-readiness tests and
three OSE prelaunch calibrations were per-
formed at the DSIF at Goldstone between
January 21 and January 30, 1964. In addition,
calibrations of DSIF Film Recorders No. 1
and 2 were performed during the period be-
ginning December 26, 1963 and continuing
through the second pass of Ranger VI over
Goldstone.
Ranger VI, consisting of the Ranger Spacecraft
Bus and Flight Model III-1 of the Ranger TV
Subsystem, was launched from Cape Kennedy,
ETR on an Atlas-D/Agena-B vehicle. Liftoff
occurred at 15:49:00 GMT, January 30, 1964.
F. FLIGHT MODEL 111-2
1. Flight Model 111-2 Tests at RCA (August
28 through September 26, 1963)
The testing of the Ranger TV Subsystem,
Flight Model III-2, commenced on August 28,
1963 and was completed on September 26,
1963. The tests performed during this period
are listed in Table 54. Every test was suc-
cessfully completed in the scheduled order.
All resulting data either met or exceeded the
specifications. With the exceptions of the
shutter failures, no equipment malfunction
necessitated removal of assemblies or sub-
assemblies from the Subsystem. However,
the Telemetry Processor Assembly was re-
moved once to incorporate a design modifi-
cation. The communications equipment was
tuned at the begi_m!ng of the testing cycle,
and performed satisfactorily for the balance
of the testing cycle without any further tuning
or adjustments. All six cameras met or ex-
ceeded specifications in all the tests. The
cameras exceeded specifications for re-
sponse, percent erase, and signal-to-noise
ratio. No significant degradation was noticed
between the first and second camera-calibra-
tion verifications.
2. Flight Model 111-2 Tests at JPL (September
30, 1963 through January 23, 1964)
Flight Model III-2 was shipped to JPL on Sep-
tember 27, 1963. Integration personnel were
on hand at JPL for continued support andtest-
ing. The Operational Support Equipment was
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aligned and calibrated to eliminate sensitivity
problems, and on September 30, the testing (as
listed in Table 55) was started.
On December 7, 1963 rework on the P Camera
was completed, and the F a Camera was re-
moved and new bottom shutter shock isolators
installed. All camera lenses and vidicon face-
plates were cleaned. All shutter shock isolators
were replaced with new types. On January 6,
1964, when the terminal maneuver for Mission
Test No. 1 was performed, a dropout was ob-
served on P2 Camera video. Subsequently,
Flight Model III-2 was removed from the Bus,
and further investigation indicated a possible
malfunction of the P2 Camera. On January 7,
1964, the P2 Camera (Serial No. 039) and the
Camera Electronics Assembly (Serial No. 033)
were replaced by P Camera Serial No. 036 and
Camera Electronics Assembly Serial No. 034.
Then, prior to the resumption of thermal-
vacuum testing, an electrical test was con-
ducted. During this test, the P-Channel did
not come on during full power. This problem
was traced to a malfunction in the P-Channel
Transmitter Power Supply. This was the sec-
ond transmitter failure to occur in a short
time; therefore, the P-Channel Transmitter
was replaced.
The Subsystem was then reassembled and
tested. During this test, the video cables from
the cameras to the video combiner were found
to be loose and improperly inserted. This
situation was corrected; and, on January 8,
1964, further testing was performed and the
TV Subsystem operated s a t i s f a c t o r i 1y.
Thermal-vacuum testing was resumed later
the same day, and the testing at JPL was suc-
cessfully concluded on January 23, 1964.
3. Flight Model 111-2 Tests at ETR and RCA
(February 3 through February 14, 1964)
Flight Model III-2 arrived at ETRon February
3, 1964 and, after inspection and a brief elec-
trical test, it was concluded that no damage
occurred during shipping. Final sty-casting of
the connectors was performed, and a final
mechanical inspection and preparation for
launch were completed on February 6. On
February 7, a backup-function test was per-
formed. A review of the postshipment test in-
dicated that two noisy telemetry frames existed
on the Channel-8 Telemetry.
On February 12, following the Ranger VI fail-
ure, TV Subsystem Flight Model III-2 was
shipped to RCA and arrived there on February
14. An electrical test indicated that the Sub-
system operated properly. On February 14,
Flight Model III-2 of the TV Subsystem was
prepared for rework in conjunction with the
anticipated Ranger redesign as a result of the
Ranger VI flight and, where necessary, all
components were released for evaluation, re-
work, and redesign.
4. Modified Flight Model 111-2 Tests at RCA
(April 5 through May 1, 1964)
The Modified Flight Model III-2 TVSubsystem
was the first flight model containing the de-
sign changes resulting from the Ranger VI
failure analysis. The philosophy of testing was
to perform a series of tests which would cover
all of the expected conditions of the lunar
mission in order to gain a high level of confi-
dence in the TV Subsystem in light of the
post-Ranger VI design changes.
A complete listing of the tests performed at
RCA is given in Table 56. The TV Subsystem
performed satisfactorily during the testing
cycle with the following exceptions. Both the
15- and 90-point telemetry exhibited excessive
noise during the pre-thermal-vacuum test of
April 19, 1964. The problem was traced to a
malfunction of the commutators and these
were replaced. Studies were conducted to
establish a new source for commutators to
prevent a recurrence of this problem during
a mission; Fifth Dimension Inc. commuta-
tors were subsequently used.
All resolvable problem areas were corrected
and the TV Subsystem was shipped to JPL
on May 1, 1964.
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5. Modified Flight Model 111-2 Tests at JPL
(May 2 through June 1, 1964)
Modified Flight Model III-2 TV Subsystem
arrived at JPL on May 2, 1964. At JPL the
Subsystem was integrated with the spacecraft
Bus to form the complete Ranger VII Space-
craft. A tabulation of the tests performed
while at JPL is given in Table 57.
During the testing cycle at JPL, the telemetry
chassis was changed to incorporate the new
5-D commutators into the TV Subsystem.
The TV Subsystem performed satisfactorily
throughout the testing at JPL with the excep-
tion of the five minor discrepancies presented
below.
• Point No. 8 of the 15-point telemetry
indicated a failure during the RF Link
Test. This point monitors the -y axis
shroud temperature. The failure was
traced to the temperature sensor; a new
unit was installed and operation was
normal.
• Tearing of sync on the F-Channel video
was noted during several of the tests.
The problem was associated with the
OSE and did not reflect on the operation
of the TV Subsystem because the tearing
was not exhibited on the tape playbacks.
• F-Channel power output did not meet the
two-minute specifications of 19.5 watts
during Mission Verification Test No. 5.
The problem was attributed to beth a
marginal battery voltage of 29.7 volts
and the fact that the F-Channel tuning
was for a slow power rise which would
permit a satisfactory one-hour mission.
Later testing demonstrated that the F-
Channel transmitter and power amplifier
were working normally.
• RFI problems were noted during the
match-mate test andthe space-simulator
operational checkouts; these were ap-
parently caused by the test setup. (Both
of these tests were conducted using an
RF link.) The Explosive-Safe Area (ESA)
test No. 2 showed that RFI was not a
problem when the high-gain antenna was
radiating into a microwave absorber or
free space.
• Noise, in the form of fast noise spikes
and some microphonics, was observed
on the P Cameras throughout the testing
cycle. The noise was within specified
limits and not considered objectionable.
With the conclusion of testing at JPL, sufficient
data had been gathered to establish a high
level of confidence in the Ranger VII Spacecraft.
On June 21, 1964, the Ranger VII Spacecraft
was shipped to the Eastern Test Range (ETR)
for a final series of tests prior to launch.
6. Modified Flight Model 111-2 Tests at ETR
(June 23 through July 28, 1964)
The tests at ETR were performed on the Modi-
fied Flight Model III-2 as part of the space-
craft, and on the spacecraft when adapted to
the launch vehicle. The purpose of these tests
was to ensure correct TV Subsystem opera-
tion, to train personnel in spacecraft and
launch-vehicle procedures, and to verify these
procedures. A list of tests performed at ETR
is given in Table 58.
Discrepancies that occurred during ETR test-
ing and their resolution are listed below.
RFI was noted during Agena shroud test-
ing. This was traced to the omni-antenna
reflecting into the high-gain antenna in
the Agena shroud. This condition would
not exist in the lunar mission, there-
fore, the RFI was not considered a
problem.
• Noise previously noted was observed
throughout testing at ETR.
• No Pl Camera video was observed dur-
ing the initial tests under the Agena
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shroud. The problem was thatthe shroud-
light was obstructed from the P1 Camera
view; this was corrected by enlarging
the shroud-light hole.
Data from the entire test program of the
Ranger VII Spacecraft was evaluated and indi-
cated that the spacecraft was ready to perform
its lunar mission. Countdown for launch started
on July 27, 1964, but was aborted at T+22
minutes because of a problem in the Atlas
guidance system. On July 28, 1964, the second
day of the launch window, the countdown was
started again. Countdown tests on the TV
Subsystem verified that, in every aspect, the
equipment was working satisfactorily. Launch
of the Ranger VII Spacecraft took place at
16:50:00 GMT on July 28, 1964. The success-
ful results of the mission justified the high
level of confidence in the spacecraft generated
by the complete and exacting test cycle to
which it had been subjected.
G. FLIGHT MODEL 111-3
1. Flight Model 111-3 Tests at RCA (November
23, 1963 through January 3, 1964}
A Subsystem Test was performed on Flight
Model III-3 of the Ranger TV Subsystem on
December 4, 1963. The test objective was to
verify overall Subsystem operation prior to
the start of environmental testing.
The TV Subsystem was exercised through all
modes of operation by simulated and real-
time commands. Overall results were satis-
factory and verified proper operation of the
Subsystem. Following the thermal-balance
tests, the communications equipment was re-
turned and checked. A leak testwas performed
on the pressure vessels and revealed that the
pressure in the Dummy Load Assembly was
zero psi. The O ring, pressure valve, valve
core, and RF connector were replaced when
a deformed pressure-valve core was
discovered.
A thermal-vacuum verification test of Flight
Model III-3 was conducted from December
9 to 12, 1963 after which three abbreviated
missions were performed for electrical veri-
fication of Subsystem operation. The collima-
tors were then installed, a successful command
checkout test performed, and the Subsystem
was placed in the thermal-vacuum chamber
on December 14, 1963.
The actual turn-on of the commands for the
Simulated Mission Tests were performed on
December 15, 1963, following pump-down of
the chamber. All operations and commands
appeared normal except for some RF power
fluctuations. Investigation disclosed that these
fluctuations were caused by the AC transients
in the monitoring equipment, and the tests con-
tinued. Three simulated missions were com-
pleted on December 15, 1963 and the results
were satisfactory.
On December 18, vibration testing was satis-
factorily completed. Electrical tests were run
before and after vibration and there was no
significant degradation in the Subsystem. The
thermal-vacuum retest was satisfactorily
completed on December 19, 1963.
The acceptance test was performed December
30, 1963 and was satisfactory except for noisy
video. The following corrections were ac-
complished prior to performing a second ac-
ceptance test.
• The P-Channel communications chain
was tuned on December 31, 1963; sub-
sequent tests indicated that the video was
now satisfactory.
• The 15-kc noise and power-supply spikes
were reduced to 30 mv and the back-
ground noise was almost completely
eliminated.
On January 3, 1964, a preshipment electrical
test was satisfactorily completed, and Flight
Model IH-3 was shipped to JPL. A chronologi-
cal listing of tests performed at RCA is
given in Table 59.
201
U>-
Z
W
I.-
0,o
>- .-
0
z
"o
Q.
0
0
i 1
0
I=.
°_
_ _ o _ _ o _ _ _ ._ ._ _ ._ o
_ _ _____ _
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ 0 0 _ 0 0 0 0
¢Q ¢Q O0 ¢0 CO ¢0 O0 00 O0 ¢0 ¢0 _ 0"_ ,._ _
b_ _ IZ_ b_ • • • o o 0 b_ 0 0 O_ _-_ _-_
0 0
O0 0"_ 00 0
O_ 0 0,1 0
o _ o
.o
0
o
o o
o _ o o o _-_
_ _ _ _ _ _o _ _ o_ o_ ._ o
I _ I I _ I
• _,_ c_ _ • _ o
o
202
VOLUME 4a SECTION IV
2. Flight Model 111-3 Tests at JPL (January
4 through February 28, 1964)
After Flight Model III-3 arrived at JPL, it
was removed from the shipping container and
an electrical test verified proper operation
of the Subsystem. While at JPL, the P-Channel
communications chain and the P2 Camera were
removed from Flight Model ffl-3 and mounted
on Flight Model III-2. The testing of Flight
Model III-3 was delayed pending the receipt
of replacement assemblies. P-Channel com-
munications equipment from Flight Model III-2
and the Transmitter Power Supply from the
LTM were installed in Flight Model III-3 and
tuned. A Subsystem command checkout without
the P2 Camera was conducted and results
showed that the Subsystem performed
satisfactorily.
On January 27, 1964, P2 Camera, Serial No.
39, and P2 Camera Electronics, Serial No. 33,
were installed in the Flight Model III-3 Sub-
system and calibration was completed on Jan-
uary 28. After retuning the Subsystem toflight
configuration, a Subsystem Test was con-
ducted and satisfactory performance was ob-
served. The Subsystem was again mated with
the Ranger VIII Bus, and System Verification
Test No. 2 was conducted. Fifteen minutes
after turn-on of the external power to the Sub-
system, F-Channel unexpectedly turned on in
warm-up. F-Channel was turned off and the
test continued in the normal cruise-mode
operation. It was concluded that the Clock-
Start relay in the Distribution Control Unit
had not been reset after the previous opera-
tions. The Backup-Function System test and
RFI tests were conducted on February 3 and
4, 1964, respectively. Both tests indicated
satisfactory performance of the Subsystem.
On February 7, a System Verification Test
was performed. During this test, two abnormal
conditions were observed during the operation
of the Subsystem:
• F-Channel turned on in warm-up when
power was switched from external to
internal at T+ 30 minutes; and
• P-Channel went to full power approxi-
mately two minutes early, at T+48
minutes.
The first problem appeared to be caused by a
transient turn-on of the High-Current Voltage
Regulator by the initial application of volt-
age to the SCR cathode. The second problem
initially appeared to be a Camera Sequencer
failure; however, the problem was still evident
after Camera Sequencer, Serial No. 002, and
Sequencer Power Supply, Serial No. 005, were
replaced with Sequencer, Serial No. 006, and
Sequencer Power Supply, Serial No. 010. Fur-
ther investigation revealed the problem to be
due to OSE malfunction, although the specific
source of the noise that caused the early full-
power turn-on of the P-Channel could not be
isolated. Match-mate tests were performed and
proved to be satisfactory. Two preshipment
electrical tests were conducted and two prob-
lems were encountered during the first test:
The P-Channel RF output ceased when
the CC&S warm-up command was re-
leased at the Test Console (Unit 18);
and
• The emergency telemetry amplitude was
approximately 50 percent below normal.
Performance during the second test was nor-
mal. After the Ranger VI mission, the Sub-
system was packed and shipped from JPL to
RCA for modification on March 2, 1964. A
chronological listing of tests performed on
FM III-3 at JPL is given in Table 60.
3. Modified Flight Model 111-3 Tests at RCA
(August 10 through October 17, 1964)
The testing and checkout of Modified FM III-3
commenced on August 10, 1964 and was com-
pleted on October 17, 1964. The testing cycle
verified the satisfactory operation of the TV
Subsystem. Table 61 lists the testing per-
formed on Modified FM III-3 at RCA.
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During the initial power application and check-
out, the TV Subsystem performed satisfac-
torily; the only problem occurred when the
Subsystem failed to turn off in response to an
RTC-5 command. The cause was found to be
a faulty turn-off circuit in the CCU. A Sub-
system test was then performed to verify the
overall operation of the integrated TV Sub-
system before environmental testing. The
vibration test cycle was preceded by an elec-
trical verification test that was normal in all
respects, as was the test run made after the
vibration testing.
The TV Subsystem was exercised through
four thermal-vacuum test cycles because a
series of problems arose during thetests. The
operation of the TV Subsystem during the first
thermal-vacuum test cycle showed low-power
output from the communications equipment
and a defocusing of the partial-scan cameras.
These problems were corrected and a second
test cycle was performed. The results of the
second test cycle did not show any improve-
ment in the operation of the P-scan cameras;
Cameras P2 and P3 were then removed and
refocused. A third test cycle was performed
to determine the extent of defocusing caused
by operation at different temperatures and
pressures. An additional refocusing of the
cameras took place following the third thermal-
vacuum test cycle and a fourth cycle was per-
formed to verify the refocusing techniques
employed. As a result of camera defoeusing,
a thorough study was initiated to investigate
the cause of this problem. The problem was
caused by a changing index of refraction inthe
environment surrounding the lenses. Compen-
sation was made for this difference by revised
focusing techniques. The data recorded during
the test indicated that the Subsystem operated
normally in all respects. Outdoor pictures
were taken as an additional verification of the
camera characteristics, particularly resolu-
tion. Camera performance was satisfactory.
The preshipment electrical test was repeated
three times before normal operation of the
TV Subsystem was acquired. The initial run
was terminated when a loss of video in the
F b camera occurred; investigation revealed
that a short circuit existed on the G2 regu-
lator output. In the second test, a review of
the telemetry data indicated an abnormality in
the G1 regulator of the F b Camera; a shorted
transistor in the telemetry circuit was dis-
covered to be the cause. This component was
replaced as were other components electrically
overstressed by the short-circuit condition.
A third test run was made and although opera-
tion appeared to be normal, the video tape
recorder did not record and the test was voided.
All operations were analyzed and indicated
the fourth test run to be normal. Following
the four preshipment electrical tests, the
Flight Model III-3 TV Subsystem was shipped
from RCA on October 17, 1964 and arrived
at JPL on October 18, 1964.
4. Modified Flight Model 111o3Tests at JPL and
ETR (October 19, 1964 through February
17, 1965)
Tests were performed at JPL to verify the
performance of the electronic equipment in
the TV Subsystem and the electrical integrity
of the TV Subsystem integrated with the space-
craft Bus. These tests were designed to verify
the satisfactory operation of the TV Subsystem
in ambient, simulated-launch, and simulated-
flight (space} environments. The test program
also verified the procedures and operational
readiness of the operational support equipment
used to check out the integrated Ranger Space-
craft prior to launch. The ETR test program
consisted of checkout and test of the TV Sub-
system integrated with the Spacecraft Bus in
the Spacecraft Checkout Facility (SCF} Hangar
AO, operations in the Explosive-Safe Facility
(ESF), and operations on the launch pad in
conjunction with the Atlas/Agena launch ve-
hicles. The purpose of the prelaunch testing
at ETR was: to reaffirm the operational readi-
ness of the TV Subsystem when integrated
with the Spacecraft Bus; to ensure that all
Subsystems of the Ranger VIH Spacecraft
207
were compatible with the launch vehicle; and
to ensure that all Subsystems of the Ranger
VIII Spacecraft were in a "go" condition at
the time of launch. These tests also provided
the opportunity to verify launch procedures
and to increase the proficiency of operating
personnel, thus ensuring smooth launch op-
erations. The results of all the tests were
normal, and only minor problems were en-
countered during the testing of Modified Flight
Model III-3. The tests performed at JPL are
listed in Table 62, and the tests performed
at ETR are listed in Table 63. The Ranger
VIII Spacecraft was launched at 12:05:00 GMT
on February 17, 1965.
H. FLIGHT MODEL 111-4
1. Flight Model 111-4 Tests at RCA (January
19 through February 1, 1964)
Camera-performance calibration for Flight
Model HI-4 was completed on January 19,
1964. The first Subsystem test was performed
and satisfactory operation of the Subsystem
was verified. However, the start of environ-
mental testing was delayed to perform adjust-
ments that resulted in refinements of the
camera picture quality.
During this period, the output of telemetry
point 57 of the 90-point telemetry was ob-
served to be zero instead of the normal 4.7
volts for the Command Switch in the ZERO
position. The problem was traced to a wire
within the Command Switch which had shorted
to one of its mounting screws; this condition
was subsequently corrected.
The vibration test was conducted and subse-
quent command checkout tests performed be-
fore and after the vibration tests; these
checkout tests proved there was no electrical
or mechanical degradation of FM III-4 due to
the vibration testing.
During thermal-vacuum tests, the 90-point
commutator was causing noise in the output
from the 225-kc VCO. The faulty commutator
was replaced and normal operation was re-
stored. Also, during the terminal-mode op-
eration of the thermal-balance test the voltage
of the P-Battery dropped to 30.45 volts and
the P-Channel was turned off; the F-Channel
also ceased to provide any detectable RF
output at T + 49 minutes and 30 seconds. The
cause of the malfunction of the F-Channel
was a short in the +100-volt circuit of the
transmitter power supply. Thermal-vacuum
testing was discontinued pending results of
the Ranger VI investigation. The Subsystem
was placed in a container in the integration
area awaiting rescheduling and modifications
prior to future testing. The summary of tests
performed on Flight Model III-4 is given in
Table 64.
2. Modified Flight Model 111-4 Tests at RCA
(October 1 through December 2, 1964)
The testing and checkout of the Modified Flight
Model IH-4 commenced on October 1, 1964
and was completed on December 2, 1964. This
cycle verified the satisfactory operation of
the Modified FM III-4 and it was shipped to
JPL on December 3, 1964. Table 65 lists the
testing performed on the Modified FM HI-4 at
RCA.
An initial power application and checkout was
performed on the power and command cir-
cuits of Flight Model HI-4. The order of the
testing varied in sequence because the cam-
eras were not available at the start of the
testing. The overall results of the tests were
satisfactory except as follows.
Pl Camera met performance specifica-
tions; however, it exhibited horizontal
sync pulses that were lower in ampli-
tude and shorter in duration than the
sync pulses of the other P-scan
cameras.
Three base-ring connectors (30J1, 30J2,
and 30J9) were not grounded to the
frame; the situation was corrected by
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removing the insulating material and
making a proper ground connection.
The Subsystem test was performed prior to
thermal-vacuum testing and the overall re-
sults were satisfactory and verified; the re-
quirement to perform a vibration test at RCA
on the Ranger IX TV Subsystem (Flight Model
III-4) was waived by JPL. The thermal-vacuum
test consisted only of simulated mission
testing.
The investigation of the camera-defocusing
problem during thermal-vacuum testing was
corrected by offsetting the vidicon to account
for index-of-refraction differences between
ambient and vacuum condition.
During the Clock Command test, F-Channel
did not turn on as expected; an investigation
revealed that the SCR gates had not been en-
abled by the console operator. After the
Cruise-On push button was depressed, the
next Clock pulse turned on F-Channel as
expected. The remaining portions of the
thermal-vacuum tests were p e r f o r m e d
successfully.
The Ranger TV Subsystem was given a com-
plete Subsystem acceptance test for JPL ap-
proval. Data derived from this test indicated
normal and satisfactory operation of the en-
tire Subsystem. The preshipment electrical
test prior to delivery to JPL was performed
successfully with no malfunctions observed.
The TV Subsystem was shipped to JPL on
December 3, 1964.
3. Modified Flight Model 111-4 at JPL and ETR
(December 5, 1964 through March 21,
1965}
The tests performed at JPL on Modified FM
III-4 were designed to verify the performance
of the electronic equipment in the TV Subsys-
tem and the electrical integrity of the TV
Subsystem when integrated with the Spacecraft
Bus. These tests were designed to verify the
satisfactory operation of the TV Subsystem in
ambient, simulated-launch, and simulated-
flight (space} environments. The test program
also served to verify the procedures and op-
erational readiness of the operational support
equipment used to check out the integrated
spacecraft prior to launch. The test program
of Flight Model III-4 at JPL is summarized
in Table 66.
Following the preshipment electrical test on
February 11, 1965, Flight Model III-4 TV
Subsystem was shipped from JPL on February
18, 1965, and arrived at the Eastern Test
Range (ETR) on February 22, 1965. The test
program at ETR commenced on February 23,
1965, with the postshipment electrical test,
and terminated with the launch on March 21,
1965. A summary of the tests performed on
Flight Model III-4 at ETR is presented in
Table 67.
The ETR test program consisted of checkout
and test of the TV Subsystem integrated with
the Spacecraft Bus in the Spacecraft Checkout
Facility (SCF) Hangar AO, operations in the
Explosive-Safe Facility (ESF), and operations
on the launch pad in conjunction with the Atlas
and Agena launch vehicles. The purpose of the
prelaunch testing at ETR was to reaffirm the
operational readiness of the TV Subsystem
integrated with the Spacecraft Bus; to ensure
that all Subsystems of the Ranger IX Spacecraft
were compatible with the launch vehicle; and
to ensure that all Subsystems of the Ranger IX
Spacecraft were in a "go" condition at the time
of launch. These tests also provided the op-
portunity to verify launch procedures and in-
crease the proficiency of operating personnel
to ensure smooth launch operations. The re-
sults of all the tests were normal, and only
minor problems were encountered during the
testing of Modified Flight Model III-4. The
Ranger IX Spacecraft was launched at 16:37:00
GMT on March 21, 1965.
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